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Distributed reactive systems consisting of classes of behaviorally similar interacting
processes arise in various application domains such as telecommunication, avionics
and automotive control. For instance, a telecommunication network with thousands
of interacting phones (constituting a phone class), or a controller managing hundreds
of clients requiring latest weather information in an air-traffic control system. Various
existing modeling notations, such as those included in the UML standard (e.g. State-
machines and Sequence diagrams), are not well equipped for requirements modeling of
such systems, since they assume a fixed number of processes in the system. Moreover,
in the behavioral analysis of requirements modeled using these notations (a) various
processes are dealt with in a concrete manner leading to scalability issues, and (b)
the inter-class associations are often not taken into account.
Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) and its variants such as UML Sequence-diagrams
are popular notations for modeling scenario-based requirements, capturing interac-
tions among various processes in the system. In this thesis, we develop two UML-like
executable modeling notations based on MSCs for parameterized validation of dis-
tributed reactive systems consisting of classes of interacting processes. These nota-
tions are– (i) Interacting Process Classes (IPC), and (ii) Symbolic Message Sequence
Charts (SMSC), respectively. We propose an abstract execution semantics for both
these notations, where we dynamically group together objects at runtime that will
have similar future behaviors. We also capture static and dynamic association links
between objects, and use class diagrams in a standard way to specify binary inter-
class associations. Finally, we study automated test-generation techniques from our
x ABSTRACT
modeling notations. The test-cases generated from our MSC-based models provide a
crucial link by enabling testing of final implementation with respect to the original
requirements.
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In recent years, the use of model-based techniques for system design and development
has gained wide acceptance and seen increased usage. The popularity of Model Driven
Architecture from the Object Management Group (OMG) [87], various model-driven
development tools such as those from IBM (Telelogic [110] and Rational [95]), and
open-source initiatives such as Eclipse Modeling Framework [33], strongly indicate a
growing trend towards model-driven development.
The key idea behind the model driven system development is a clear separation of
business and application logic from the underlying platform technologies. Specifically,
the Model Driven Architecture (MDA) distinguishes between two kinds of models– (i)
Platform Independent Models (or PIMs), capturing the system description free from
the details of the underlying platform, and (ii) Platform Specific Models (or PSMs),
which include various implementation specific details in addition to the functionality
4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
captured by PIMs. This separation of concerns immediately offers several advantages.
First of all, the system description captured by PIMs being independent of specific
implementation details, can be reused across various implementation platforms. This
results in a long lasting intellectual property, while the underlying technology keeps
rapidly evolving. Further, PIMs are generally specified using open standard notations
such as UML [77], and are therefore vendor neutral, thus allowing for easy migration
across technologies. However, that is not all; the use of model based techniques
offers various other advantages. Besides serving as initial design documents, system
models are used for — (semi-) automated code generation for obtaining a system
implementation (e.g. [100]), validation of functional and non-functional requirements
through simulation, testing, model-checking etc. (e.g. [69]), and automated model-
based test generation for testing system implementations derived separately from the
same requirements (e.g. [20]).
Various modeling notations used in model-driven system development can be
broadly classified based on– (i) whether they are visual (e.g. Statecharts [48], Message
Sequence Charts [62]) or textual (e.g. CCS [78], Z-notation [121]), and (ii) whether
they specify system behavior (e.g. Statecharts) or structure (e.g. Class-diagrams).
In this work, our focus is on the use of UML-like behavioral modeling notations for
modeling and parameterized validation of distributed systems requirements.
1.1. THE PROBLEM ADDRESSED IN THIS WORK 5
1.1 The Problem Addressed in this work
Distributed reactive systems consisting of classes of behaviorally similar interacting
processes arise in various application domains such as telecommunication, avionics
and automotive control. For instance, a telecommunication network with thousands
of interacting phones (constituting a phone class), or a controller managing hundreds
of clients requiring latest weather information in an air-traffic control system. The ini-
tial requirements for such systems generally focus on specifying various inter-process
interaction scenarios among system processes, and abstract away from the local com-
putations. Further, at the time of laying out the initial requirements, it is often
unnatural to fix or, specify an upper bound on the number of processes of various
types (e.g. number of phones in a telecommunication network) in the system. Such
systems can also be characterized as parameterized systems, the parameter being the
number of processes in various classes, while the behavior of each class is specified
using a finite state machine. These are well studied in the domain of automated
verification (e.g. [28, 91]).
We find that various existing modeling notations, such as those included in the
UML standard (e.g. State-machines and Sequence diagrams), are not well equipped
for requirements modeling of such systems, since they assume a fixed number of
processes in the system. Hence, while constructing a requirements model using the
existing notations, number of processes of various types need to be fixed artificially.
This has several drawbacks–
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• Problems with validation: For a requirements model obtained by artificially
fixing the number of processes in various classes, in general, it cannot be guar-
anteed to exhibit all possible system behaviors (when a sufficiently large number
of objects are present). Hence, any validation (are we building the right prod-
uct) or verification (are we building the product right) results obtained for the
restricted system cannot be guaranteed to hold for all implementations of the
given system in general.
• Remodeling: For different object configurations (differing in the number of ob-
jects of various types), separate requirements models need to be obtained in
most of the cases. Besides the remodeling effort, various analyses, test genera-
tion etc. done over the existing models, may have to be repeated for any newly
constructed models. Clearly, this leads to a lot of wasted effort.
• Scalability: As the number of objects of various process types is increased in
the system, requirements models may become large and complex, and hence,
difficult to maintain and update. For example, in case of Message Sequence
Charts [62], each process in the system is represented individually. Further,
though various notations provide modeling at the level of classes instead of
individual processes (e.g. Statecharts [48], Live Sequence Charts [27]), their
execution semantics is still concrete. This means, that during the execution of
requirements models obtained using these notations, various objects and their
states in the system are represented individually. Thus, modeling/execution of
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system requirements with a large number of objects may easily become error-
prone or inefficient, severely limiting the use of model based techniques in such
cases.
Finally, we observe that inter-class associations, which form an integral part of
any object-oriented system description, often do not play an explicit role in the re-
quirements modeling and behavioral analysis of such systems. Since, associations
constitute a key factor in determining static and/or dynamic communication struc-
ture of a distributed reactive system, we find that it is important to involve them
explicitly in the requirements modeling and their analysis.
1.2 Solution Proposed in this dissertation
Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) [62] is a popular visual notation for modeling the
scenario based requirements, capturing interactions among various processes in the
system. In this thesis, we develop two executableMSC based notations for parameter-
ized requirements modeling and validation of distributed reactive systems consisting
of classes of interacting processes.
In the modeling frameworks that we develop, we impose no restrictions on the
number of objects a process class may have. In case, the requirements document does
not specify the number of objects for a class, say p, we allow p to have an unbounded
number of objects (represented as ω). While modeling the requirements themselves,
we do not refer to individual objects of various classes. Instead, we specify the class
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and constraints for selecting a subset of objects from that class, to participate in a
given event (or a set of events appearing along a lifeline in a MSC). In our setting,
the constraints for selecting objects to participate in various event(s) may consist
of one or more of the following– (i) a boolean guard regarding the valuation of an
object’s variables, (ii) a history-based guard over the past event-execution history of
an object, and (iii) a constraint regarding an object’s association links (with other
participating objects).
Thus, a requirements model in our framework may consist of a large or, even an
unbounded number of objects in various process classes. If the execution semantics
of such systems maintains the local state of each object, this will lead to an imprac-
tical blow-up during execution. Instead, we propose an abstract execution semantics,
where we dynamically group together objects at runtime that will have similar future
behaviors. While doing so, we keep track of only the number of objects in each equiv-
alence class and not their identities. This results in considerable time and memory
efficiency of our simulators.
We also capture static and dynamic association links between objects, and use
class diagrams in a standard way to specify binary inter-class associations. Structural
constraints imposed by the system are naturally captured via static associations. For
instance, a node may be able to take part in a “transmit” transaction only with
nodes with which it has a “neighbor-of” association. Dynamic associations on the
other hand are needed to guarantee that proper combinations of objects take part in
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a transaction. For instance, when choosing a pair of phone objects to take part in a
“disconnect” transaction, we may have to choose a pair which is currently in the “con-
nected” relation. This relation has presumably arisen due to the fact that they took
part last in a “connect” transaction. The combination of these features together with
the imperative to develop an abstract execution semantics is a challenging task. We
note that this issue does not arise in parameterized verification, since no associations
are maintained there.
1.3 Contributions of this thesis
Modeling notations. We develop two modeling frameworks, where one can
efficiently simulate and validate a system with an arbitrary number of active
objects, such as a telephone switch network with thousands of phones, an air
traffic controller with hundreds of clients etc. The first modeling notation of
Interacting Process Classes [41, 44] uses labeled transition systems to describe
intra-process control flow of various classes in the system description, while
using a high-level notion of transactions to capture interactions among various
process classes. In our setting we use Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) [62] to
capture transactions, since they form a natural candidate for describing inter-
process interactions and are also widely used. The second notation of Symbolic
Message Sequence Charts [101] is a light-weight extension of the MSC notation.
While, in the case of MSCs, a lifeline can represent only a concrete object,
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SMSCs introduce the concept of a symbolic lifeline. Instead of representing a
single object, a symbolic lifeline in a SMSC represents a collection of objects
from a class. During execution, a set of objects to execute an event occurring
along a SMSC lifeline is dynamically chosen based on the event guard.
Maintaining associations in abstract setting. our abstract execution se-
mantics (for both IPC and SMSC notations) do not maintain the identity or
state of an individual object at runtime. Thus, challenges arise if static and/or
dynamic association links need to be maintained between various objects at
runtime. We address this issue by maintaining over-approximate association in-
formation at runtime, where we maintain links between groups of objects, with
each object-group specifying an object state and number of objects currently
in that state. Though maintaining over-approximate association information
preserves all valid system behaviors, it may give rise to spurious behaviors.
Test-case generation. Finally, we note that the distributed system require-
ments highlighting inter-process interactions are more closely reflected in the
scenario-based models such as MSCs. Given the effort involved in deriving a
system implementation, it is likely to deviate from the requirements and con-
tain errors. Thus, test-cases generated from scenario-based models can provide
a crucial link by enabling testing of final implementation with respect to the
original requirements [45]. We study test-generation from our modeling nota-
tions which are scenario-based [43].
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1.4 Organization of the Thesis
In the following chapter we present a discussion of the related work, also comparing
our work with the existing literature. In Chapter 3, we discuss in detail our modeling
notation of Interacting Process Classes (IPC), while the notation of Symbolic Message
Sequence Charts (SMSCs) is discussed in Chapter 4. Besides presenting the syntax
and abstract execution of semantics of the IPC and SMSC notations, the maintenance
of association links in the abstract setting is also discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. In
Chapter 5 we take a look at some of the key differences between IPC and SMSC
notations. From Chapter 6 onwards we study model-based test case generation.
While, Chapter 6 covers the related work, automated generation of test-cases from our
IPC and SMSC models is described in detail in Chapters 7 and 8, respectively. Finally,
concluding remarks appear in Chapter 9, along with a discussion on extensions and







The use of behavioral modeling notations for requirements specification and validation
of complex reactive systems is an important area of research. Use of such models
during the early phases of system development forms an easy and more sound basis
of communication among stake-holders, system designers and end users. Moreover,
such specifications can be used for requirements simulation and validation. This can
provide the user with an early feedback and help detect various design errors in early
stages of system design.
We can broadly categorize various behavioral modeling notations into the fol-
lowing two categories: a) Intra-object (or state-based) notations, or b) Inter-object
(or scenario-based) notations. The state-based notations specify the control flow of
various classes of objects in a system description using finite state machine represen-
tations such as Statecharts [49]. The scenario-based notations, such as, Live Sequence
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Charts [27] and Triggered Message Sequence Charts [106], are used to specify various
interaction scenarios between system processes. There has also been work on using
a combination of state-based and scenario-based notations, where the control flow
for various processes is specified using labeled transition systems and the inter-object
interactions are specified using Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) [103]. All these
approaches deal with concrete objects and their interactions.
2.1 State-based models
Some of the widely used executable state-based notations in the design and analy-
sis of reactive systems are Statecharts [48], Specification and Description Language
(SDL) [2], and Petri-nets [97]. Statecharts provide a hierarchical state-based behavior
description mechanism, allowing user to specify both concurrent (using AND-states)
and sequential (using OR-states) behavior of a process. The execution of system is
event-driven. A transition between two states is generally triggered by an external
event (from the environment), or by a message sent by another process in the system.
There are a number of design methodologies based on some variant of Statecharts, as
exemplified in the commercial tools such as Rhapsody and RoseRT [100, 95].
A Specification and Description Language (SDL) system description consists of
concurrent processes described using notation similar to the extended finite state ma-
chines, and communicating via signal (or message) exchange over FIFO channels. The
following ITU standard [61] provides a formal syntax and semantics for SDL, support-
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ing both textual as well as graphical specification of SDL models. The Telelogic SDL
Suite [3] from IBM is a commercial tool offering a SDL-based design methodology for
real-time communication systems. The tool supports visual modeling of SDL designs,
their simulation, and automated code generation.
Petri-nets are a graphical and mathematical modeling tool, most commonly used
for the description of concurrent distributed systems, and their analysis. A petri-net
description consists of places and transitions, with input-arcs connecting places to
transitions and output-arcs connecting transitions to places. Places generally repre-
sent process states, while transitions represent concurrent activities in which one or
more processes participate together. A transition is enabled for execution if there are
enough tokens (representing processes) in all the places connected to the given tran-
sition via input arcs. Several tools supporting petri-nets based modeling and analysis
are available (see [90]). Colored Petri Nets (CPN) [65] extend the capability of or-
dinary Petri nets with the strengths of a high-level programming language, making
them suitable for modeling large systems. While Petri nets provide the primitives
for process interaction, the programming language features enable definition of new
data types and manipulation of data values. We note that CPN can also be used
to compactly model the system requirements we target. However, they lack sym-
bolic behavioral techniques that we develop and do not explicitly cater for inter-class
associations.
There has also been work on using a combination of state-based and scenario-
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based notations, where the control flow for various processes is specified using labeled
transition sys- tems and the inter-object interactions are specified using Message
Sequence Charts (MSCs) [103].
Various design methodologies based on above notations do not provide an abstract
execution semantics1, which can facilitate scalable and efficient model-based simula-
tion and validation of systems consisting of classes with a large (or even unbounded)
number of objects. Further, inter-process interactions are specified at a fairly low
level of granularity, typically a single message send/receive. Both our notations of
Interacting Process Classes (IPC) and Symbolic Message Sequence Charts (SMSC),
which we discuss in this thesis, support an abstract execution semantics, allowing
for validation of distributed reactive systems consisting of a large number of behav-
iorally similar processes. The IPC is an object-oriented extension of the work in [103],
and is a state-based notation (unlike SMSCs, which are purely scenario-based). The
IPC notation allows inter-process interactions to be described at a fairly high-level of
granularity, e.g. using Message Sequence Charts (MSCs).
The new standard UML 2.0 advocates the use of “structured classes” where in-
teraction relationships between the sub-classes can be captured via entities such as
ports/interfaces; Our present frameworks do not cater for structured classes but it
can easily accommodate notions such as ports/interfaces.
Here, we also mention various programming frameworks, such as Lustre and Es-
1Note that, in this work we only consider process abstraction– grouping together of behaviorally
similar processes, and do not consider data abstraction over process variables.
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terel2, specifically targeted towards development of reactive control systems. How-
ever, they are more useful in the later stages of system development, when require-
ments have stabilized and focus is on obtaining the system implementation. Fur-
ther, these frameworks assume the perfect synchrony hypothesis, where the compu-
tation/communication for processing all events that occur within one clock tick hap-
pen instantaneously. In our case, we do not make any such assumptions regarding
computations or, communication among processes. We target a more high-level ini-
tial system requirements, focusing on inter-process interaction protocols, rather than
computational aspects (e.g. computing output signals in response to input signals).
2.2 Scenario-based Models
The distributed system requirements generally focus on specifying inter-process in-
teractions and abstract away from the local computations, and are therefore more
naturally captured using scenario-based notations such as Message Sequence Charts
(MSCs) [62]. Examples of such requirements are often found in practice, for instance–
• Requirements document for Center-TRACON Automation System (or, CTAS)
[1]. CTAS is a control system aiding in management of arrival air-traffic at busy
airports (discussed in Section 4.2).
• Media Oriented Systems Transport (or, MOST) [79], a multimedia and info-
2http://www.esterel-technologies.com/




Figure 2-1: An example MSC.
tainment networking standard for the automotive industry (discussed in Sec-
tion 7.1). One of the specification documents, namely the ‘MOST dynamic
specification’, contains the scenario based requirements for this standard.
The simplest form of MSC specification consists of a basicMSC (or bMSC), repre-
senting a single interaction scenario among a finite set of processes. Various processes
participating in a bMSC are represented as vertical lines (called lifelines), which ex-
change messages among themselves and may also participate in local computation
actions [62]. In the following, we refer to a bMSC simply as MSC. A message ex-
changed between two lifelines in a MSC is represented by a horizontal or a downward
sloping arrow, from the sending process to the receiving process. An example of
a MSC is shown in Figure 2-1. It represents two processes p and q, exchanging a
message m (from p to q). Further, process q participates in a local action a.
While an MSC represents a single execution scenario of the system, more complete
system descriptions can be obtained in the form of High-level Message Sequence
Charts (HMSCs). An HMSC is a directed graph, whose nodes are labeled with other
(H)MSCs with a finite level of nesting. Various HMSC nodes can be flattened out
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such that, each node simply corresponds to an MSC — the resulting structure is also
referred to as Message Sequence Graph (MSG). In our discussions, we assume HMSC
to be a flattened structure. Further, an HMSC has a unique start node, with a subset
of its nodes designated as final nodes. A path from the start node to a final node
in an HMSC represents an accepting path. The MSC corresponding to an accepting
path in a HMSC [7] represents a valid run of the system.
Other extensions to HMSC notation, namely Compositional Message Sequence
Charts [47] and Causal Message Sequence Charts [37], have also been studied. Both
these notations improve the expressive power of HMSCs by allowing specification of
MSC protocols which cannot be specified using HMSCs.
2.2.1 Analysis of MSC Specifications
The MSCs are equipped with a formal execution semantics [98], and can be subjected
to various analyses such as detecting race conditions and timing conflicts [7], detecting
non-local choice and process divergence [15], and model checking [8]. Race conditions
in an MSC can exist when the visual event ordering described in the MSC may be
violated at runtime due to the underlying communication architecture. For example,
two messages sent by the same process to another process may not arrive in order, if
the underlying communication is not FIFO. In [7], an MSC analyzer is presented for
detecting such conflicts, given an underlying communication architecture. The non-
local branching choice intuitively refers to the inability of the processes to locally make
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a (globally) consistent choice regarding which branch to pursue at a branching node
in an HMSC specification. This leads to problems in directly obtaining a distributed
implementation from an HMSC. Process divergence, on the other hand, refers to the
possibility of a process making unbounded progress relative to other processes in a
given HMSC. In [15], authors give syntax-based analysis algorithms for detecting both
non-local choice and process-divergence. Model-checking HMSC specifications refers
to validating them against properties that may be described using logics (e.g. Linear
Temporal Logic [23]), as automata, or as HMSCs. Model-checking HMSCs in general
is shown to be undecidable, whereas it is decidable for the bounded subclass of HMSCs
[8]. Consequently, model-checking has been studied for other subclasses of HMSCs
where it becomes decidable (e.g. [38]).
We note that various decidability results for MSCs also apply to our notation of
SMSCs (discussed in Chapter 4), which is an extension of the MSC notation.
2.2.2 Realizability and Implied Scenarios
An HMSC specification is said to be realizable (or, implementable), if there exists a
distributed implementation that generates precisely the specification behaviors [6].
Since, the ultimate goal is to obtain a system implementation satisfying the given
requirements, the synthesis of MSCs has been widely studied, for example, as Stat-
echarts [71, 119] or Communicating Finite State Machines (CFSMs) [6, 81, 38]. A
different approach in this direction is the work on Netcharts [82], which are a visual
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formalism for specifying collections of MSCs, similar to HMSCs. However, unlike
HMSCs where control of processes is specified at a global level, Netcharts specify
distributed process control. This leads to a more natural and direct translation of
Netcharts into Communicating Finite State Machines. Further, Netcharts are more
expressive than HMSCs, in the sense that they can specify all regular MSC languages
[53], unlike HMSCs, which can only describe finitely-generated regular MSC lan-
guages. The above notion of regularity is studied for MSCs, since it directly relates
to their realizability by means of bounded message passing automata.
However, implementations obtained from the HMSC specifications may give rise
to additional behaviors, which are not present in the original scenario specification.
These behaviors are referred to as implied-scenarios [114, 6], which mainly arise be-
cause various components have a local view of system behavior, and may not make
globally consistent decisions (as per HMSC specification). An implied scenario may
be desirable, i.e. an acceptable scenario has been overlooked and needs to be incorpo-
rated in the system specification, or undesirable, representing unacceptable behavior.
An approach for detecting implied scenario is presented in [114]. A distinction be-
tween “positive” and “negative” implied scenarios is made in [115]. If a detected
implied scenario corresponds to a negative scenario specified with the requirements,
then it is not reported (as user is already aware of its presence). For a reported
implied scenario, user classifies it as either positive or negative, accordingly updating
the requirements model to eliminate the implied scenarios.
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In our case, since we are adding to the expressive power of MSCs in our notation
of SMSCs, various issues regarding realizability of HMSCs and existence of implied
scenarios also extend to SMSCs. However, in the current work we do not investigate
implementation of SMSC based specifications.
2.2.3 Scalability of MSC Specifications
The MSC language offers two constructs for dealing with the problem of voluminous
scenarios involving several instances and events: gates and instance decomposition.
The first option allows a message to be split into two parts, with the message send in
one scenario, and the corresponding receive in another scenario, implicitly joined by
a gate. The second option allows an instance in one MSC to be decomposed into a
collection of instances, whose behavior is depicted in another MSC. These are useful
approaches for decomposing a large specification into tractable pieces; however, their
focus is on structural changes to scenarios rather than behavioral abstractions (which
we develop for our notation of SMSCs in Chapter 4), and thus such approaches only
partially address the MSC scalability problems that allow similar interaction patterns
to be concisely represented as in SMSCs. Note that in the conventional usage of MSCs,
conditions can appear in the MSC syntax. However, there is no attempt to integrate
the conditions into the execution semantics of MSCs [98]. On the other hand, we
introduce event guards in SMSCs, which not only refer to conditions on variables
of concrete objects, but also serve as an object selector from a collection of objects
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during execution.
2.2.4 Other Notations
In recent years, a number of MSC variants have been proposed (e.g. [18, 106, 27, 115]).
Of these, Live Sequence Charts (LSCs) and Triggered MSCs (TMSCs) are equipped
with an execution semantics [52, 21]. The notation of Live Sequence Charts (LSCs)
[27, 51] offers an MSC-based inter-object modeling and simulation framework for
reactive systems. LSCs describe system behavior by prescribing existential and uni-
versal temporal properties that the overall system interactions should obey, rather
than giving a per-process state machine. Consequently, the control flow information
pertaining to individual processes is completely suppressed in LSCs. More impor-
tantly, we note that in the LSC framework, though the objects of a process class can
be specified symbolically, the execution mechanism (the play-engine as described in
[51]) does not support abstract execution. The symbolic instances must be instanti-
ated to concrete objects during simulation. The approach taken in [117] maintains
constraints on concrete process identities to alleviate this problem of LSCs. However,
it falls short of fully symbolic execution (as in this paper where no process identities
are maintained), and also requires additional annotations about process identities
in the LSC specification. In the case of two modeling notations –IPC and SMSC–
that we present in this thesis, we do not maintain any process identifiers, leading
to a full symbolic execution semantics. Also, the work on Triggered Message Se-
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quence Charts [106] allows for a non-centralized execution semantics, in comparison
to the play-engine of LSCs. However, the TMSC language supports neither symbolic
specifications nor abstract execution of process classes.
2.3 Parameterized System Verification
In this thesis, we deal with distributed systems consisting of classes of interacting pro-
cesses, where a class may contain unboundedly many processes. The family of systems
with many concurrent processes of the same type, are also known as parameterized
systems. Such systems have mainly been studied in the context of parameterized
verification (e.g. [24]).
Verification of parameterized systems is known to be undecidable [10], and two
distinct approaches are considered to address this problem. We either look for re-
stricted subsets of parameterized systems for which the verification problem becomes
decidable, or we look for sound but not necessarily complete methods.
The first approach tries to identify a restricted subset of parameterized systems
and temporal properties, such that if a property holds for a system with up to a
certain number of processes, then it holds for every number of processes in the system.
Moreover, the verification for the reduced system can be accomplished by model
checking. Systems that are verified with this approach include systems with a single
controller and arbitrary number of user processes [39], rings with arbitrary number
of processes communicating by passing tokens [32, 31], systems formed by composing
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an arbitrary number of identical processes in parallel [60], and systems formed by
unbounded processes of several process types where the communication mechanism
between the processes is restricted to conjunctive / disjunctive transition guards [30].
The sound but incomplete approaches include methods based on synthesis of in-
visible invariant (e.g., [9]) which can be viewed as a combination of assertion synthesis
techniques with abstraction for verification; methods based on network invariant (e.g.,
[75]) that relies on the effectiveness of a generated invariant and the invariant refine-
ment techniques; regular model checking [66, 99] that requires acceleration techniques.
Compositional proof methods have been studied in [14], while explicit induction based
proof methods for parameterized families have been discussed in [102].
The abstract execution semantics that we develop for our IPC and SMSC modeling
notations in this thesis, involve grouping together active objects at runtime into
equivalence classes. This approach is related to counter abstraction schemes developed
for grouping processes in parameterized systems (e.g., see [28, 91]). In such systems,
there are usually unboundedly many processes whose behavior can be captured by a
single finite state machine or an extended finite state machine. It is then customary
to maintain the count of number of processes in each state of the finite state machine;
the names/identities of the individual processes are not maintained. For instance,
in [91] a concrete system consisting of n > 1 identical processes is abstracted into a
finite state system in which for each local state, the process count can be either 0, 1
or 2. The count of 0(1) indicates currently zero(single) process in the corresponding
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state, while count of 2 indicates 2 or more processes in a state. In our abstract
execution semantics for IPC and SMSC, we also abstract away process identities, and
maintain only the count of objects in each execution state at runtime. Further, for
a class p with unboundedly many objects, a cutoff number cp is used such that the
count of objects in a p-state can be a fixed number belonging to [0, cp], or it can
be ω– representing cp + 1 or more objects of class p. Note that, this is similar to
the count-abstraction for parameterized systems as described above (with cp = 1).
However, in our setting, currently we do not employ our abstract execution semantics
for the purpose of parameterized verification. Rather, the focus is on parameterized
requirements modeling, validation and test-case generation for distributed systems
consisting of interacting classes. Additionally, in our setting inter-object associations
across classes have to be maintained — an issue that does not arise in parameterized
system verification. This indeed is one of the key technical challenges in our work:
How does one capture the information, say, “an object i is linked via some association
asc to an object j” when we do not maintain object identities in our abstract execution
semantics?
2.4 Model Checking and Data Abstraction
There are several works which employ data abstraction techniques for the purpose
of model checking [25, 54, 22]. The main aim is to reduce the state space of a
given system-model in order to make model checking tractable. In these approaches,
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various data types are replaced with smaller-sized types, thus obtaining an abstract
model of the system in terms of behaviors, which is generally an over-approximation
of the original system. Such an abstraction preserves the correctness of properties, in
the sense that, a property proven correct for the abstract model, also holds for the
original model. In our present work, we only abstract away the process identities and
dynamically group together various processes having identical states during run-time
(a form of control abstraction [68]). Thus, currently we do not abstract away any
other data types; but it can be easily integrated in to our framework.
2.5 The Semantics of a Class
Finally, we note that both the formalisms proposed in this thesis –Interacting Process
Classes (IPC) and Symbolic Message Sequence Charts (SMSCs)– support object-
oriented modeling of requirements. Hence, a specification in either of these two no-
tations consists of a finite set of classes, whose instances (commonly referred to as
processes in our work) constitute the interacting entities.
In general, two types of semantics are associated with a class in the object-oriented
setting– value-based, or reference-based [107]. In the case of value semantics, a class
is denoted by a set of values, where each value in such a set corresponds to an object
of the class at some stage of its evolution. While, in the case of reference semantics,
a class is denoted by a set of references to values (denoting objects). In our present
work, we assume value semantics for various process-classes in a specification.
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Chapter 3
Interacting Process Classes (IPC)
The notation of Interacting Process Classes (IPC) [41, 44] uses labeled transition
systems to describe the behavior of classes of interacting objects. However, the unit
of interaction rather than just being a message exchange between a process pair, may
involve more than two participants. Further, an interaction unit can describe an
abstraction of a protocol that involves bidirectional flow of signals and data between
the objects taking part in the interaction. In our operational semantics, this unit of
interaction, called a transaction, is executed in an atomic fashion. For illustrative
purposes however, we use the notation of Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) to refine
the transactions.
We develop the IPC modeling language in two steps. First we present the core
modeling language without associations and develop its concrete execution semantics.
We then formulate our abstract execution semantics. As a second step, we introduce
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(static and dynamic) object associations and correspondingly extend the semantics.
Further, we establish results relating the concrete semantics to the abstract semantics.
Finally, we present experimental results demonstrating capabilities of the simulator
for our model.
3.1 The Modeling Language
Our model consists of a network of interacting process classes where processes with
similar functionalities are grouped together into a single class. We will often say “ob-
jects” instead of processes and speak of “active” objects when we wish to emphasize
their behavioral aspects.
In what follows, we fix a set of process classes P with p, q ranging over P. For
each process class p, we let the set of objects in class p to be a finite non-empty set
but do not require its cardinality to be specified; this is a fundamental feature of
our modeling language. We now describe the notion of a transaction for specifying
a unit of execution involving one or more processes in the system. A transaction
γ = (R, I, Ch) consists of three components-
1. A finite set of roles R. Each role r in R is a pair (p, ρ) where p ∈ P is the name
of a class from which an object playing this role is to be drawn. On the other
hand, ρ indicates the functionality assigned to the role r (“Sender”, “Receiver”
etc.).
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2. I is a guard consisting of conjunction of guards, one for each role r in R. The
guard Ir associated with role r = (p, ρ) specifies the conditions that must be
satisfied by an object of class p in order for it to be eligible to play the role r.
3. Ch represents the behavior corresponding to roles R in transaction γ.
The set of all transactions is denoted as Γ.
We require that if (p1, ρ1) and (p2, ρ2) are two distinct members of R , then ρ1 6= ρ2.
We however do not demand p1 6= p2. Thus two different roles in a transaction may
be played by two objects drawn from the same class. Further, for a transaction
γ = (R, I, Ch) ∈ Γ, the way Ch is defined is not central to our modeling notation and
its semantics; any suitable means for specifying the behavior can be used– for example,
Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) specifying the communication/computation actions
to be executed by objects assigned to various roles in a transaction, or, simply post-
conditions specifying change in the variable valuations of objects playing various roles
in a transaction can be used.
For the purpose of exposition we will use Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) for
describing the behavior (Ch) of a transaction. For a transaction γ = (R, I, Ch) ∈ Γ,
we view Ch as a labeled poset of the form Ch = ({Er}r∈R,≤, λ) where Er is the set of
events that the role r takes part in during the execution of γ. The labeling function λ,
with a suitable range of labels, describes the messages exchanged by the instances as
well as the internal computational steps during the execution of Ch. Finally, ≤ is the
partial ordering relation over the occurrences of the events in {Er}r∈R. Within the















Figure 3-1: Transactions departReqA & noMoreDest; A is an internal computation
event in noMoreDest
MSCs, the communication via sending and receiving of messages can be synchronous
or asynchronous. This issue is orthogonal to our model. In the operational semantics
of our model, we assume for convenience that the execution of each transaction is
atomic. As a consequence, the concatenation of MSCs in our setting, say, to depict
the execution of a sequence of transactions, will be synchronous [7].
We show an example transaction in Figure 3-1(a). It occurs in our IPC model
of Rail-car example presented in [27, 49]. For the moment, let us ignore the regular
expression at the top portion of this chart. Note that as a notational shorthand we
often write the role (p, ρ) as pρ. This convention has been followed in the transactions
of Figure 3-1. In Figure 3-1(a), the roles are “CarReqSendr”, “CarHandlerReqRecvr” and
“CruiserStartRecvr”. This naming convention is intended to indicate that the function-
ality “ReqSendr” is played by an object drawn from the class “Car”, the functionality
“ReqRecvr” is played by an object belonging to the class “CarHandler”, and so on.
For each class, a labeled transition system will capture the common sequences
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of actions that the objects belonging to the class can go through. An action label
will name a transaction and the role to be played by an object of the class in the
transaction. We use Actp to denote the set of all actions that process class p can go
through. Accordingly, a member of Actp will be a triple of the form (γ, p, ρ) with
γ = (R, I, Ch) ∈ Γ, r = (p, ρ) ∈ R. The action label (γ, p, ρ) will be abbreviated as
γr. When p is clear from the context it will be further abbreviated as γρ.
As mentioned earlier, in a transaction γ = (R, I, Ch), the guard Ir associated
with the role r = (p, ρ) will specify the conditions that must be satisfied by an
object Or belonging to the class p in order for it to be eligible to play the role r.
These conditions will consist of two components: The first one is a history property
of the execution sequence of actions that Or has so far gone through. It will be
captured using regular expressions over the alphabet Actp, the set of all the action
labels corresponding to process class p. We denote it using Λ. The second component
is a propositional formula (denoted as Ψ) built from boolean assertions regarding the
values of the variables owned by Or. Thus, guard of a role r is of the form Ir = (Λ,Ψ).
For instance, consider the transaction “departReqA” shown in Figure 3-1(a)). A
Car object wishing to play the role (Car, ReqSendr) must have last played the role
(Car, DestRecvr) in the transaction setDest or in the transaction selectDest . This is
captured by the guard
Act⋆car .(setDestDestRecvr |selectDestDestRecvr)
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shown at the top of the lifeline corresponding to role (Car, ReqSendr) in Figure 3-1(a).
As this example shows, we use regular expressions to specify the history component
of a guard. Also, note that in the transaction “departReqA” , the guard does not
restrict the local variable valuation of participating objects in any way. On the other
hand, in the transaction of Figure 3-1(b), the variable “dest” owned by the car-
object intending to play the role (Car,StopSendr) must satisfy “dest = 0”; there is
no execution history based guard for this role. Finally, if for some role no guard
is mentioned (e.g. CruiserStartRecvr in Fig.3-1(a)) then the corresponding guard is
assumed to be vacuously true.
The transition system describing the common control flow of the objects belonging
to the class p will be denoted as TSp. It is a structure of the form
TSp = 〈Sp, Actp,→p, initp, Vp, vinitp〉.
We first explain the nature of the components Actp, Vp and vinitp . As described earlier,
Actp is the set of action labels, with each label specifying a transaction and a role
in that transaction, that the p-objects can play in the transactions in Γ. The effects
of the computational steps performed by an object will be described with the help
of the set of variables Vp associated with p. Each object O in p of course will have
its own copy of the variables in Vp. For convenience, we shall assume that for each
variable u ∈ Vp, all the objects of class p assign the same initial value to u. This initial
assignment is captured by the function vinitp . We assume appropriate value domains
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for the variables in Vp exist but will not spell them out here. A computational step
can be viewed as a degenerate type of transaction having just one role. Hence we
will not distinguish between computational steps and transactions in what follows.
Returning to TSp = 〈Sp, Actp,→p, initp, Vp, vinitp〉, Sp is the finite set of local states,
initp ∈ Sp is the initial state and →p⊆ Sp × Actp × Sp is the transition relation. In
summary, our model can be defined as follows.
Definition 1. The IPC Model Given a set P of process-classes, a set Γ of trans-
actions and a set of action labels Actp for p ∈ P involving transactions from Γ, a
system of Interacting Process Classes (IPC) is a collection of P-indexed labeled tran-
sition systems {TSp}p∈P where
TSp = 〈Sp, Actp,→p, initp, Vp, vinitp〉
is a finite state transition system as explained above.
3.2 Modeling A Rail-Car System: The First-Cut
We discuss here the preliminary modeling of a Rail-car example [27, 49] using the
Interacting Process Classes (IPC) formalism. This example was initially developed
in [49] and used subsequently in [27] to illustrate the modeling capabilities of Live
Sequence Charts. It is a non-trivial distributed control system with many process
classes such as cars, cruiser, terminal etc. The schematic structure is shown in Figure














3-2. There are six terminals located along two parallel cyclic tracks, one of them
running clockwise and the other anti-clockwise. Each adjacent pair of these terminals
is connected by the two parallel tracks. There is fixed number of rail cars for trans-
porting passengers between the terminals. There is a control center which receives,
processes and communicates data between various terminals and railcars.
As shown in Figure 3-3, each terminal has four parallel platforms. At any time
at most one car can be parked at a platform. Further, there are two entrance and
two exit segments which connect the two main rail tracks to the terminal’s platform
tracks. Also, each terminal has a destination board for the use of passengers. It
contains a push button and an indicator for each destination terminal. Each rail-car
also has a similar destination-panel for the use by passengers. Further, a rail-car is
equipped with an engine and cruise-controller to maintain the speed. The cruiser can
be off, engaged or disengaged.
The list of process classes and the number of concrete objects in each process class
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Table 3.1: Process Classes & Object counts in Rail-car Example with 48 cars
for a rail-car system with 48 cars is shown in Table 3.1. Note that tDestPanel repre-
sents the destination panel in the terminal and cDestPanel represents the destination
panel in the rail-car. Thus, with 48 cars and 6 terminals, we have 48 cDestPanel and
only 6 tDestPanel (refer Table 3.1). We have only one ControlCenter object which
is related to all the Terminal and Car objects. Also each Car is associated to a
ProximitySensor, which notifies the car when it arrives within 100 and 80 yards of
some terminal, and also associated to a Cruiser which maintains the car speed.
When a car is at a terminal or arrives in one, a unique CarHandler gets associated
with the Car to handle communication between the car and the terminal. Once the
car leaves the terminal a CarHandler is no longer associated with it. We have two
Entrance and two Exit objects associated with each terminal. They represent the
entrance and exit segments connecting the rail tracks to the terminal’s platforms.
P latformManager and ExitsManager respectively allocate platforms and exits to
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CarHandler, which in turn notifies the Car of these events.
We show a fragment of the IPC model of the Rail-car example in Figure 3-4. Con-
trolling the movement of the cars between the terminals involves a complex descrip-
tion. The classes shown in Figure 3-4 are Car, Cruiser, Terminal and CarHandler.
The Cruiser stands for the cruise control of a car. This will be captured as asso-
ciations via Class Diagrams as discussed in Section 3.5. The CarHandler manages
interaction between an approaching/departing car and the corresponding terminal.
In Figure 3-4, for each process class, we have shown a fragment of the transition
system corresponding to that process class. As explained in the last section, the
action labels of the transition system for a process class specify a transaction and
a role in that transaction (which we model using a Message Sequence Chart). We
have not shown all the transactions corresponding to the (transaction, role) pairs
appearing as action labels in Figure 3-4; there are too many of them. However, two
of these transactions, namely, departReqA and noMoreDest appear in Figure 3-1.
In this preliminary model, we do not discuss associations; the class associations
for the rail-car example appear in Figure 3-5. The modeling and simulation of pro-
cess classes with associations will be dealt with in Section 3.5 after developing the
execution semantics of the core model.
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3.3 Concrete Execution Semantics
We now formulate a concrete execution semantics of the IPC model. Given a set
of transactions Γ and an IPC model {TSp}p∈P as defined in Section 3.1 (Definition 1),
for any class p we define Hp to be the least set of minimal DFAs (Deterministic Finite
State Automata) [58] given by: A is in Hp iff there exists a transaction γ = (R, I, Ch)
and a role r ∈ R of the form (p, ρ) such that the guard Ir of r is (Λ,Ψ) and A is
the minimal DFA recognizing the language defined by the regular expression Λ, the
history part of the guard, i.e.
Hp = {dfa(Λ)|γ = (R, I, Ch) ∈ Γ ∧ r = (p, ρ) ∈ R ∧ Ir = (Λ,Ψ)}. (3.1)
Expression dfa(Λ) in Eq. (3.1) above represents the minimal DFA corresponding to
regular expression Λ.
To capture the state of an object we now define the notion of a behavioral partition
Definition 2. Behavioral Partition Let the following be an IPC description.
{TSp = 〈Sp, Actp,→p, initp, Vp, vinitp〉}p∈P
Let Hp = {A1, . . . ,Ak} be the set of minimal DFAs defined for class p (Eq.(3.1)).
Then a behavioral partition behp of class p is a tuple (s, q1, . . . , qk, v), where
s ∈ Sp, q1 ∈ Q1, . . . , qk ∈ Qk, v ∈ V al(Vp).
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Qi is the set of states of automaton Ai and V al(Vp) is the set of all possible valuations
of variables Vp. We use BEHp to denote the set of all behavioral partitions of class
p.
A concrete configuration is used to capture the “local states” of all objects of all
process classes and is defined below.
Definition 3. Concrete Configuration Given an IPC specification
S = {TSp}p∈P such that Op represents the set of objects of process class p, a concrete
configuration of S is defined as follows.
cfgc = {pmapp : Op → BEHp}p∈P ,
where BEHp is the set of all behavioral partitions of class p (Definition 2, page 39).
The set of all concrete configurations of S is denoted as CcS .
The system moves from one concrete configuration to another by executing a
transaction. A transaction γ ∈ Γ can be executed at a concrete configuration cfgc =
{pmapp}p∈P iff for each role r = (p, ρ) of γ where r has the guard (Λ,Ψ), there exists a




−→ s′ is a transition in TSp
2. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, if Ai is the DFA corresponding to the regular expression of
Λ, then qi is an accepting state of Ai.
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3. v ∈ V al(Vp) satisfies the propositional guard Ψ.
This implies that there exists a distinct object for each role r of γ, such that these
objects can together execute the transaction γ. We let objects(γ) represent the set
of objects chosen to execute transaction γ. Computing the new configuration cfg′
c
as a result of executing transaction γ in configuration cfgc involves computing the
new state or destination behavioral partition for each object o ∈ objects(γ). For an
object o playing the role r in transaction γ, such that its current state is given by the
behavioral partition pmapp(o) = (s, q1, . . . , qk, v), we use ‘nstateγr (o)’ to represent






−→ s′ is a transition in TSp.
- for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, qi
(γr)
−→ q′i is a transition in DFA Ai.
- v′ ∈ V al(Vp) is the effect of executing γr on v.
Thus, an object o in the state given by behavioral partition pmapp(o) moves
to a new state given by behavioral partition nstateγr(o) by performing role r in
transaction γ. The new concrete configuration cfg′
c
as result of executing transaction
γ in configuration cfgc is obtained as follows-
cfg′
c
= {pmap′p|p ∈ P}, where
∀p ∈ P . pmap′p(o) =


pmapp(o), o ∈ Op\objects(γ)
nstateγr(o), o ∈ Op ∩ objects(γ)
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Thus, for all the objects that do not participate in transaction γ, i.e. they are




unchanged from cfgc. While for all the objects which execute γ, their states in cfg
′
c
are computed as described above.
Example For illustration, consider the example shown in Figure 3-4. Suppose c is
a concrete configuration at which
• Two Car objects Oc1 and Oc2 are residing in state stopped and a third object,
Oc3, is in state s2 of TSCar. Further suppose they have the values 0, 1 and
2 respectively for the variable dest and have no regular expression based his-
tory guards. Then we have– pmapCar(Oc1) = 〈stopped, 0〉, pmapCar(Oc2) =
〈stopped, 1〉 and pmapCar(Oc3) = 〈s2, 2〉.
• Three Cruiser objects, O1 . . . O3 are residing in state started of TSCruiser such
that the histories of O1 and O2 satisfy the regular expression
(ActCruiser )
⋆.alertStopDisEgRecvr
while the history of O3 satisfies the regular expression
(ActCruiser )
⋆.departAckAGetStarted .
Further, let ‘(ActCruiser )
⋆.alertStopDisEgRecvr ’ be the only regular expression guard
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appearing in the Cruiser’s specification. It can be easily verified that the min-
imal DFA, say A1, recognizing the language of this regular expression has only
two states- let these be q1 and q2, where q1 is the initial state and q2 is the
accepting state. Assuming no Cruiser variables, at current configuration c we
have– pmapCruiser(O1) = pmapCruiser(O2) = 〈started, q2〉 and pmapCruiser(O3)
= 〈started, q1〉.
• Six Terminal objects, Ot1 . . . Ot6 are residing in state s1 of TSTerminal. Assum-
ing no history based guards and local variables, we have– pmapTerminal(Ot1) =
. . . = pmapTerminal(Ot6) = 〈s1〉.
Suppose we want to execute transaction noMoreDest shown in Figure 3-1(b) at
configuration c. As for the role (Car,StopSendr), though Oc1 and Oc2 are in the
appropriate control state, only Oc1 can be chosen since it (and not Oc2) satisfies
the guard dest = 0. For the cruisers, we observe that all the three Cruiser objects
O1, O2, O3 are in the “appropriate” control state at configuration c for the purpose
of executing noMoreDest. However, only O1 and O2 have histories which satisfy the
history part of the guard associated with the role (Cruiser,StopRecvr), i.e. they are
in the accepting state q2 of DFA A1 representing this history guard. Hence either one
of them (but not O3) can be chosen to play this role. For the role (Terminal,Inc),
both the history and propositional guards are vacuous and hence we can choose any
one of the 6 objects residing in the control state s1.
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Assume that Oc1, O1 and Ot1 are chosen to execute transaction noMoreDest in
configuration c. In the resulting configuration c′, all objects other than Oc1, O1 and
Ot1 will have their control states, histories and variable valuations unchanged from c,
thus remaining in the same behavioral partitions as c. The objects Oc1, O1, Ot1 will
move to control states idle, stopped, s1 in their respective transition systems. Value of
variable dest for Oc1 remains unchanged, while the state of DFA A1 for O1 is updated
to q1. Thus at the resulting configuration c
′ we have– pmap′Car(Oc1) = 〈idle, 0〉,
pmap′Cruiser(O1) = 〈stopped, q1〉 and pmap
′
Terminal(Ot1) = 〈s1〉.
3.4 Abstract Execution Semantics
We observe that various objects of a process class have same local state (i.e. they map
to the same behavioral partition) at a given concrete configuration during execution,
and are thus behaviorally indistinguishable. Further, for classes with unboundedly
many instances at run-time, the concrete execution semantics will produce an infinite-
state system. Thus, we formulate an abstract execution semantics of the IPC
model, where we do not maintain states and identities of individual objects. Instead,
during execution, the objects of a class are grouped into behavioral partitions.
Let {TSp = 〈Sp, Actp,→p, initp, Vp, vinitp〉}p∈P be an IPC specification S. Now
suppose c is a concrete configuration and an object O belonging to process class p
has an execution history σ ∈ Act⋆p at c. Then at c, the state of object O is given by
the behavioral partition (s, q1, . . . , qk, v) in case- O resides in s ∈ Sp at c, qj is the
3.4. ABSTRACT EXECUTION SEMANTICS 45
state reached in the DFA Aj ∈ Hp when it runs over σ for each j in {1, . . . , k}, and
the valuation of O’s local variables is given by v. Thus, two p-objects O1 and O2 of
process class p map to the same behavioral partition (at a concrete configuration) if
and only if the following conditions hold.
• O1 and O2 are currently in the same state of Sp,
• Their current histories lead to the same state for all the DFAs in Hp, and
• They have the same valuation of local variables.
This implies that the computation trees of two objects in the same behavioral par-
tition at a concrete configuration are isomorphic. We make use of this property for
dynamically grouping together objects of a process class into behavioral partitions.
This is a strong type of behavioral equivalence to demand. There are many weaker
possibilities but we will not explore them here.
3.4.1 Abstract Execution of Core Model
To explain how abstract execution takes place, we first define the notion of an “ab-
stract configuration”.
Definition 4. Abstract Configuration Let {TSp}p∈P be an IPC specification S
such that each process class p contains Np objects. An abstract configuration of the
IPC is defined as follows.
cfga = {countp}p∈P
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- countp : BEHp → N ∪ {ω} is a mapping s.t.
Σb∈BEHpcountp(b) = Np
- BEHp is the set of all behavioral partitions of class p,
- ω represents an unbounded number.
So countp(b) is the number of objects in partition b. The set of all abstract configu-
rations of an IPC S is denoted as CaS .
We note that Np can be a given positive integer constant or it can be ω (standing
for an unbounded number of objects). If Np is ω, our operational semantics remains
unchanged provided we assume the usual rules of addition/subtraction (i.e. ω+1 = ω,
ω−1 = ω and so on). For a process class p, Np can be ω if, either a) the initial object
count for p is explicitly specified as ω, in order to model and validate a system with
any number of p objects, or b) objects of class p can be dynamically created and we
specify a threshold object count, exceeding which the object count of p will become
ω. We discuss the exact mechanism for object creation/deletion for a process class p
later in Section 3.4.2. For convenience of explanation, we assume that Np is a given
constant in the rest of our discussion.
Our abstract execution efficiently keeps track of the objects in various process
classes by maintaining the current abstract configuration; only the behavioral parti-
tions with non-zero counts are kept track of. The system moves from one abstract
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configuration to another by executing a transaction. How can our simulator check
whether a specific transaction γ is enabled at an abstract configuration cfg? Since we
do not keep track of object identities, we define the notion of witness partition for a
role r, from which an object can be chosen to play the role r in transaction γ.
Definition 5. Witness partition Let γ ∈ Γ be a transaction and cfga ∈ C
a
S be an
abstract configuration. For a role r = (p, ρ) of γ where r has the guard (Λ,Ψ), we
say that a behavioral partition beh = (s, q1, . . . , qk, v) is a witness partition, denoted
as witness(r, γ, cfga), for r at cfga if
1. s
(γr)
−→ s′ is a transition in TSp
2. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, if Ai is the DFA corresponding to the regular expression of
Λ, then qi is an accepting state of Ai.
3. v ∈ V al(Vp) satisfies the propositional guard Ψ.
4. countp(b) 6= 0, that is there is at least one object in this partition in the config-
uration cfga.
An “enabled transaction” at an abstract configuration can now be defined as
follows.
Definition 6. Enabled Transaction Let γ be a transaction and cfga ∈ C
a
S be an
abstract configuration. We say that γ is enabled at cfga iff for each role r = (p, ρ) of
γ , there exists a witness partition witness(r, γ, cfga) such that
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- If beh ∈ BEHp is assigned as witness partition of n roles in γ, then countp(b) ≥
n. This ensures that one object does not play multiple roles in a transaction.
The “destination partition” — the partition to which an object moves from
its “witness partition” after executing a transaction — can be defined as follows.
We denote the destination partition of beh w.r.t. to transaction γ and role r as
beh′ = dest(beh, γ, r). Thus, an object in behavioral partition beh moves to partition
dest(beh, γ, r) by performing role r = (p, ρ) in transaction γ.
Definition 7. Destination Partition Let γ be an enabled transaction at an abstract
configuration cfga ∈ C
a
S and beh = (s, q1, . . . , qk, v) be the witness partition for the role
r = (p, ρ) of γ. Then we define dest(beh, γ, r) — the destination partition of beh







−→ s′ is a transition in TSp.
- for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, qi
(γr)
−→ q′i is a transition in DFA Ai.
- v′ ∈ V al(Vp) is the effect of executing γr on v.
We now describe the effect of executing an enabled transaction γ at a given ab-




sult of executing transaction γ in configuration cfga involves computing the desti-
nation behavioral partition beh′ = dest(beh, γ, r) corresponding to witness partition
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beh = witness(r, γ, cfga) for each role r of γ, and then computing the new count of
objects for each behavioral partition. In other words, we have
∀b ∈ BEHp . count
′
p(b) = countp(b)
+ |{x | b = dest(w, γ, x) ∧ w = witness(x, γ, cfg)}|
- |{x | b = witness(x, γ, cfg)}|
where countp(b) and count
′
p(b) are the number of objects of class p appearing in the




that BEHp is the set of all behavioral partitions of p. Hence, given the abstract




Example Consider TSCruiser shown in Figure 3-4(b). Suppose we simulate the
specification with 24 Cruiser objects (assume that other process-classes are also ap-
propriately populated with objects) using abstract execution semantics. In the tran-
sition system TSCruiser, only the transition noMoreDestStopRecvr is guarded using a
non-trivial regular expression Act⋆Cruiser .alertStopRcvDisEng ; the corresponding DFA,
say A1, will have just two states as can be easily verified. Initially all the 24 objects
will be in the stopped state of TSCruiser with null history and this will correspond to
the initial state, say q1, of A1. All these objects are in the same behavioral parti-
tion 〈stopped , q1 〉, where we have suppressed the valuation component since there are
no local variables associated with this class in this example. Suppose now a cruiser
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object, say O1, executes (in cooperation with objects in other classes) the trace:
“departReqAStartRecvr , departAckAGetStarted , engageEngRecvr , alertStopDisEgRecvr”
O1 will now reside in the control state started. Also, since alertStopDisEgRecvr is ex-
ecuted at the end, O1’s history will correspond to the non-initial state (call it q2)
of the DFA A1. Subsequently suppose another cruiser object, say O2, executes the
trace: “departReqAStartRecvr , departAckAGetStarted”. Then O2 will also end up in the
control state started. However, unlike O1, the execution history of O2 will correspond
to q1, the initial state of A1. After the above executions we have three non-empty
behavioral partitions for cruiser objects — (i) 〈stopped , q1 〉 which has 22 objects
which have remained idle, (ii) 〈started , q2 〉 which has object O1 and (iii) 〈started , q1 〉
which has object O2. Objects in different behavioral partitions have different sets
of actions enabled, thereby leading to different possible future evolutions. Now let
object O1 execute the action noMoreDestStopRecvr . This will result in O1 migrating
from behavioral partition (ii) to (i) above. Thus, O1 will be now indistinguishable
from the 22 objects which have remained idle throughout. For all of these 23 objects,
the action departReqAStartRecvr is now enabled. This is the manner in which objects
migrate between different behavioral partitions during abstract execution.
Maximum Number of Partitions We shall assume in what follows that the value
domains of all the variables are finite sets. Thus, the number of behavioral partitions
of a process class is finite. In fact, the number of partitions of a process class p is
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bounded by




where |Sp| is the number of states of TSp, |V al(Vp)| is the number of all possible
valuations of variables Vp, |A| is the number of states of automaton A ∈ Hp. Recall
that Hp is the set of minimal DFAs accepting the regular expression guards of the
various roles of different transactions played by class p (Eq.(3.1)). Note that the
maximum number of behavioral partitions does not depend on the number of objects
in a class. In practice, many regular expression guards of transactions are vacuous
leading to a small number of partitions. For example, the Cruiser class of the Rail-
Car Example shown in Figure 3-4(b) can have at most 14 behavioral partitions since
— (i) TSCruiser has seven (7) states (not all of them are shown in Figure 3-4(b)),
(ii) the Cruiser class has no local variables that is VCruiser = ∅ and (iii) only one of
the regular expression guards involving a Cruiser object results in a DFA with two
states1; all other regular expression guards involving the Cruiser class are accepted
by a single state DFA. Thus, the number of behavioral partitions of the Cruiser class
is at most 7∗2 = 14 while the number of objects can be very large. In fact, in Section
3.7 we report experiments that the number of behavioral partitions encountered in
actual abstract execution runs is often lower than the upper bound on number of
partitions (48 Cruiser objects are divided into less than 6 partitions, see Table 3.2).
1This is the guard for the role CruiserStopRecvr in transaction noMoreDest, see Figure 3-1(b).
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3.4.2 Dynamic Process Creation/Deletion
We also support dynamic process creation and deletion by means of special trans-
actions whose names are prefixed with start p or stop p for all p ∈ P. We let
start pX/stop pX denote any such special transaction name. A transaction
start pX (stop pX) contains a single role r which does not contain any events, though
role r may have a guard Ir = (Λ,Ψ) as any other transaction. Transaction start pX
starts off a new process instance of class p, while transaction stop pX terminates the
process instance executing it. A start pX transaction can appear in the transition
system of a process class q, where q may be different from p (i.e. q 6= p), thus allowing
an object of one process class to create an object of another process class. However,
transaction stop pX can only appear in TSp, the transition system for process class
p. We now discuss the effect of executing these transactions for abstract execution
semantics.
Let {TSp = 〈Sp, Actp,→p, initp, Vp, vinitp〉}p∈P be an IPC specification and trans-
action start pX appearing in TSq (q may be different from p) be enabled at an
abstract configuration cfga with b = (s, q1, . . . , qk, v) as a witness partition. Let Np
be the current object count of process class p, and q0i be the initial state of DFA
Ai ∈ Hp, where i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and k = |Hp|. Then executing start pX at cfga
with b as the witness partition will result in the new configuration cfg′
a
such that:
i) a process instance of q executing start pX will move from witness partition b to




′)+1, and ii) a new p-process instance will start off in the initial
partition given by bi = (initp, q
0
1, . . . , q
0
k, vinitp) such that, count
′
p(bi) = countp(bi) + 1,
if the number of objects in process class p (i.e. Np) is less than a given threshold
value (say tp) which is set by the user, and count
′
p(bi) = ω otherwise. We also update
N ′p = Np + 1, when Np is less than the threshold value tp; otherwise N
′
p = ω.
Similarly, if stop pX is enabled at an abstract configuration cfga with
b = (s, q1, . . . , qk, v) as a witness partition, then executing stop pX at cfga with b as
the witness partition will result in the new configuration cfg′
a
such that count′p(b) =
countp(b) − 1, when countp(b) is a constant number, and count
′
p(b) = ω otherwise.
Thus, we just decrement the count of witness partition b by 1 (when it is a constant),
without incrementing the count of its corresponding destination partition. This in-
dicates termination of the process instance executing this transaction. Similarly, we




We now turn to extending our language with static and dynamic associations. This
will help us to model different kinds of relationships (either structural or established
through communications) that can exist between objects. The ability to track such
relationships substantially increases the modeling power.



































































Figure 3-4: Fragment of Labeled Transition Systems for process classes of the Rail-car
example — (a)Car (b)Cruiser (c)Terminal (d)Carhandler
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3.5.1 Modeling Static and Dynamic Associations
Our notion of static and dynamic associations is similar to the classification presented
in [108].
Static Associations A static association expresses a structural relationship be-
tween the classes. In a class-diagram, a static association is annotated with fixed
multiplicities at both its ends. Static associations, as the name suggests, remain fixed
and do not change at runtime. We can refer to static associations in transaction
guards to impose the restriction that objects chosen for a given pair of agents should
be statically related. The full class diagram for the Rail-car example with 24 cars
appears in Figure 3-5. For example, the following pairs of classes: (PlatformManager,
Terminal), (Terminal, ControlCenter), (Car, ControlCenter) and (Car, Cruiser) are
statically associated in Figure 3-5. In particular, the association between Car class
and the Cruiser class denotes the itsCruiser relation of a car with its cruiser. Note
that we do not allow dynamic object-creation/deletion of a statically associated class–
such as Car, Terminal etc. in the Rail-car example.
Dynamic Associations A dynamic association expresses behavioral relationship
between classes, which in our case would imply that the objects of two dynamically
associated classes can become related to each other through exchange of messages
(by executing transactions together) and then at some stage leave that relation. In
the class-diagram, a dynamic association is annotated with varying multiplicities at














































Figure 3-5: Class diagram for Rail-car example.
both its ends.
3.5.2 Concrete execution of IPC models with associations
In our concrete execution semantics, for a k-ary association asc relating objects of
process classes p1, . . . , pk, the k-tuple(s) of objects 〈O1, . . . , Ok〉 following the asso-
ciation are stored in relation asc during execution . We now describe the steps for
handling an arbitrary association asc of arity k involving process classes p1, . . . , pk
during concrete execution.
• Initialization: For a k-ary static association asc, the k-tuples of objects follow-
ing the association are inserted in relation asc. For example, if k = 2 (binary
association), and asc is a one-to-one binary association between two process
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classes p1, p2 each containing n objects O1, . . . , On(O
′
1, . . . , O
′
n), we populate
asc with n object pairs, 〈O1, O
′
1〉, . . . , 〈On, O
′
n〉.
If asc is a dynamic association, for convenience we assume that initially asc
does not contain any k-tuple of objects. However, its content can change during
execution.
• Check: Let γ be a transaction and r1, . . . , rk be the roles in transaction γ with
the guard (r1, . . . , rk) ∈ asc. If O1, . . . , Ok are the objects chosen to play the
roles r1, . . . , rk respectively, we also require that the the k-tuple 〈O1, . . . , Ok〉 be
present in the asc relation.
• Insert: Let γ be a transaction and r1, . . . , rk be the roles in transaction γ with
the post-condition insert (r1, . . . , rk) into asc. Let O1, . . . , Ok be the objects
chose to play the roles r1, . . . , rk respectively. Upon executing γ, we insert
the k-tuple 〈O1, . . . , Ok〉 in the relation asc. Note that the insert operation is
possible only if asc is a dynamic association.
• Delete: Let γ be a transaction and r1, . . . , rk be the roles in transaction γ with
the post-condition delete (r1, . . . , rk) from asc. If O1, . . . , Ok are the objects
chosen to play the roles r1, . . . , rk respectively, we require that the the k-tuple
〈O1, . . . , Ok〉 be present in the relation asc. Furthermore, we delete the above
k-tuple from asc upon executing γ. Note that the delete operation is possible
only if asc is a dynamic association.
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Example We now illustrate the use of dynamic associations using the Rail-car
example. During execution, various rail-cars enter and leave the terminals along
their paths. When a car is approaching a terminal, it sends arrival request to that
terminal by executing contactTerminal transaction and while leaving the terminal, its
departure is acknowledged by the terminal by executing departAckA or departAckB
transaction. Hence, the guard of departAck(A/B) requires that the participating Car
and Terminal objects should have together executed contactTerminal in the past.
Since this condition involves a relationship between the local histories of multiple
objects, we cannot capture it via regular expressions over the individual local histories.
Hence we make use of the dynamic relation itsTerminal between the Car and Terminal
classes as part of our specification.
Instead of giving details of the contactTerminal and departAck(A/B) transactions,
we list here relevant roles of these transactions.
• contactTerminal has roles (Car,ReqSendr) and (Terminal,ReqRecvr),
• departAckA and departAckB have roles (Car,AckRecvr) and (Terminal,AckSendr).
Note that transactions departAck(A/B) also involve other roles which we choose
to ignore here for the purpose of our discussion.
In the concrete execution, if car object Oc and terminal object Ot play the roles
(Car,ReqSendr) and (Terminal,ReqRecvr) in contactTerminal, then the effect of con-
tactTerminal is to insert the pair 〈Oc, Ot〉 into the itsTerminal relation (refer to Fig-
ure 3-6). The departAck(A/B) transaction’s guard now includes the check that the
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inserts (O1,O2)  into itsTerminalcontactTerminal
departAck(A/B) checks (O1,O2)  belongs to itsTerminal
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O2 plays the role
where, O1 plays the role 
O2 plays the role
where, O1 plays the role 
O2 plays the role









Figure 3-6: Dynamic Relation itsTerminal
object corresponding to the role (Car,AckRecvr) and object corresponding to role
(Terminal,AckSendr) be related by the dynamic relation itsTerminal; so if objects
Oc and Ot are selected to play the (Car,AckRecvr) and (Terminal,AckSendr) roles in
departAck(A/B), the check will succeed. Furthermore, the effect of departAck(A/B)
transaction is to remove the tuple 〈Oc, Ot〉 from itsTerminal relation.
Thus, for a dynamic relation, the specifications will include the effect of each
transaction on the relation in terms of insertion/deletion of tuples of objects into
the relation. Furthermore, the guard of a transaction can contain a membership
constraint (‘check’) on one or more of the specified static/dynamic relations. For
execution of concrete objects, it is clear how our extended model should be executed.
The question is how can we keep track of associations in the abstract execution
semantics.
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3.5.3 Abstract execution of IPC models with associations
For associations, the key question here is how we maintain relationships between
objects if we do not keep track of the object identities. We do so by maintaining
associations between behavioral partitions. To illustrate the idea, consider a binary
relation D which is supposed to capture some dynamic association between objects
of the process class p. In our abstract execution, each element of D will be a pair
(b, b′) where b and b′ are behavioral partitions of class p; furthermore for all pairs
(b, b′) ∈ D we also maintain a count indicating the number of concrete object pairs
in behavioral partitions b, b′ which are related via D. To understand what (b, b′) ∈ D
means, consider the concrete execution of the process class p. If after an execution σ (a
sequence of transactions), two concrete objects O,O′ of p get D-related (〈O,O′〉 ∈ D)
then the abstract execution along the same sequence of transactions σ must produce
〈b, b′〉 ∈ D where b (b′) is the behavioral partition in which O (O′) resides after
executing σ. The same idea can be used to manage relations of larger arities. Note
that associations are maintained between behavioral partitions, but associations are
not used to define behavioral partitions. Hence there is no blow-up in the number of
behavioral partitions due to associations.
Formally, the set of abstract configurations (Definition 4, page 46) in our opera-
tional model remains unchanged. Recall from Definition 4 (page 46) that an abstract
configuration is defined as cfg = {countp}p∈P where countp(b) is the number of ob-
jects in partition b ∈ BEHp; BEHp is the set of all behavioral partitions of class p.
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In the presence of a k-ary association asc relating objects of process classes p1, . . . , pk
we maintain asc in our abstract execution as
BEHp1 × BEHp2 × . . .×BEHpk → N ∪ {ω}
The association is maintained by maintaining counts for k-tuples 〈beh1, . . . , behk〉
where beh1 ∈ BEHp1, . . . , behk ∈ BEHpk . Following are the steps for handling asso-
ciations in our abstract execution. We describe the steps for an arbitrary association
asc of arity k involving process classes p1, p2, . . . , pk.
• Initialization: For each process class p we have an initial variable valuation
vinitp and an initial state initp in the high-level LTS of class p. Consequently, we
can compute an initial behavioral partition behinitp for each process class p. Now,
if asc is a static association, we initialize the counts of k-tuples of behavioral








is non-zero and is obtained from the class diagram annotations. For example, if
k = 2 (binary association), and asc is a one-to-one binary association between




〉 to be n.
Now suppose asc is a dynamic association. For convenience we assume that
initially asc does not contain any k-tuple of objects (which are in their initial
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state and have null histories). Consequently, the counts for every k-tuple of
behavioral partitions is set to zero.
• Check: Let γ be a transaction and r1, . . . , rk be the roles in transaction γ with
the guard (r1, . . . , rk) ∈ asc. If beh1, . . . , behk are the chosen witness partitions
for r1, . . . , rk respectively, we also require that the asc count maintained for the
k-tuple 〈beh1, . . . , behk〉 be greater than zero. Furthermore, let beh
′
1, . . . , beh
′
k
be the destination partitions of beh1, . . . , behk respectively, upon executing γ.
We then decrement the asc count for the k-tuple 〈beh1, . . . , behk〉 by 1; the asc
count for the k-tuple 〈beh′1, . . . , beh
′
k〉 is incremented by 1.
• Insert: Let γ be a transaction and r1, . . . , rk be the roles in transaction γ
with the post-condition insert (r1, . . . , rk) into asc. Let beh
′
1, . . . , beh
′
k be the
destination partitions of the roles r1, . . . , rk respectively, upon executing γ. We
increment the asc count for the k-tuple 〈beh′1, . . . , beh
′
k〉 by 1. Note that the
insert operation is possible only if asc is a dynamic association.
• Delete: Let γ be a transaction and r1, . . . , rk be the roles in transaction γ with
the post-condition delete (r1, . . . , rk) from asc. If beh1, . . . , behk are the chosen
witness partitions for r1, . . . , rk respectively, we require that the asc count main-
tained for the k-tuple 〈beh1, . . . , behk〉 be greater than zero. Furthermore, we
decrement the asc count for the k-tuple 〈beh1, . . . , behk〉 by 1, upon executing γ.
Note that the delete operation is possible only if asc is a dynamic association.
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• Default: Let γ be a transaction and BEHγ be the set of witness partitions for
the roles in γ. Let τ be a k-tuple in relation asc with association count greater
than zero and BEHτ represent the set of behavioral partitions it contains, such
that, BEH = BEHτ ∩ BEHγ 6= ∅. Then for the k-tuple τ
′, obtained from k-
tuple τ by replacing the partitions in BEH with the corresponding destination
partitions upon executing γ, we increment its asc count by 1.
It might seem that our maintenance of association information will lead to undue
blow-up. This is because we maintain counts corresponding to k-tuples of behavioral
partitions. However, typically we only have binary associations in the class diagrams
of the IPC specifications. So, we only need to maintain counts for pairs of behav-
ioral partitions. Furthermore, very few of these pairs have non-zero counts during
execution, and we only need to maintain pairs which have non-zero counts.
Example As discussed earlier, the dynamic relation itsTerminal is maintained be-
tween the objects of class Car and Terminal (as shown in Figure 3-6). This relation-
ship is established between a Car and a Terminal object while executing contactTer-
minal and exists till the related pair executes either departAckA or departAckB. For
illustration, suppose one object each from class Car and class Terminal plays the role
(Car,ReqSendr) and (Terminal,ReqRecvr) respectively in the transaction contactTer-
minal. Let bCar (bTerm) be the behavioral partitions in to which the objects of Car
(Terminal) go by executing contactTerminalReqSendr (contactTerminalReqRecvr). So in
our abstract execution, corresponding to pairs of behavioral partitions of the Car and
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Terminal class, we maintain a count indicating the number of pairs in the itsTerminal
relation. Thus, for the pair 〈bCar, bTerm〉 we increment its count by 1.
Now when we execute departAck(A/B) transaction, we will pick a pair from this
relation as witness behavioral partitions for the roles (Car,AckRecvr) and (Termi-
nal,AckSendr). We have not maintained information about which Terminal object in
bTerm is related to which Car of bCar. In our abstract execution, when we pick bCar
and bTerm as witness partitions of two roles in transaction departAck(A/B), we are
assuming that the corresponding objects of bCar and bTerm which are associated via
itsTerminal are being picked. Furthermore, after executing departAck(A/B) transac-
tion, we decrement the count for pair 〈bCar, bTerm〉 by 1.
3.6 Exactness of Abstract Semantics
In this section we first show that our abstract execution semantics is an over-approximation
in the sense that every concrete execution can be realized under the abstract execu-
tion semantics but the converse, in general, is not true. We then describe a procedure
for checking whether an abstract execution run is a spurious one.
3.6.1 Over-Approximation Results
In what follows, we only consider finite sequence of transactions. After all, traces
produced by (concrete or abstract) execution are always finite.
Theorem 1. Suppose σ is a finite sequence of transactions that can be exhibited in
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the concrete execution of an IPC model S. Then σ can also be exhibited in the abstract
execution of S.
The proof of Theorem 1 proceeds by induction on N , the length of the execution
sequence σ. The detailed proof appears in Appendix A.1.
We next note that the converse of the above theorem holds in the absence of
associations.
Theorem 2. Suppose S is an IPC model which has no association relations appearing
in the guards of any of the transactions. Then every finite sequence of transactions
under the abstract execution semantics is also an execution sequence under the con-
crete execution semantics.
Proof. The proof follows by a straightforward induction on the length of abstract
execution run. The induction hypothesis is:
Let σ be a finite sequence of transactions allowed in the abstract execution seman-
tics of an IPC model S. Let beh ∈ BEHp be a behavioral partition of class p with
count = n after the abstract execution of σ. Then σ is also a concrete execution.
Furthermore, after the concrete execution of σ there exists exactly n concrete objects
of class p which reside in partition beh based on their control state, execution history
and variable valuation.
Let σ = σprev ◦ γ and the induction hypothesis holds for σprev. In the induction
step, we need to show that the above holds after the execution of σ = σprev ◦γ as well.
Let r1, . . . , rm be the roles of transaction γ and let beh1, . . . , behm be their witness
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behavioral partitions in the abstract execution of γ. By the induction hypothesis, we
have concrete objects o1, . . . , om, whose states are given by the behavioral partitions
beh1, . . . , behm, to play the roles r1, . . . , rm in the concrete execution of γ. Further-
more, if beh′1, . . . , beh
′
m are the destination partitions of beh1, . . . , behm after the ab-
stract execution of γ, we are guaranteed that o1, . . . , om will move to beh
′
1, . . . , beh
′
m
after the concrete execution of γ. This follows from- a) the definition of a destina-
tion partition, Def. 7, and b) the method for computing the behavioral partition
representing the new state of an object in concrete execution semantics (Section 3.3).
Now, in abstract execution, the object count of each of the witness (destination) par-
tition behi(beh
′
i) will be decremented (incremented) by 1 after executing γ. Similarly,
after the concrete execution of γ, the number of objects whose state is given by the
behavioral partition behi(beh
′
i), will be decremented (incremented) by 1. Thus, the
induction step is established.
3.6.2 Spurious abstract executions
We now show that the converse of theorem 1 does not hold, i.e. a finite sequence
of transactions exhibited by the abstract execution of an IPC model S may not be
exhibited by the concrete execution of S. Consider a fictitious system consisting of 3
process classes: Cruiser, Car and BrakeControl, such that each Cruiser and Brake-
Control object is associated with a Car object via static associations Asc1 and Asc2.
In other words, Asc1 (Asc2) captures the relationship between a car and itsCruiser
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Figure 3-7: An example to show spurious runs in our abstract execution semantics
(itsBrakeController). Fragments of the transition systems for these components are
shown in Figure 3-7, along with the checks on the static associations by various trans-
actions. Assume that there are no variables declared in these process classes and that
all the action labels shown in the example have trivial guards, that is they do not
impose any restriction on the execution history of the object to play that role (of
course the object should be in the appropriate control state). Suppose now, that we
have an initial abstract configuration
c = {(〈sA1〉, 2), (〈sB1〉, 2), (〈sC1〉, 2)}.
Process classes Cruiser, Car and BrakeControl contain 2 objects each, in their initial
states sA1, sB1 and sC1 respectively.
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Furthermore, for the association Asc1 (representing itsCruiser relationship), the
count associated with the pair 〈sA1, sB1〉 is 2, and for the association Asc2 (represent-
ing itsBrakeController relationship), the count associated with the pair 〈sB1, sC1〉 is
2.
It is easy to see that the abstract execution semantics allows the sequence of trans-
actions t1, t2, t3. After a car object and its cruiser execute t1, abstract configuration
reached is
c1 = {(〈sA1〉, 1), (〈sA2〉, 1), (〈sB1〉, 1), (〈sB2〉, 1), (〈sC1〉, 2)}.
Also, for the association Asc1, the count associated with the pair 〈sA1, sB1〉 now
becomes 1 (it is decremented by 1), and incremented by 1 for the pair 〈sA2, sB2〉.
There is no change in the association content for Asc2.
Since the car object executing t1 (call it Car1 for convenience of explanation) is
now in state sB2 it cannot execute transaction t2 since it is not enabled from sB2.
Suppose now t2 is executed by another car object (call it Car2 for convenience of
explanation). This produces the configuration
c2 = {(〈sA1〉, 1), (〈sA2〉, 1), (〈sB2〉, 2), (〈sC1〉, 1), (〈sC2〉, 1)}.
For association Asc2, the count associated with the pair 〈sB1, sC1〉 is decremented by
1, and incremented by 1 for the pair 〈sB2, sC2〉. There is no change in the association
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content for Asc1.
In our abstract execution, the two car objects are not distinguishable at this point
since they are both in state sB2. One of these cars (actually Car1) has its cruiser
in state sA2 from where transaction t3 is enabled; another car (actually Car2) has
its brake controller in state sC2 from where t3 is enabled. But since the distinction
between Car1 and Car2 is not made in abstract execution, transaction t3 (involving
all the classes — Car, Cruiser, BrakeControl) will be executed in the abstract exe-
cution. In particular note that in the association information for Asc1 (Asc2), the
count associated with 〈sA2, sB2〉 (〈sB2, sC2〉) is greater than zero. This will allow t3
to be executed “as per” our abstract execution semantics.
In the concrete execution, however t3 cannot be executed after transactions t1, t2
are executed. After executing transactions t1, t2 there cannot be any concrete car
object which has its cruiser (related by association Asc1) as well its brake controller
(related by association Asc2) in the appropriate control states for executing transac-
tion t3. Thus, if trace σ is simulated in the concrete execution, it will get deadlocked
after executing the transactions t1, t2. Though in this example we have only con-
sidered static associations, similar incompleteness of our abstract execution can be
shown with dynamic associations.
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3.6.3 Detecting spurious abstract executions
Detecting spurious abstract executions is similar in objective to detecting spurious
counter-example traces in abstraction-refinement based software model checking (e.g.
see [54]). In our setting, this can be done effectively.
Theorem 3. There is an effective procedure which accepts as input an IPC S =
{TSp}p∈P and a finite sequence σ which is an execution sequence under the abstract
execution semantics, and determines whether or not σ is a spurious execution se-
quence; in other words, σ is not an execution sequence under the concrete semantics.
Proof. Let σ = γ1 . . . γn be a finite sequence of transactions from an IPC S which is
allowed under our abstract execution semantics.
For each process class p, let nump,σ denote an upper-bound on the number of
p-objects required for exhibiting the execution sequence σ. We define nump,σ to be
the total number of roles (p, ρ) appearing in transaction sequence σ s.t. for each
such role (p, ρ) in a transaction occurrence γi in σ, γiρ is an outgoing transition from
the initial state of TSp (the transition system for process class p). This is because,
the number of unique p-objects that can participate in transactions in σ, must have
initially executed a role (p, ρ) in a transaction γi (occurring in σ) s.t. γiρ is an outgoing
transition from the initial state of TSp. Note that, a transaction γ can occur more
than once in an execution trace σ. For computing nump,σ, we treat each transaction
occurrence as distinct.
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We now define xp,σ = min(Np, nump,σ) if Np, the number of objects in p is a given
constant. Otherwise the number of objects of p is not fixed and we set xp,σ = nump,σ.
It is worth noting that xp,σ serves as a cutoff on the number of objects of class p only
for the purpose of exhibiting the behavior σ and not all the behaviors of the system.
For the execution trace σ, we can say that σ is a concrete run in the given system
iff it is a concrete run in the finite state system where each process class p has xp,σ
objects. To show this we consider the following two cases:
1. Np ≤ nump,σ for each process class p ∈ P. In this case xp,σ = Np for all p and
hence the given system and the finite state system are equivalent.
2. Np > nump,σ for some process classes p ∈ P. Then xp,σ = nump,σ for the
process classes having Np > nump,σ, and xp,σ = Np for the remaining process
classes. From our earlier argument that nump,σ gives an upper bound on the
number of p-objects for each class p to exhibit the trace σ, if this finite state
system exhibits σ, it must be exhibited by the concrete execution of the given
system with Np objects for each class p. The reverse direction follows from the
reasoning that no more than nump,σ objects of class p can participate in one or
more transactions of trace σ, even if the system has more than nump,σ objects
of class p.
Using an illustrative example, we now show how a spurious run is detected for
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a given IPC system S and a trace σ, by first deriving a finite state system from
S corresponding to σ. Again, we consider the example discussed in Section 3.6.2
(Figure 3-7), consisting of three process classes- Cruiser, Car and BrakeControl. Also,
consider the trace σ = t1.t2.t3 which can be exhibited in the given system following
our abstract execution semantics, as was demonstrated in Section 3.6.2.
Suppose we now want to check whether or not σ is spurious. From Figure 3-7 we
obtain the roles for transactions in σ– for t1, roles are (Cruiser,P1) and (Car,P2),
for t2, roles are (Car,Q1) and (BrakeControl,Q2), and roles in transaction t3 are
(Cruiser,R1), (Car,R2) and (BrakeControl,R3). We now compute nump,σ for each
process class in the system. First, we consider the Cruiser class. It participates
in transactions t1 and t3 in σ, playing the roles (Cruiser,P1) and (Cruiser,R1) in
these transactions respectively. Only one of these roles, (Cruiser,P1) in transaction
t1, is played from the initial state sA1 of the transition system describing Cruiser
(Figure 3-7). Thus, numCruiser,σ = 1. Similarly we can determine that numCar,σ = 2
and numBrakeControl,σ = 1. As NCruiser = NCar = NBrakeController = 2 in the given
system S, we get xCruiser,σ = 1, xCar,σ = 2 and xBrakeControl,σ = 1. Now to detect
whether or not σ is spurious in the given system S, we only need to check if σ is a
valid execution trace of the finite state system obtained above. Note that we have
already shown σ to be spurious for the given system S in Section 3.6.2. Following the
similar reasoning, σ can easily be shown spurious for this finite state system as well,
leading to a deadlock after the execution of transactions t1, t2.
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We have implemented the above procedure using the Murphi model checker [83].
This model checker has in-built support for symmetry reduction [59] which can be
exploited in the IPC setting. We present the details of the implementation in Ap-
pendix A.2.
3.7 Experiments
We have implemented our abstract execution method by building a simulator in
OCaml [85], a general purpose programming language supporting functional, imper-
ative and object-oriented programming styles.
3.7.1 Modeled Examples
For our initial experiments, we modeled a simple telephone switch drawn from [55].
It consists of a network of switch objects with the network topology showing the
connection between different geographical localities. Switch objects in a locality are
connected to phones in that locality as well as to other switches as dictated by the
network topology. We modeled basic features such as local/remote calling as well
as advanced features like call-waiting. Next we modeled the rail-car system whose
behavioral requirements have been specified using Statecharts in [49] and using Live
Sequence Charts in [27]. As mentioned in Section 3.2, Rail-Car system is a substantial
sized system with a number of process classes: car, terminal, cruiser (for maintaining
speed of a rail-car), car-handler (a temporary interface between a car and a terminal
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while a car is in that terminal), etc.
We have also modeled the requirement specification of two other systems - one
drawn from the rail transportation domain and another taken from air traffic control
(see http://scesm04.upb.de/case-studies.html for more details of these exam-
ples). We now briefly describe these two systems. The automated rail-shuttle system
[94] consists of various shuttles which bid for orders to transport passengers between
various stations on a railway-interconnection network. The successful bidder needs to
complete the order in a given time, for which it gets the payment as specified in the
bid; the shuttle needs to pay the toll for the part of network it travels. If an order is
delayed or not started in time, a pre-specified penalty is incurred by the responsible
shuttle. A part of network may be disabled some times due to repair work, causing
shuttles to take longer routes. A shuttle may need maintenance after traveling a
specified distance, for which it has to pay. Also, in case a shuttle is bankrupt (due to
payment of fines), it is retired. The weather update controller [26] is a an important
component of the Center TRACON Automation System, automation tools developed
by NASA to manage high volume of arrival air traffic at large airports. The case study
involves three classes of objects: weather-aware clients, weather control panel and the
controller or communications manager. The latest weather update is presented by the
weather control panel to various connected clients, via the controller. This update
may succeed or fail in different ways; furthermore, clients get connected/disconnected
to the controller by following an elaborate protocol.
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Example Process Class # Concrete Objects # of partitions
in Test Case
I II III
Telephone Phone 60 9 9 7
Switch Switch 30 9 9 9
Car 48 12 10 11
CarHandler 48 3 8 8
Terminal 6 6 6 6
Platform 6 1 3 3
Mngr.
Exits 6 1 2 2
Mngr.
Rail-Car Entrance 12 2 1 2
Example Exit 12 1 2 2
Cruiser 48 1 3 5
Proximity 48 1 1 2
Sensor
cDestPanel 48 1 1 1
tDestPanel 6 1 1 1
Automated Shuttle 60 6 5 6
Shuttle Agent
Weather Clients 20 3 3 3
Update
Table 3.2: Maximum Number of Behavioral partitions observed during abstract sim-
ulation
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3.7.2 Use Cases
We used guided abstract simulation on each of our examples to test out the prominent
use cases. The details of these experiments appear in Table 3.2. For the Telephone
Switch example with call-waiting feature, we consider three possible test cases. In
the first one there were three calls made, each independent of another, and without
invoking the call-waiting feature. In the second and third cases, we have two ongoing
calls and then a third call is made to one of the busy phones, invoking the call-waiting
feature. These two cases differ in how the calls resume and terminate.
For the Rail-car example we simulate the following test cases– (a) cars moving
from a busy terminal to another busy terminal (i.e. a terminal where all the platforms
are occupied, so an incoming car has to wait), while stopping at every terminal, (b)
cars moving from a busy terminal to less busy terminals while stopping at every
terminal, and (c) cars moving from one terminal to another while not stopping at
certain intermediate terminals. In the rail shuttle-system example, again we report
the results for three test runs corresponding to (a) timely completion of order by
shuttle leading to payment, (b) late completion of order leading to penalty, and (c)
shuttle being unable to carry out order as it gets late in loading the order. Finally,
for the weather update controller, we report the results of simulating three test cases
corresponding to (a) successful update of latest weather information to all clients, (b)
unsuccessful weather update where clients revert to older weather settings, and (c)
unsuccessful update leading to disconnecting of clients.
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Time Memory
Example Setting (sec) (MB)
C A C/A C A C/A
Telephone 60 phones 2.0 1.5 1.3 87 63 1.4
switch 120 phones 4.1 1.5 2.7 189 64 3.0
Rail-Car 24 cars 3.9 2.1 1.9 173 83 2.1
48 cars 7.0 2.2 3.2 353 84 4.2
Automated 30 cars 0.7 0.4 1.6 33 18 1.8
Shuttle 60 cars 1.2 0.4 2.7 69 18 3.8
Weather 10 clients 0.6 0.5 1.2 21 18 1.2
Update 20 clients 0.8 0.5 1.6 27 18 1.5
C ≡ Concrete Exec., A ≡ Abstract Exec.
Table 3.3: Timing/Memory Overheads of Concrete Execution and Abstract Execution
For each test case, we report the object count for each process class as well as
the maximum number of behavioral partitions observed during simulation. We have
reported the results for only process classes with more than one object. Since we are
simulating reactive systems, we had to stop the simulation at some point; for each test
case, we let the simulation run for 100 transactions – long enough to exhibit the test
case’s behavior. From Table 3.2, we can see that the number of behavioral partitions
is substantially less than the number of concrete objects. Furthermore, even if the
number of concrete objects is increased (say instead of 48 cars in the Rail-car example,
we have 96 cars), the number of behavioral partitions in these simulation runs remain
the same.
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3.7.3 Timing and Memory Overheads
Since one of our main aims is to achieve a simulation strategy efficient in both time
and memory, a possible concern is whether the management of behavioral partitions
introduces unacceptable timing and memory overheads. We measured timing and
memory usage of several randomly generated simulation runs of length 1000(i.e. con-
taining 1000 transactions) in our examples and considered the maximum resource
usage for each example. We also compared our results with a concrete simulator
(where each concrete object’s state is maintained separately). For meaningful com-
parison, the concrete simulator is also implemented in OCaml and shares as much
code as possible with our abstract simulator. Simulations were run on a Pentium-IV
3 GHz machine with 1 GB of main memory. The results are shown in Table 3.3. For
each example we show the time and memory usage for both the abstract and concrete
simulation. Also, for a given example, we obtained results for two different settings,
where the second setting was obtained by doubling the number of objects in one or
more of the classes, e.g. in the rail-car example with 24 and 48 cars respectively.
We observe that for a given example and a given number of objects, the running
time and memory usage for the concrete simulator are higher than that for the ab-
stract simulator. Also for the same example but with higher number of objects, in
case of abstract execution, the time/memory remain roughly the same, whereas they
increase for the concrete case (as indicated by the increase in ratio C/A for higher
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Figure 3-8: Execution Time and Memory Usage for different settings of the RailCar
example.
Furthermore, in the graphs shown in Figure 3-8, we compare the growth in timing
and memory usage in the railcar example, for both concrete and abstract simulations.
Each successive setting is obtained by increasing the number of cars and its associ-
ated components: “car-handler”, “proximity-sensor”, “cruiser” and “dest-panel” by
24. Clearly our abstract execution allows the designer to try out different settings
of a model by varying the number of objects without worrying about time/space
overheads.
3.7.4 Checking for spurious execution runs
Recall that in the presence of associations, our abstract execution semantics is sound
but incomplete. Consequently, we may encounter execution runs which are ”spuri-
ous”, that is, do not appear in any concrete system execution. In Section 3.6.3, we
have presented a decision procedure for checking whether a finite sequence of trans-
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actions produced by our abstract simulator is spurious. As mentioned, we used the
Murphi model checker to implement this spuriousness check.
During our experiments, we found that the spuriousness check for all the test
cases of all our examples was completed in less than 0.1 second using Murphi. Also,
when simulating an example system against meaningful use cases, the execution run
produced by our abstract simulator was typically not spurious. In fact, there was
only one false positive among all the test cases we tried for all the examples. This is
to be expected, since we use our simulator to try out meaningful/prominent use-cases
for a given system specification in the IPC model.
3.7.5 Debugging Experience
In this section, we share some experiences in reactive system debugging gained us-
ing our simulator tool. In particular, we describe our experiences in debugging the
weather-update control system [26]. The weather-update control system consists of
three process classes: the communications manager (call it CM), the weather con-
trol panel (call it WCP) and Clients. Both CM and WCP have only one object,
while the Client class has many objects. In Figure 3-9, we show a snippet of the
transition system for CM. Even for the snippet shown in Figure 3-9, the transition
system shown is a slightly simplified version of our actual modeling. We have given
the transactions names to ease understanding, for example Snd Init Wthr stands for
“send initial weather” and so on.
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We now discuss two bugs that we detected via simulation. The first one is an
under-specification in the informal requirements document for the weather-update
controller. In Figure 3-9, the controller CM initially connects to one or more clients
by executing the transactions Connect and Snd Init Wthr. In the Connect transaction
CM disables theWeather Control Panel (WCP). If the client subsequently reports that
that it did not receive the weather information (i.e. transaction Not Rcv Init Wthr
is executed), CM goes back to Idle state without re-enabling the Weather Control
Panel (WCP). Hence no more weather-updates are possible at this stage. This results
from an important under-specification of the weather-update controller’s informal
requirements document. This error came up in a natural way during our initial
experiments involving random simulation. Simulation runs executing the sequence of
transactions
Connect,Snd Init Wthr,Not Rcv Init Wthr,Upd from WCP
got stuck and aborted as a result of which the simulator complained and provided
the above sequence of transactions to us. From this sequence, we could easily fix
the bug by finding out why Upd from WCP cannot be executed (i.e. the Weather
Control Panel not being enabled). We note that since the above sequence constitutes
a meaningful use-case we would have located the bug during guided simulation, even
if it did not appear during random simulation. In this context it is worthwhile to
mention that for every example, after modeling we ran random simulation followed
by guided simulation of prominent test cases.
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We found another bug during guided simulation of the test case where connected
clients get disconnected from the controller CM since they cannot use the latest
weather information. This corresponds to the connected clients executing the Dis-
connect transaction with the CM, and the CM returning from Done2 to Idle by ex-
ecuting Enable WCP (Figure 3-9). For this simulation run, even after all clients are
disconnected, the CM executes Upd from WCP (update from Weather Control Panel)
followed by Rdy for PreUpd (ready for pre-update). The simulator then gets stuck
at the PreUpd Wthr (pre-update weather) transaction since there are no connected
clients. From this run, we found a missing corner case in the guard for Upd from WCP
transaction – no weather updates should take place if there are no connected clients.
In this case, it was a bug in our modeling which was detected via simulation.
Currently, our simulator supports the following features to help error detection.
• Random simulation for a fixed number of transactions
• Guided simulation for a use-case (the entire sequence of transactions to be
executed need not be given)
• Testing whether a given sequence of transactions is an allowed behavior.
In future, we plan to employ error localization techniques (e.g. dynamic slicing) on
problematic simulation runs. Full details of the simulator (along with its source code)









































































Figure 3-9: Snippet of Transition System for Weather-Update Controller
3.8 Discussion
In this chapter, we have studied a modeling formalism accompanied by an execution
technique for dealing with interacting process classes; such systems arise in a number
of application domains such as telecommunications and transportation. Our models
are based on standard notations for capturing behaviors and our abstract execution
strategy allows efficient simulation of realistic designs with large number of objects.
The feasibility of our method has been demonstrated on realistic examples.
The notion of “roles” played by processes in protocols have appeared in other
contexts (e.g. [105]). Object orientation based on the actor-paradigm has been
studied thoroughly in [74]. We see this work approach as an orthogonal one where
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the computational rather than the control flow features are encapsulated using classes
and other object-oriented programming notions such as inheritance.
We note that, our model can be easily cast in the setting of Colored Petri nets
[65] with our operational semantics translating into an appropriate token game. We
feel however our formulation is simpler and better structured in terms of a network





Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) are widely used by requirements engineers in the
early stages of reactive system design. Conventionally, MSCs are used in the system
requirements document to describe use-cases — possible ways in which the objects
constituting a distributed reactive system may communicate among each other as
well as with the environment. MSCs may be composed to yield complete behavioral
descriptions. Such compositions may be captured as a High Level Message Sequence
Chart or HMSC. The complete MSC language appears in a recommendation of the
ITU [62]. The syntax and process theory based operational semantics of the language
have also been outlined in [98].
The benefits of MSCs notwithstanding, it has been observed that while describing










Figure 4-1: An MSC showing read request from a processor to various memory devices
via a bus. The bus controller (BC) controls access to the bus.
requirements of systems containing many objects, MSC specifications tend to grow
too large for human comprehension [98, 109]. We find this problem to be partic-
ularly acute when the system contains several objects which conform to a common
behavioral protocol when interacting with other objects. Such objects may be con-
sidered as instances of a common process class. In the absence of suitable abstraction
mechanisms, similar interactions involving different objects from the same class have
to be repeated to convey all possible scenarios that may occur, thereby leading to
voluminous MSC specifications.
Let us consider an example to illustrate this point. Consider a master-slave proto-
col interaction, where several master processes are competing to get service from the
slave processes. An arbiter controls access to the slaves. Furthermore, whenever any
master needs service and the arbiter grants access to the slaves, a specific slave will
be allocated depending on the kind of service needed. A concrete realization of such
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an interaction can be observed in bus access protocols. The master processes are the
processors hooked to the bus. The slave processes are memory devices from which
the processors are trying to read or write. The arbiter is the bus controller which
decides, according to some scheduling policy, the processor to be granted bus access.
Usually when a processor needs to access a memory address for reading/writing data,
it broadcasts the appropriate address and control signals over the bus to various mem-
ory devices. Then after decoding the address, one of the devices will respond to the
processor’s read/write request.
Figure 4-1 shows an MSC capturing the above-mentioned interaction between a
processor and memory units. Clearly, if there are n processors hooked to the bus,
we will have n such MSCs — all structurally similar! Furthermore, even within each
MSC, there is lot of structural similarity. In fact, since MSCs capture point-to-point
communication, the broadcast of address by a processor to all memory units is not
captured exactly in Figure 4-1. Instead, the processor sends a read request separately
to each of the memory units. In the MSC shown in Figure 4-1, the read request is for
an address which is from the address space of memory unit M2. Since there are two
other memory devices, we would then need to repeat the same interaction to convey
the cases when the read request is in the address space of M1 or M3.
Clearly, as we increase the number of memory devices and processors in the system,
such an approach will not scale up. Individual MSCs will become large, containing
many lifelines, and similar MSCs representing essentially the same interaction will
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have to be repeated. Moreover, since a lifeline may appear in several MSCs, modifying
the specification (for example by adding or removing memory devices) may be error-
prone and will involve considerable effort. Finally, validation of such specifications
will become inefficient as the number of memory devices and processors is increased.
Technical Contributions To address various shortcomings of the MSCs as dis-
cussed in the preceding, we introduce simple yet powerful extensions to the MSC
language to support efficient specification and validation of systems involving classes
of behaviorally similar objects. Our extensions are based on the meaning of a life-
line in an MSC. The MSC standard (now integrated into UML 2.0) suggests that a
lifeline denotes a concrete object. As the above example indicates, this may lead to
voluminous behavioral descriptions that scale poorly. In our extension, we first relax
the meaning of a lifeline to consider three possibilities (i) a concrete object (ii) any k
objects from a class for a given positive constant k (existential abstraction), or (iii) all
objects from a class (universal abstraction). Moreover, guards may be used to further
restrict the object(s) that may engage in the events depicted on the lifeline. Thus, if
we have a universally abstracted MSC lifeline drawn from process class p with guard
gp, it will be played by all object(s) of class p which satisfy gp. These extensions yield
a concise MSC notation called Symbolic Message Sequence Chart (SMSC) [101].
Further, we note that the inter-class associations appear quite commonly in an
object-oriented system description, and are used to convey structural information re-
garding static/dynamic relationships among various communicating processes. How-
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ever, information regarding associations is not made explicit in MSCs. Similar to
the case of IPC (Chapter 3), while modeling a distributed protocol using scenarios,
a designer may want to explicitly specify establishing/removing of association links,
and moreover, constrain the communicating processes to be linked via specific as-
sociations. We address this issue by introducing constraints in our SMSC modeling
notation for- (i) inserting object pairs in a given association, (ii) checking that only
object pairs related via a given association communicate with each other, / and (ii)
removing existing association links between various object pairs.
In the following, we first present the syntax, concrete semantics, and abstract
semantics of SMSCs without associations. The abstract semantics allows for efficient
symbolic simulation of SMSCs showing interactions among process classes with large
(or even an unbounded) numbers of objects. It also serves as a formal execution se-
mantics which can be used to reason about interactions between an unbounded number
of objects. We then present experimental results, discussing SMSC modeling and ex-
ecution of a real-life controller- the CTAS weather controller [26] from NASA, which
is part of a control system for managing high volume air traffic. Experimental results
obtained from the CTAS controller allow us to better understand the issues in mod-
eling, analyzing and debugging real-life control systems involving structurally similar
interactions among many objects. Finally, we introduce associations in our SMSC
modeling framework and discuss in detail an abstract SMSC execution semantics in
the presence of associations.









Figure 4-2: A Symbolic MSC
4.1 Syntax
The basic building block of our system model is a Symbolic Message Sequence Chart
or SMSC. Like an MSC, a SMSC depicts one possible exchange of messages between a
set of objects. However, while a lifeline in an MSC corresponds to one concrete object
(henceforth called a concrete lifeline), a lifeline in a SMSC may be either concrete or
symbolic.
4.1.1 Visual Syntax
Graphically, we represent SMSCs as in Figure 4-2. This SMSC depicts processor-
memory interaction, corresponding to the MSC discussed earlier in Figure 4-1. One
important difference between these representations is that the three concrete memory
lifelines M1, M2 and M3 appearing in Figure 4-1, have been merged into a single
symbolic lifeline in Figure 4-2, representing the class of memory devices in the system.
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Visually, this is depicted in a SMSC by enclosing the symbolic lifeline name by a
rectangular box e.g. M in Figure 4-2. During simulation, a symbolic lifeline may
be bound to an arbitrary number of objects. Otherwise, if a lifeline is concrete (i.e.,
process class contains a single object) its name will appear as it is, e.g. the lifeline
corresponding to the bus controller BC in Figure 4-2.
Within a SMSC lifeline representing a class of objects, a selected subset of objects
may engage in events appearing along the lifeline. This selection is performed based
on the following criteria associated with each event — (i) valuation of variables of
the object, (ii) execution history of the object, and (iii) an abstraction mode that
specifies whether all objects (universal mode ∀) or, any k objects (existential mode
∃k) satisfying criteria (i), (ii) may perform the event.
We use the shorthand ∃k to denote the existential abstraction of lifelines. This
is to emphasize that exactly k objects will play such a lifeline. Clearly k ≥ 1. For
the examples in this paper, we have only used ∃1 (i.e. selecting one object) whenever
we used existential abstraction. Henceforth we always assume ∃1 since the extension
of our semantics to the general case is trivial. We mention these extensions via
footnotes when we present our semantics. Moreover, in Section 4.11, we mention
other variations of existential abstraction which can be incorporated with minimal
modifications to our modeling language and its semantics.
In Figure 4-2, initially, the concrete processor lifeline P sends ‘read(addr)’ message
to all the memory devices in the system. This is indicated by the universal abstraction
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with guard true for the receive event of message ‘read(addr)’ by symbolic lifeline M .
Subsequently, the memory device in whose address space the read address lies, replies
to processor with the required data. Thus, only one memory device replies. This
is shown by the existential abstraction ∃1 with guard inRange(addr) = true for the
send event of message ‘reply(data)’ by symbolic lifeline M . Note that this single
scenario succinctly represents the possibility of any device M1, M2 or M3 responding
to a processor (refer to Figure 4-1 to see the interactions between concrete objects),
thereby avoiding the need for separate scenarios for each case. Thus SMSCs go far
beyond notational shorthands for message broadcast between scenario lifelines [72].
Furthermore, interaction of the memory devices with different processors can also be
represented in the same SMSC simply by making the processor lifeline symbolic as
well (i.e., the lifeline marked P in Figure 4-2 also becomes symbolic and denotes any
processor object). While using SMSCs, it is often the case that every event which
appears on a lifeline has the same guard and abstraction mode. In such cases, for ease
of specification, the object selection criteria may be written only once, immediately
above the lifeline name, with the intended interpretation that the criteria applies to
every event shown on the lifeline.
Finally, since variable valuation plays an important role in selecting objects in a
symbolic lifeline, SMSCs allow changes in variable valuation to be specified as event
postconditions on the lifeline. For example, in the SMSC shown in Figure 4-2, when
P receives the requested data from one of the memory devices, it sets its variable
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v = data. This is shown as v′ = data in Figure 4-2 since for any variable x we show
its updated value by its primed version x′.
4.1.2 Abstract Syntax
The complete MSC language includes several types of events: message sends and
receives, local actions, lost and found messages, instance creation and termination
and timer events. For SMSCs in this paper, we will only consider message exchange
(sends and receives) between lifelines and local actions on individual lifelines. A
message m exchanged between two lifelines (representing two concrete objects) p and
q in a conventional MSC gives rise to two events: an out(p, q,m) event denoting
the message send event performed by p, and an in(p, q,m) event that denotes the
corresponding receive performed by q. A local action l performed by p is represented
by the event action(p, l). We use AMSC to denote the MSC alphabet consisting of
message sends, receives and local actions, for a given set of MSCs. Ap denotes the
set of events in AMSC that may be performed by objects in class p.
The notions of lifeline abstraction and event guards in SMSCs necessitate changes
in the event syntax as defined above. To explain these, we introduce some auxiliary
notation. Let P denote the set of all process classes1 with p, q ranging over P.
Let GVp represent the set of all possible propositional formulae built from boolean
predicates regarding the values of the variables owned by p. For example, if p has an
1A process class represents the set of objects following the same behavioral protocol.
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integer variable v, then the element gVp ∈ G
V
p , where g
V
p =(v > 5), represents those
objects of p which have a value greater than 5 for v. Similarly, let GHp represent the
set of all possible regular expression based execution histories of objects belonging
to p. For example, if gHp =(h = A
⋆
p.(out(p, q,m) | out(p, q, n)).A
⋆
p), where h denotes
a variable representing the execution history of an object, then gHp ∈ G
H
p , and it
denotes those objects of p whose execution history includes the sending of message
m or n to object(s) q. Here Ap represents the set of events that process class p can
participate in.
Next, we define an object selector of process class p to be an expression of the
form [mode]p.[gp]. The square brackets denote optional parts, where mode is required
only if process class p contains multiple objects (i.e. corresponds to a symbolic
lifeline); otherwise, p may denote the single concrete object in the class p. Further,
mode represents the abstraction mode and may be either ∃1 for existential (∃k in
the general case) or ∀ for universal interpretations. Also, gp represents a guard
which may either be true or consist of a variable valuation constraint gVp ∈ G
V
p
and/or an execution history constraint gHp ∈ G
H
p . For example, os1=∀p.(v1 = 0∧h =
A⋆p.out(p, q,m).A
⋆
p) is an object selector for class p that may be used to specify those
objects of p whose v1 variable is set to 0, and whose execution history (denoted by
h) involves sending of message m to q. In case gp = true, it indicates that there is no
restriction on the variable valuation or the execution history of object(s) to be chosen
to play the symbolic lifeline. We use OSp to denote the set of all object selectors for
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p ∈ P, and OSP denotes the set of all object selectors.
A postcondition updating the state of objects executing a given event is specified
as a sequence of comma separated assignment statements. For each process class
p ∈ P, let Vp be its associated set of variables with function v
init
p giving the initial
assignment of values to the objects of p. We assume finite value domains for all
the variables and that all the objects of a class p assign the same initial value to
any variable u ∈ Vp.
2 Then, an assignment statement appearing in a postcondition
corresponding to an event from class p is of the form x′ = aexpr, where (i) x ∈ Vp,
and (ii) aexpr represents an arithmetic expression involving variables from Vp, integer
constants, and the following arithmetic operators ‘+,−, /,×’. Let Postp represent the
set of postconditions for class p ∈ P. We define PostP =
⋃
p∈P Post
p ∪ {ǫ}, where ǫ
represents an empty postcondition.
We now define the sets of message send events Aout, receive events Ain, and local
action events Aact, that are needed for defining the set A
SMSC of atomic actions in
SMSCs.
Definition 8. Let P denote the set of all process classes with p, q ∈ P. Let M and
L denote the set of all message names and local action names, respectively. Then the
2If the initial states of objects in a class are different, we can simply execute additional actions
from our initial state.
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sets Aout, Ain, Aact and A
SMSC are defined as follows:
Aout = {out(osi, osj,m, pc) | osi, osj ∈ OS
P ,m ∈M, pc ∈ PostP}
Ain = {in(osi, osj ,m, pc) | osi, osj ∈ OS
P ,m ∈M, pc ∈ PostP}
Aact = {action(os, l, pc) | os ∈ OS
P , l ∈ L, pc ∈ PostP}
ASMSC = Aout ∪Ain ∪Aact
We use ASMSCp to denote the set of all SMSC events that may be performed by objects
of class p.
The main difference between MSC events and SMSC events is that in the latter,
we use object selectors instead of lifeline names, and include postcondition as part of
an event. However, for defining the history based guard of an event, we can simply
use the normal MSC events, e.g. h = A⋆p.out(p, q,m).A
⋆
p may be used inside a SMSC
event to select object(s) of class p which have previously sent m to some object(s) of
class q. Also, for simplicity, we have not included message parameters in the above
definition, but our approach may be easily extended to richer message structures. We
now formally define a SMSC.
Definition 9 (SMSC). A SMSC sm can be viewed as a partially ordered set sm =
(L,EL,≤), where L is the set of lifelines in sm, EL =
⋃
l∈LEl where El ⊆ A
SMSC is
the set of events lifeline l takes part in sm, and ≤ is the partial ordering relation over
the occurrences of events in EL, such that ≤= (≤L ∪ ≤sm)
⋆ is the transitive closure
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of ≤L and ≤sm, where
(a) ≤L=
⋃
l∈L ≤l, ≤l is the linear ordering of events in El, which are ordered
top-down along the lifeline l, and
(b) ≤sm is an ordering on message send/receive events in EL. If es =
out(osi, osj, m, pc1) and the corresponding receive event is er = in(osi, osj, m, pc2),
we have es ≤sm er.
In our system model, SMSCs may be composed together to yield High-level SMSCs
(or HSMSCs) in the same way that MSCs may be arranged in High-level MSCs
(HMSCs). A HSMSC is essentially a directed graph whose each node is either a SMSC
or (hierarchically) a HSMSC. Formally, a HSMSC is a tuple H = (N,B, vI , vT , l, E)
where (i) N is a finite set of nodes (ii) B is a finite set of boxes (or supernodes)
representing (already defined) HSMSCs (iii) vI ∈ N ∪B is the initial node or box (iv)
vT ∈ N∪B is the terminal node or box (v) l is a labeling function that maps each node
in N to a SMSC and each box in B to another HSMSC (vi) E ⊆ (N ∪B)× (N ∪B)
is the set of edges that describe control flow.
We now define the system specification S.





p }〉 where H = (N,B, v
I , vT , l, E) is a HSMSC describing the inter-
actions among objects from process classes in P.
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Expression Template In order to make specifications more readable, we identify
a commonly occurring regular expression template that we have encountered in our
modeling. Consider a process class p ∈ P and e1, e2 ∈ Ap. For regular expressions of
the form h1 = A
⋆
p.e1 we write it as h1 = last(e1).
4.2 CTAS Case Study
We now discuss a well known example to illustrate system modeling using SMSCs.
The weather update controller [26] is an important component of the Center TRA-
CON Automation System (CTAS) automation tools developed by NASA to manage
high volume of arrival air traffic at large airports. It consists of a central communi-
cations manager (CM), a weather control panel (WCP), and several weather-aware
clients. The weather-aware clients consist of components such as aircraft trajectory
synthesizer, route analyzer etc. which require latest weather information for their
functioning. Since the number of clients in the system can be large, the power of
lifeline abstraction in SMSCs becomes useful.
Complete behavioral description of the CTAS example as a HSMSC (sans hierar-
chy) is shown in Figure 4-3. Various nodes of this HSMSC are labeled with the SMSC
names. In the CTAS requirements document [1], the requirements are given from the
viewpoint of the CM. All the clients are initially disconnected from the controller
(CM) and the execution sequence -2.6.2, 2.8.3, 2.8.5, 2.8.8- taken from the require-
ments document, forms the scenario in which a client successfully gets connected to


















Figure 4-3: HSMSC for the CTAS case study. The Connect, UsedWthr and No-
tUsedWthr SMSCs are shown in Figure 4-4, 4-5.
CM. This behavior corresponds to the execution of the left loop (marked using bold
lines) in Figure 4-3, such that the four SMSCs along this marked path correspond
to the above four requirements. For example, SMSC Connect (shown in Figure 4-4)
represents the requirement 2.6.2 shown below.
Requirement 2.6.2: The CM should perform the following actions when a weather-
aware client attempts to establish a socket connection to CM– (a) set the weather-aware
client’s weather status to ‘pre-initializing’3, (b) set the weather-cycle status to ‘pre-
initializing’, (c) disable the weather control panel...
The Client lifeline in Connect appears as a symbolic lifeline with its name appear-
ing in a rectangular box. The two events along the Client lifeline: sending message
3We use integers to represent different status values. For example, in SMSC Connect ‘status=1’
represents the ‘pre-initializing’ status.
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connect to CM and receiving message setStatus 1 from CM, both have existential
abstraction. This is because only one client can get connected at a time to CM.
Also, they both have propositional guard status = 0, showing client status which
gives its current interaction stage with CM. However, the history based guards for
the two events are different. For sending message connect to CM, the regular expres-
sion guard for Client is h = (ǫ | last(e1)), where e1 = in(CM,Client, close) as shown
below SMSC Connect in Figure 4-4. This guard imposes the constraint that either
a fresh Client object (having no execution history, and is therefore disconnected),
or a Client object which has last been disconnected from CM (due to the receipt of
close message) can send the ‘connect’ request to the CM. For the subsequent event of
receiving setStatus 1 message from the CM, the history based guard is h = last(e2),
where e2 = out(Client, CM, connect), which allows only the object(s) which have
recently sent ‘connect’ message to CM to execute this event. Note that in specifying
the regular expression guards, we have used the template expression last(e) described
earlier in Section 4.1.2.
Further, all the connected clients can be updated with the latest weather informa-
tion by WCP via CM. This behavior corresponds to the execution of the right loop
in Figure 4-3 (marked using bold lines) 4. In case any client either fails to use the
original data (in case it has failed to receive the new data), or update itself (having
received the new weather information), all the connected clients get disconnected.
4We do not give the corresponding requirements from the requirements document due to lack of
space.







 1 Client. status=0 ! h = ( " | last(e1) ) CM.status=0
e1 = in(CM,Client,close)
e2 = out(Client,CM,connect)
 1 Client. status=0 ! h = last(e2)
< enbld’=0 >
WCP.enbld=1
Figure 4-4: Connect SMSC from CTAS.






















< status’=0 > Client.status=6  v=0
< status’=0, v’=0 >
1 Client.status=6  v=1
 Client.status=6 < enbld’=1 >
WCP.enbld=0
SMSC NotUsedWthr
Figure 4-5: CTAS SMSCs showing successful and unsuccessful completion of weather
update.
The two SMSCs shown in Figure 4-5 show the successful and unsuccessful com-
pletion respectively of the weather update cycle for the connected clients. Again in
both these SMSCs, the Client lifeline is symbolic. Further in SMSC UsedWthr, since
all events along the Client lifeline have same guarding expression ∀Client.status = 6,
it appears only once at the top of the lifeline, which is equivalent to specifying it
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for each event. The execution sequence in UsedWthr takes place when all connected
clients have responded yes to using the new weather update information, and hence
the universal abstraction for the Client lifeline.
The scenario shown in NotUsedWthr SMSC in Figure 4-5 takes place when one
of the clients is unable to use the new weather information, and hence responds with
message no to CM. This causes CM to send the message close to all the connected
clients, thereby all of them getting disconnected from CM. Note that in NotUsedWthr
SMSC, the first event (sending of message no) of Client has existential abstraction,
whereas the subsequent events have universal abstraction. Thus, the Client lifeline
in the NotUsedWthr SMSC shows the use of mixed abstraction modes within a SMSC
lifeline.
4.3 Process Theory
The semantics of the ITU MSC language is defined using a process theory [98]. This
theory has a signature Σ that consists of a set of constants and a set of operators.
Constants consist of (i) the empty process ǫ (ii) deadlock δ, and (iii) atomic actions
from a set Act. Operators comprise the unary operators iteration ⋆ and unbounded
repetition∞, and the binary operators delayed choice ∓, delayed parallel composition
‖, weak sequential composition ◦, as well as the generalized versions (‖S and ◦S) of
‖ and ◦, which account for ordering of actions coming from different lifelines e.g.
message sends and receives in MSCs. The set of closed Σ terms is denoted by CT (Σ)
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(see [98] for details).
4.3.1 Configurations
To seamlessly integrate our proposed extensions with the ITU framework, we adopt
the above theory, but constrain the execution of process terms in this theory by
associating a configuration element C. As we will see later, we need a notion of
configuration to determine at any given point during execution, which object(s) from
a given process class can perform a particular action.
During execution, a configuration is used to capture the “local states” of all objects
of all process classes. The question is, in a scenario-based modeling language like
SMSC, how do we capture the local state of an object. Clearly, we need (a) the
object’s control flow (which SMSC it is currently executing and which events in the
current SMSC have been executed), (b) the variable valuations of the object and (c)
a bounded representation of the (unbounded) history of events which allows us to test
the satisfaction of history-based regular expression guards in the specification. Here
we note that the control flow of objects will be captured by terms in our process theory.
The variable valuations will be explicitly captured. Finally, the history information
for an object o can be captured by representing the regular expression guards as
minimal DFAs and then maintaining the states in these DFAs in which object o lies.
Maintaining such information for each individual object for each process class will
give a notion of concrete configurations, and the transition between these concrete
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configurations (using the semantic rules presented below) provides a straightforward
concrete execution semantics. However, we will later develop abstract configurations
to enable (i) efficient simulation of systems with finite number of objects, and (ii)
reasoning about systems with infinitely many objects. For this reason, at this stage,
we do not impose any concrete structure on configuration C.
We develop the process theory independent of whether configuration C (which
appears in the rules of the process theory) is concrete or abstract. We only require
C to support two methods (i) a supports method, supports(a), which is true iff C
permits an action a and (ii) a migration method, migrates to(a), which returns the
set of possible configurations that C migrates to through the execution of a. We use
C to denote the set of all configurations.
4.3.2 Semantic Rules and Bisimulation
The MSC process theory has an operational semantics defined by means of deduction
rules. A deduction rule is of the form
H
Concl
, where H is a set of premises and
Concl is the conclusion. For ITU MSCs, the semantics for constants consists of two
rules (i)
ǫ ↓
, which implies that the empty process may terminate successfully and





, which expresses that a process represented by the atomic action a can
perform a and thereby evolve into the empty process ǫ. The rules for constants
in our theory are presented in Table 4.1. While the empty process may terminate
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C.supports(a) == true, C′ ∈ C.migrates to(a)
C : a
a
−→ C′ : ǫ










−→ C′ : x′, C : y 6
a
−→
C : x∓ y
a




−→ C′ : y′, C : x 6
a
−→
C : x∓ y
a




−→ C′ : x′, C : y
a
−→ C′ : y′
C : x∓ y
a
−→ C′ : x′ ∓ y′
immediately, the execution of an atomic action a has to be supported by the associated
configuration C, and this leads to a new configuration C ′.
Beyond this simple extension, the rest of our technical development is along the
lines of the formal MSC theory. For example, our deduction rules for the delayed
choice operator ∓ are shown in Table 4.2. Thus x∓y can terminate if either x (DC1)
or y (DC2) is able to terminate. Except for the addition of the configuration element
for the execution semantics rules, the rules are similar in spirit to the MSC rules for
∓. If C : x can execute a and C : y cannot (DC3), then on execution of a, the choice
is resolved in favor of x. DC4 shows the complementary case when C : y executes
a, and C : x cannot. Finally, if both C : x and C : y are able to execute a, then
the execution of a does not resolve the choice, but rather, delays it (DC5). Semantic
rules for the other operators may be defined similarly (see [98]).
To account for configurations, we also extend the bisimilarity based term equality
definition in the MSC standard [98]. This definition uses a permission relation
a
→֒ on
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terms; intuitively, x
a
→֒ x′ states that an action a is allowed to precede the execution of
actions of x even if this action is composed after x by means of sequential composition.
The reason for allowing this bypass is that the notion of sequential composition is
weak and allows instances to proceed asynchronously. The execution of a, however,
disables all alternatives in x that do not allow the bypass, and as a result, x evolves
to term x′. The deduction rules for →֒ are presented in [98]. We do not reproduce
the details here, but use →֒ for completeness of our modified term equality definition
below.
Definition 11 (Bisimulation). Let C be the set of all possible configurations. A binary
relation BC ⊆ CT (Σ)×CT (Σ) is called a bisimulation relation iff for all a ∈ Act and
s, t ∈ CT (Σ) with sBCt, the following conditions hold
∀s′∈CT (Σ),C,C′∈C(C : s
a
−→ C ′ : s′ ⇒ ∃t′∈CT (Σ)(C : t
a
−→ C ′ : t′ ∧ s′BCt′)) (4.1)
∀t′∈CT (Σ),C,C′∈C(C : t
a
−→ C ′ : t′ ⇒ ∃s′∈CT (Σ)(C : s
a
−→ C ′ : s′ ∧ s′BCt′))(4.2)
∀s′∈CT (Σ)(s
a
→֒ s′ ⇒ ∃t′∈CT (Σ)(t
a
→֒ t′ ∧ s′BCt′)) (4.3)
∀t′∈CT (Σ)(t
a
→֒ t′ ⇒ ∃s′∈CT (Σ)(s
a
→֒ s′ ∧ s′BCt′)) (4.4)
s ↓ ⇐⇒ t ↓ (4.5)
Two closed terms p, q ∈ CT (Σ) are bisimilar in C, denoted by p ↔C q, iff there
exists a bisimulation relation BC such that pBCq. Note that even though we carry
state information in the form of configuration C in above definition, our notion of
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bisimilarity is stateless, which is the most robust notion of equality for state-bearing
processes [80].
Theorem 4. ↔C has the following properties.
(i) ↔C is an equivalence relation.
(ii) ↔C is a congruence with respect to the function symbols from the signature Σ.
Proof. (i) ↔C is an equivalence relation.
To prove this we show that following three properties hold–
(a) ↔C is reflexive,
(b) ↔C is symmetric, and
(c) ↔C is transitive.
↔C is reflexive It is easy to see that for any bisimulation B
C as defined in Defini-
tion 11, ∀s∈CT (Σ) sB
Cs and hence, ↔C is reflexive.
↔C is symmetric Let s, t ∈ CT (Σ) and s↔C t. Thus, there exists a bisimulation
BC (see Defn. 11) such that sBCt. By exchanging the order of conditions (4.1) with
(4.2) and (4.3) with (4.4), we can conclude that tBCs. Hence, t ↔C s and ↔C is
symmetric.
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↔C is transitive Let s, t, u ∈ CT (Σ) such that s ↔C t, t ↔C u. Thus, there exist
bisimulation relations BC1 and B
C
2 such that sB
C
1 t and tB
C
2u. To show that s ↔C u,




2 is also a bisimulation relation (as per Definition 11).
Consider (p, q) ∈ BC3 . Then, there exists r ∈ CT (Σ) such that pB
C
1 r and rB
C
2 q.
Using condition (4.1) from Definition 11 we get–
∀p′∈CT (Σ),C,C′∈C(C : p
a
−→ C ′ : p′ ⇒ ∃r′∈CT (Σ)(C : r
a
−→ C ′ : r′ ∧ p′BC1 r
′))
∀r′∈CT (Σ),C,C′∈C(C : r
a
−→ C ′ : r′ ⇒ ∃q′∈CT (Σ)(C : q
a
−→ C ′ : q′ ∧ r′BC2 q
′))
From the above two conditions we get the following–
∀p′∈CT (Σ),C,C′∈C(C : p
a
−→ C ′ : p′ ⇒ ∃q′∈CT (Σ)(C : q
a
−→ C ′ : q′ ∧ p′BC3 q
′))
Note that p′BC3 q
′ since, p′BC1 r
′, r′BC2 q




2 . Hence, condition (4.1)
of Definition 11 holds for BC3 . Similarly, we can show the remaining conditions of
Definition 11 to hold for the relation BC3 . Therefore, B
C
3 is also a bisimulation.
(ii) ↔C is a congruence with respect to the function symbols from the
signature Σ.
In the following we show that ↔C is a congruence with respect to the delayed choice
operator ∓ (see Table 4.2) over signature Σ. That is, for all p, q, r ∈ CT (Σ) p ↔C q
implies p∓ r ↔C q∓ r. Since p↔C q, there exists a bisimulation B
C
1 such that pB
C
1 q.
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We define relation
BC = {(p∓ r, q ∓ r)|p↔C q ∧ p, q, r ∈ CT (Σ)} ∪B
C
1 ∪ {(r, r)|r ∈ CT (Σ)}(4.6)
and show that BC is a bisimulation. To show that condition (4.1) of Definition 11
holds, we consider the following three cases corresponding to rules –DC3, DC4 and
DC5– of the delayed choice operator ∓ (see Table 4.2). Consider (p∓ r, q ∓ r) ∈ BC .
Case I Let C : p ∓ r
a
−→ C ′ : p′ as per rule DC3, Table 4.2 for the delayed choice
operator, which implies C : p
a
−→ C ′ : p′ and C : r 6
a
−→. Now, since p ↔C q,
we know that there exists q′ such that C : q
a
−→ C ′ : q′ and p′ ↔C q
′ (see
Definition 11). Further, from the definition of BC above (see Eq. (4.6)), we get
(p′, q′) ∈ BC. Hence,
∀p′∈CT (Σ),C,C′∈C(C : p∓ r
a
−→ C ′ : p′ ⇒
∃q′∈CT (Σ)(C : q ∓ r
a
−→ C ′ : q′ ∧ (p′, q′) ∈ BC)).
Case II Let C : p ∓ r
a
−→ C ′ : r′ as per rule DC4, Table 4.2 for the delayed choice
operator, which implies C : r
a
−→ C ′ : r′ and C : p 6
a
−→. Now, since p↔C q, we
know that C : q 6
a
−→. Hence, we get
∀r′∈CT (Σ),C,C′∈C(C : p∓ r
a
−→ C ′ : r′ ⇒ (C : q ∓ r
a
−→ C ′ : r′ ∧ (r′, r′) ∈ BC)).
Case III Let C : p∓ r
a
−→ C ′ : p′ ∓ r′ as per rule DC5, Table 4.2 for the delayed choice
operator, which implies C : p
a
−→ C ′ : p′ and C : r
a
−→ C ′ : r′. Now, since
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p ↔C q, we know that there exists q
′ such that C : q
a
−→ C ′ : q′ and p′ ↔C q
′
(see Definition 11). Further, from the definition of BC above (see Eq. (4.6)), we
get (p′ ∓ r′, q′ ∓ r′) ∈ BC. Hence,
∀p′,r′∈CT (Σ),C,C′∈C(C : p∓ r
a
−→ C ′ : p′ ∓ r′ ⇒
∃q′∈CT (Σ)(C : q ∓ r
a
−→ C ′ : q′ ∓ r′ ∧ (p′ ∓ r′, q′ ∓ r′) ∈ BC)).
From the three cases above, we can easily see that condition (4.1) of Definition 11
holds for the relation BC. Similarly, the remaining conditions of Definition 11 can be
easily shown to hold for the relation BC . Hence BC is a bisimulation.
Congruence of ↔C with respect to other function symbols from the signature Σ
can be shown in a similar manner.
The result also follows automatically from [80] by noting that our term deduction
system is in the process-tyft format (with negative premises) presented there and
moreover, is stratifiable [98].
4.4 Execution Semantics for SMSCs
In the following, we develop a concrete and an abstract operational semantics for
SMSCs using the process theory outlined so far. First, the set of atomic actions Act
in the process theory is defined as ASMSC, the set of SMSC events as defined in Section
4.1. In Section 4.4.1 we explain the translation of SMSC specifications to terms in
our process theory. Then, Section 4.4.2 presents our notion of concrete configuration
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and a concrete execution semantics based on these configurations. To enable efficient
simulation of systems with large or even unbounded number of objects, we develop
an abstract execution semantics for SMSCs in Section 4.4.4.
4.4.1 Translating SMSCs to process terms
In general, a SMSC may consist of an arbitrary (but finite) number of events. Se-
mantics is provided for a SMSC body by sequentially composing the semantics of
the first event definition with the semantics of the remaining part of the SMSC
body. The generalized weak sequential composition operator is used to impose
necessary ordering requirements across lifelines. For example, let us consider the
UsedWthr SMSC in Figure 4-5. The first event in the SMSC is the sending of
message yes to CM by all clients with status=6; this is represented by the event
e1=out(∀Client.(status = 6), CM.(status = 6), yes, ǫ). The corresponding receive
by CM is represented by
e2 = in(∀Client.(status = 6), CM.(status = 6), yes, 〈status
′ = 0〉)
The constraint that e2 has to follow e1 is represented by the ordering requirement
e1 7→ e2, as in the MSC language. The composition of these two events may be given
by e1◦
{e1 7→e2} e2, using the generalized weak sequential operator ◦
S, where S is a set of
ordering requirements that constrain execution. Subsequently, CM sends an enable
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message to WCP , represented by the event
e3 = out(CM,WCP.(enbld = 0), enable, ǫ)
Composing this after e1 and e2, we get e1 ◦
{e1 7→e2} e2 ◦ e3. Since e2 and e3 are both
performed by CM , the sequential operator ensures their correct ordering, and addi-
tional ordering requirements are not needed. Similarly, the subsequent events in the
UsedWthr SMSC may be composed to obtain the complete event-based behavioral
description.
To map HSMSC graphs into event-based descriptions, we follow an approach that
is similar to the way a regular expression is obtained from an automaton. Successive
applications of a rewrite rule [98] are used to convert the graph into a normal form,
ultimately yielding an expression consisting of SMSCs composed via operators like ∓,
◦ etc. Replacing each SMSC by its corresponding event-based description will then
give us the desired event-based representation of the HSMSC graph.
4.4.2 Concrete Execution Semantics
As mentioned in Section 4.3, the execution of terms in our theory is constrained
by a configuration. When we developed our process theory in Section 4.3, we did
not assume a specific definition of configurations, but required our configurations to
provide these two functions supports and migrates to. In particular, these functions
capture the transition between system configurations thereby forming the core of our
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execution semantics. We develop a notion of concrete configurations (Def. 14)
and elaborate a concrete execution semantics over these concrete configurations.
Since SMSC events carry guards, we maintain a configuration to keep track of
the state of objects during execution, and for each event determine the objects which
satisfy its guard. We note that the ability of a p object to perform a SMSC event
depends on (i) its execution history and (ii) valuation of its local variables. We now
define the notion of a behavioral partition for capturing the execution state of an
object. A behavioral partition for class p represents one possible state of a p object
in terms of its execution history and variable valuation.
Definition 12 (Behavioral Partition). Let Vp be a set of variables belonging to class
p. Let Rp denote a set of regular expressions over events Ap (the set of events that
may be performed by objects of class p), with |Rp| = k. For each Ri ∈ Rp, let Di be
the minimal DFA recognizing Ri. Then a behavioral partition behp(Vp, Rp) of class p
defined over Vp and Rp is a tuple 〈q1, q2, · · · , qk, v〉, where
q1 ∈ Q1, . . . , qk ∈ Qk, v ∈ V al(Vp).
Qi is the set of states of automaton Di and V al(Vp) is the set of all possible valuations
of variables Vp. We use BEHp(Vp, Rp) to denote the set of all behavioral partitions
of class p defined over Vp and Rp. We use BEH to represent the set of all behavioral
partitions.
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Let us consider any object O of class p with execution history σ. Then, O is in the
execution state given by behavioral partition 〈q1, q2, · · · , qk, v〉 ∈ BEHp(Vp, Rp) iff (i)
qj is the state reached in the DFA Dj when it runs over σ for each j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}
and (ii) the valuation of O’s local variables in Vp is given by v. The total number of
behavioral partitions of a process class is bounded, provided the value domains of all
variables in Vp are also bounded. Also, this number is independent of the number of
objects in a class.
Next we introduce the notion of a signature; for each process class p, a signature
contains a set of variables belonging to p and a set of regular expressions over Ap.
Definition 13 (Signature). For any class p, let Vp be a set of variables belonging to p
and Rp be a set of regular expressions over Ap. Then the set of tuples T={(Vp, Rp)}p∈P
is called a signature.
Given a signature T={(Vp, Rp)}p∈P , the set of all variables in T is then given
by Tv =
⋃
p∈P Vp. Similarly, the set of all regular expressions in T is given by
Tr=
⋃
p∈P Rp. For any two signatures T = {(Vp, Rp)}p∈P and T
′ = {(V ′p , R
′
p)}p∈P ,
we define their union as a signature T ∪ T ′ = {(Vp ∪ V
′
p , Rp ∪ R
′
p)}p∈P . Also, we say
T ⊇ T ′ if for all p, Vp ⊇ V
′
p and Rp ⊇ R
′
p. Intuitively, this means that T is defined
over a larger state space (variables and execution history) than T ′. We now define
the notion of a concrete configuration.
Definition 14 (Concrete Configuration). For each process class p let Op represent
the set of objects of class p, and T={(Vp, Rp)}p∈P be a signature. A concrete config-
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uration over T is defined as cfgc = {objp}p∈P where objp : Op → BEHp(Vp, Rp), with
BEHp(Vp, Rp) denoting the set of all behavioral partitions of class p (Definition 12).
The set of all concrete configurations over signature T is CTC .
We now explain when a concrete SMSC configuration supports an event a and
the new configuration it migrates to on execution of a. These functions appear in rule
Const2, Table 4.1, and are required for defining the transition between system con-
figurations. We begin by defining a mapping active : ASMSC → OSP that indicates




osi if e = out(osi, osj, m, pc), action(osi, ℓ, pc)
osj if e = in(osi, osj, m, pc)




m ∈ {∃k, ∀} if p is symbolic
concrete otherwise,
We also use a function simple : ASMSC → AMSC to convert a SMSC event to an
MSC event; simple(e) replaces each object selector occurring in e by the correspond-
ing process class and also removes e’s postcondion. For example, simple(out(∀p.v1 =
0, q,m, pc)) = out(p, q,m).
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supports function A concrete configuration supports an event defined on process
class p if there is at least one p object5 which satisfies the variable valuation and
execution history criteria on the event guard. More precisely, let e ∈ ASMSCp (i.e.,
active process class in e is p) be a SMSC event and cfgc = {objp}p∈P ∈ C
T
C be a
concrete configuration defined on signature T={(Vq, Rq)}q∈P . Let ϑ and Λ be the
propositional and history based guards in event e. Further, let O ∈ Op be a p object
whose state is given by objp(O) = 〈q1, q2, · · · , qk, v〉. Then, object O satisfies the
guard of event e at configuration cfgc if
(a) ∃Ri ∈ Rp s.t. L(Ri) = L(Λ) (the set of strings accepted by the two expressions
are same), Qi is the set of states in the minimal DFA accepting Λ and qi ∈ Qi is an
accepting state of the minimal DFA.
(b) v ∈ V al(Vp) satisfies the propositional guard ϑ.
We can now define the supports function. Let e be a SMSC event and cfgc ∈ C
T
C
be a concrete configuration. Then, cfgc.supports(e)=true iff there exists an object
whose state satisfies the guard of e.6
migrates to function We next describe the function cfgc.migrates to(e),
which returns the set of possible destination configurations that result when e is
executed at configuration cfgc. We first describe the state update of an object O ex-
5To be precise, we need at least one object for events with modes ∃1 or ∀. If the mode is ∃k with
k > 1, we need at least k objects.
6This ensures that there is at least one object satisfying the guards in cfgc. If event e’s mode is
existential abstraction ∃k with k > 1, we require at least k objects to satisfy e’s guard at cfgc.
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ecuting event e. Let the state of object O at concrete configuration cfgc be given by
the behavioral partition 〈q1, · · · , qk, v〉, and simple(e)
7 = e′. Then, the updated state
of object O, resulting after the execution of event e at concrete configuration cfgc,
is denoted as update(O, cfgc, e) and given by the behavioral partition 〈q
′





(a) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, qi
e′
−→ q′i is a transition in DFA Di.
(b) v′ is the effect of e’s postcondition on v.
Let O(e) denote the set of all objects whose states satisfy the guard of event e at
cfgc. Then cfgc.migrates to function is defined as follows.
Case 1: mode(os) = ∀. Then cfgc.migrates to(e) returns a unique new config-
uration cfg′c that is computed as follows. For all objects other than those in
O(e), their states at cfg′c remain unchanged from cfgc, while for each object
O ∈ O(e), its state at cfg′c is determined by update(O, cfgc, e).
Case 2: mode(os) = ∃k. For k = 1,
8 cfgc.migrates to(e) returns a set of
possible new concrete configurations as follows. Any object O ∈ O(e) is chosen
to execute the event e, and a new configuration is obtained by changing the
state of O to update(O, cfgc, e) (states of all other objects remain unchanged).
7Recall that simple(e) replaces the object selectors in event e by the corresponding process class
names and removes e’s postcondition.
8The case for ∃k with k > 1 is handled in a similar fashion.
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Repeating this for each object in O(e) gives us the set of all possible new
configurations.
Case 3: mode(os) = concrete. Since we are dealing with only one object, we
can employ Case 2 for ∃1.
Thus, if mode(e) = ∀, then all objects satisfying the guard of event e are chosen
to execute it, with their states updated accordingly in the resulting configuration.
On the other hand, if mode(e) = ∃, then any one object which satisfies e’s guard is
selected to execute e, resulting in a new configuration with its state updated.
4.4.3 Example Illustrating Concrete Execution
We revisit the CTAS example described in Section 4.2 and show the working of our
concrete execution semantics.





1 , CM, connect, ǫ) in SMSC Connect shown in Figure 4-4, at
a given concrete configuration, where gV1 : status = 0 and g
H
1 : h1 = (ǫ | last(e1)).
Assume that only the history based guards—h1 = (ǫ | last(e1)) and h2 = last(e2)
9—
shown in SMSC Connect appear in the system description for Client process class.
Process class CM does not have any history based guards. Further, Client class has
variables status and v, and CM has a single variable status. It can be easily seen that
9e1 and e2 appear at the bottom of MSC Connect in Figure 4-4. Expression last(e) was described
at the end of Section 4.1.2 under ‘Expression Template’.
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the DFAs corresponding to regular expressions h1 and h2 contain only two states.




1}, respectively, where q0 and q
′
1 are accepting states.
State q0 is the state of a Client object ready to connect to the CM. This may either
be a fresh Client object (with no execution history), or a Client object that has last
received a close message from CM. State q′1 is the state reached by a client object
that has sent a connect message to CM in the immediate past.
Let cfgc be a concrete configuration at which the state of a Client object OC is
given by the behavioral partition 〈q0, q
′
0, 0, 0〉. The first two elements of the OC ’s
state correspond to the states in the two DFAs h1 and h2, while the next two numeric
elements represent the values (0 in each case) of variables status and v. By executing





1 , i.e., e can be executed by any Client object satisfying
the guard gV1 ∧ g
H
1 . Following the description of supports function given earlier in
Section 4.4.3, we can easily see that OC ’s state satisfies the guard of event e, and
hence OC can be chosen to execute e. After executing e, OC will move to states q1
and q′1 in the two DFAs, with its updated state given by 〈q1, q
′
1, 0, 0〉 at the resulting
configuration (following ‘Case 2’ of migrates to function described in Section 4.4.3).
4.4.4 Abstract Execution Semantics
As described in the preceding section, our concrete execution semantics maintains the
state of each individual object during execution. However, maintaining the state of
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each individual object during simulation can be computationally expensive, and lead
to state explosion. To overcome this, we develop an abstract execution semantics for
SMSCs in the following. In our abstract execution semantics, instead of maintain-
ing individual states of various objects, we group together objects whose states are
determined by the same behavioral partition (see Def. 12) at runtime, and maintain
only the count of objects (and not their identities) in each behavioral partition. We
consider any two objects O1 and O2 of a process class p to be in the same behavioral
partition in BEHp(Vp, Rp), if and only if they have the same valuation of local vari-
ables in Vp, and their current histories lead to the same state for DFAs corresponding
to the regular expressions in Rp.
We now define the notion of an abstract configuration.
Definition 15 (Abstract Configuration). Let each process class p contain Np objects,
and T={(Vp, Rp)}p∈P be a signature. An abstract configuration over T is defined
as cfg = {countp}p∈P where countp : BEHp(Vp, Rp) → N ∪ {ω} is a mapping s.t.
Σb∈BEHp(Vp,Rp)countp(b) = Np. The set of all abstract configurations over signature T
is denoted as CT .
Thus, an abstract configuration records the count of objects in each behavioral
partition of each process class. The idea is to dynamically group together objects
during execution based on their variable valuation and execution history. This is
similar to abstraction schemes developed for grouping processes in parameterized
systems [91]. We note that our notion of configurations and execution semantics
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permits unboundedly many objects in a system specification. Thus, in the above defi-
nition we could have Np = ω, with ω representing an unbounded number of objects
in class p. Further, for class p with Np = ω, we define a cutoff number cutp ∈ N
such that cutp + n = ω, n ≥ 1. By default, we assume cutp = 1. To formulate
our abstract execution semantics, we define the following two arithmetic operations—
⊕,⊖ : N∪{ω}×N∪{ω} → N∪{ω}—representing addition and subtraction involving
ω. For all n1, n2 ∈ N ∪ {ω}, representing object counts of class p:
n1 ⊕ n2 =


ω, if Np = ω and n1 + n2 > cutp
n1 + n2, otherwise
(4.7)
n1 ⊖ n2 =


ω, if n1 = ω, n2 6= ω
n1 − n2, otherwise
(4.8)
Indeed, in Section 4.5 we present experiments detailing validation of SMSC sys-
tems with unbounded number of objects.
As in the case of concrete execution semantics discussed earlier in Section 4.4.3,
we now describe the abstract versions of the supports and migrates to functions for
our abstract execution semantics. Again, these functions form the core of our abstract
semantics (see rule Const2, Table 4.1), required for defining the transition between
abstract configurations.
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supports function Intuitively, an abstract configuration supports an event defined
on process class p, if there is at least one p object10 which satisfies the variable
valuation and execution history criteria on the event guard. Since we do not maintain
the states of individual objects in an abstract configuration, this is determined by
verifying that there is at least one behavioral partition of class p which satisfies the
event guard, and has a non-zero count of objects. We call such a behavioral partition
a witness partition, which we formally define below.
Definition 16 (Witness Partition). Let e ∈ ASMSCp (i.e., active process class in e is
p) be a SMSC event and cfg ∈ CT be an abstract configuration defined on signature
T={(Vq, Rq)}q∈P . Let ϑ and Λ be the propositional and history based guards in event
e. We say that behavioral partition behp = 〈q1, q2, · · · , qk, v〉 is a witness partition
for event e at configuration cfg if
(a) ∃Ri ∈ Rp s.t. L(Ri) = L(Λ) (the set of strings accepted by the two expressions
are same), Qi is the set of states in the minimal DFA accepting Λ and qi ∈ Qi is an
accepting state of the minimal DFA.
(b) v ∈ V al(Vp) satisfies the propositional guard ϑ.
(c) countp(behp) ≥ 1, that is, there is at least one object in the partition behp at
the configuration cfg.
We use Witness(e, cfg) to represent the set of all behavioral partitions that can
act as a witness partition for e at cfg. We are now in a position to define the supports
10To be precise, we need at least one object for events with modes ∃1 or ∀. If the mode is ∃k with
k > 1, we need at least k objects.
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function for abstract execution. Let e be a SMSC event and cfg ∈ CT be an abstract
configuration. Then, cfg.supports(e)=true iff there exists a behavioral partition beh,
such that beh is a witness partition for e at cfg.11
migrates to function We next describe the function cfg.migrates to(e) for ab-
stract execution, which returns the set of possible abstract destination configurations
that result when e is executed at configuration cfg. We first introduce the notion
of a destination partition—the partition to which an object moves from its witness
partition after executing an event. We denote the destination partition of beh with
respect to e as dest(beh, e).
Definition 17 (Destination Partition). Let beh = 〈q1, · · · , qk, v〉 ∈ Witness(e, cfg)
for an abstract configuration cfg and event e ∈ ASMSC. Let simple(e)12 = e′. We
then define dest(beh, e) (the destination partition of beh w.r.t to e) as a behavioral




(a) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, qi
e′
−→ q′i is a transition in DFA Di.
(b) v′ is the effect of e’s postcondition on v.
Let abstract configuration cfg ∈ CT , e ∈ ASMSCp , active(e) = os, and
Witness(e, cfg) = B. Then cfg.migrates to function is defined as follows. In the
11This ensures that there is one witness partition with at least one object satisfying the guards
in cfg. If event e’s mode is existential abstraction ∃k with k > 1, we need to consider all possible
witness partitions in cfg and choose a total of k objects from them.
12Recall that simple(e) replaces the object selectors in event e by the corresponding process class
names and removes e’s postcondition.
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following, count′p(b) denotes the count of objects in behavioral partition b of process
class p after executing e at configuration cfg.
Case 1: mode(os) = ∀. Then cfg.migrates to(e) returns a unique abstract
configuration that is computed as follows. LetDP = {d | ∃b ∈ B. d = dest(b, e)}
be the set of all destination partitions. Then ∀d ∈ DP , we first set count′p(d) =
countp(d)⊕ Σb s.t. dest(b,e)=d countp(b). Then, for all b ∈ B we deduct countp(b)
from count′p(b) to reflect the migration of these objects from b to dest(b, e).
Case 2: mode(os) = ∃k. For k = 1,
13 cfg.migrates to(e) returns a set of possible
abstract configurations as follows. Let us choose any b ∈ B, and let dest(b, e) =
d. Then we set count′p(d) = countp(d) ⊕ 1 and count
′
p(b) = countp(b) ⊖ 1 to
obtain a new configuration (where counts associated with all other partitions
remain unchanged). Repeating this for each b ∈ B gives us the set of all possible
new abstract configurations.
Case 3: mode(os) = concrete. Since we are dealing with only one object, we
can employ Case 2 for ∃1.
Thus, if mode(e) = ∀, all objects belonging to all witness partitions for e at cfg
migrate to corresponding new destination partitions. On the other hand, ifmode(e) =
∃, then any one object belonging to any one witness partition for e at cfg will migrate
to a new destination partition.
13The case for ∃k with k > 1 is handled in a similar fashion— except that there may be several
witness partitions, and more than one object may be chosen from each witness partition provided
the total number of objects is k.
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4.4.5 Example Illustrating Abstract Execution
We illustrate our abstract execution semantics using the CTAS example (see Sec-





1 , CM, connect, ǫ) in SMSC Connect shown in Figure 4-4, at
a given abstract configuration, where gV1 : status = 0 and g
H
1 : h1 = (ǫ | last(e1)). As
described earlier in Section 4.4.3, we assume two history based guards h1 and h2 for
the Client process class and none for the CM class. Further, the DFAs corresponding
to the regular expressions h1 and h2 contain only two states, given by {q0, q1}, and
{q′0, q
′
1}, respectively, where q0 and q
′
1 are the accepting states. State q0 is the state
of a Client object ready to connect to the CM. Also, two variables status and v are
defined in the Client class, while CM contains a single variable status.
Assuming 20 Client objects in a given system specification, such that, 15 of them
are ready to connect to CM (i.e., are in state q0 of the DFA representing guard h1),
we consider the following abstract configuration for Client class–
cfgClient(b1) = 15, cfgClient(b2) = 5, where b1 = 〈q0, q
′
0, 0, 0〉 b2 = 〈q1, q
′
0, 0, 0〉.
Here, b1 and b2 are the behavioral partitions of the Client class. The first two elements
in b1 and b2 correspond to the states in the minimal DFAs representing the history
guards h1 and h2, respectively, while the next two numeric elements represent the
values (0 in each case) of variables status and v. By executing event e above, a
disconnected Client sends a connection request to CM. Following Definition 16, we
can determine Witness(e, cfg) = {b1}. Thus, there is only one behavioral partition
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b1 that can serve as witness partition for e. Any Client object from b1 can now be
chosen to execute event e. After the execution of e, the selected Client object will
move to states q1 and q
′
1 in the two DFAs, and the destination partition (following
Definition 17) is given by dest(b1, e) = 〈q1, q
′
1, 0, 0〉. The new abstract configuration
cfg′ for Client class (following ‘Case 2’ of migrates to function described earlier) is as
follows–
cfg′Client(b1) = 14, cfg
′
Client(b2) = 5, cfg
′
Client(b3) = 1, where b1 = 〈q0, q
′
0, 0, 0〉,
b2 = 〈q1, q
′
0, 0, 0〉, b3 = 〈q1, q
′
1, 0, 0〉.
Note that one Client object from behavioral partition b1 has migrated to a new
partition b3.
4.4.6 Properties of SMSC Semantics
A pertinent question that arises from the above discussion is that given a SMSC spec-
ification S, what is the signature T that we should use to define the concrete/absrtact
configuration space CT in which S may be simulated? Let us assume that for any
class p, Vp(S) represents the set of all variables that appear on event variable guards
or post-conditions on lifeline p in S. Similarly, let Rp(S) denote the set of regular
expressions used on event history guards of lifeline p in S. We define signature T (S),
the signature derived from S, as T (S) = {Tp(S) = (Vp(S), Rp(S))}p∈P . Then T (S)
represents a necessary and sufficient signature to simulate S.
Given such a mechanism for obtaining a signature from SMSC specifications, it
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is reasonable to ask the following question. Given two SMSC specifications S1 and
S2, under what signatures T—or, configuration spaces C
T—should the bisimulation
equivalence of S1 and S2 be tested? The following theorems try to address this
question.
Theorem 5. Let S1 and S2 be two SMSC systems and let T (S1) 6= T (S2). Then
∀T ⊇ T (S1) ∪ T (S2) S1 6↔CT S2.
Proof. Note that, for a SMSC specification S having signature T (S) =
{Tp(S)}p∈P , the variables in Vp(S) and regular-expressions in Rp(S) are part of vari-
ous events appearing in S. Now, considering S1 and S2, clearly there exists an event
in S1 not equal to any event in S2 (since, T (S1) 6= T (S2)), or vice-versa. Hence, from
the definition of bisimulation (see Defn. 11) it is easy to see that we cannot guarantee
that S1 ↔CT S2 under a signature T ⊇ T (S1) ∪ T (S2).
Theorem 6. Let S1 and S2 be two SMSC systems such that T (S1) = T (S2) = T and
S1 ↔CT S2. Then for any signature T
′, S1 ↔CT ′ S2.
Proof. Since, S1 ↔CT S2, there exists a bisimulation relation B
CT such that S1B
CT S2




∈CT (Σ),C,C′∈CT (C : S1
a
−→ C′ : S′1 ⇒ ∃S′2∈CT (Σ)(C : S2
a












a be executable from S1 at some configuration C1 ∈ C
T ′, leading to configuration
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C ′1 ∈ C
T ′. Then, a can also be executed from S2 at configuration C1 and leading to
configuration C ′1. This is because, the event-guard and postcondition being part of
an event itself, following condition (4.9) above if an event can be executed from S1 at
any given configuration C, it can also be executed from S2 at configuration C, with
both executions leading to the same destination configuration. Note that, the set of
actions executable from S1 at a configuration C1 ∈ C
T ′ will be a subset of actions
executable from S1 at a configuration C ∈ C









). Hence, we get
∀S′
1
∈CT (Σ),C,C′∈CT ′ (C : S1
a
−→ C ′ : S ′1 ⇒ ∃S′2∈CT (Σ)(C : S2
a






Thus, condition (4.1) of Definition 11 holds for relation BC
T
′
. The remaining condi-




bisimulation and S1 ↔CT ′ S2.
Thus, if S1 and S2 have the same signatures under which they are bisimilar, they
are bisimilar under any signature.
4.5 Experiments
The operational semantics for SMSCs has been implemented as Prolog rules in the
XSB logic programming system [4]. XSB supports tabled resolution for query evalua-
tion. This speeds up execution by avoiding redundant computation. The operational
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semantics of SMSCs lend themselves naturally to Prolog rules leading to a straightfor-
ward implementation. On the other hand, the underlying well-engineered fixed point
engine in XSB ensures that the evaluation of the rules is done efficiently as well.
Both concrete and abstract execution semantics of SMSCs are implemented in XSB
and they share as much code as possible. We now present the experimental results
obtained for the ‘CTAS weather controller’ example which was described earlier in
Section 4.2. All experiments were conducted on a Pentium-IV 3GHz machine with
1GB of main memory.
Modeling effort First we briefly discuss the modeling effort required for the CTAS
example from given requirements document. The requirements [1] are given as a set of
scenarios from the perspective of the controller (or CM - communications manager),
with precondition(s) given for the occurrence of each scenario. We were able to
directly translate each scenario into corresponding SMSC. The high level control
flow (HSMSC) was easily obtained by following the preconditions given for various
scenarios. Some characteristic features of the modeled example are shown below.
Note that CTAS HSMSC is flat, i.e. each of its node corresponds to a SMSC.
# HSMSC nodes = # SMSCs 17
Total # Events 103
# Events with non-trivial reg. expr. guards 3
# Events with non-trivial propositional guards 65
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Figure 4-6: (a) Abstract vs Concrete Simulation Times for Different Settings of CTAS
(b) Peak Memory Requirement for Abstract and Concrete Simulation, (c) Abstract vs
Concrete State Space Exploration Times, (d) Peak Memory Requirement for Abstract
and Concrete State Space Exploration.
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Simulation The graphs in Figure 4-6(a) and (b) compare the simulation time/mem-
ory for abstract vs concrete semantics for the CTAS example. The use case used
in simulation first connects all the Client objects to the controller (CM) and then
performs the weather updates on all the connected clients (refer to Section 4.2).
Different runs correspond to different settings of the CTAS model with number of
client objects being varied (shown on the x-axis of the graph). As we can easily
observe, for abstract simulation the time/memory remains almost constant (≈ 1.9
sec/40 MB) even as the number of objects is increased from 20 to 100, while it
increases at least linearly (3.5→ 48.7 sec/100→ 900 MB) for concrete simulation. We
recall that in abstract simulation, various objects are grouped together into behavioral
partitions, unlike in concrete simulation where the states of all objects have to be
maintained and manipulated individually.
State Space Exploration We explored all possible traces up to a certain length,
where each step in a trace is the execution of an SMSC event. The results appear in
Figure 4-6(c) & (d), where the bound on the length of traces explored is set to 20.
We find that abstract exploration time/memory is constant (≈ 4.8 sec/41 MB) across
different settings of CTAS, and increases linearly (19 → 139 sec/ 81 → 590 MB) for
the concrete exploration. Moreover, we found that the exploration time/memory
required for the CTAS model with an unbounded number of client objects is same
as that for the CTAS model with a bounded number of client objects for abstract
execution semantics (4.8 sec/41 MB). Thus, using our abstract execution semantics,
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the system designer can try out various system settings (having sufficiently large
or even unbounded number of objects) without worrying about computation costs.
Furthermore, the designer can perform reachability analysis for a system setting with
unbounded number of objects to look for falsification of invariant properties in all
possible system settings with finitely many objects.
4.6 Associations
In many distributed systems, various processes often come together to execute a short
interaction scenario, establishing temporary links amongst them lasting over the pe-
riod of communication. For example, in a telephone network consisting of thousands
of phones and switches, communication links are established between the caller and
the called phones via the intermediate switches for the duration of the call. Thus,
while modeling such distributed protocols, a designer may want to explicitly specify
establishing/removing of such association links, and moreover, constrain the commu-
nicating processes to be linked via such associations. In the object-oriented setting,
such a link between the processes can be viewed as an instance of an association
between the classes to which these processes belong, as depicted in a corresponding
class diagram. An association can be static– representing a static (or permanent)
relationship between the processes of the associated classes, or it can be dynamic–
representing dynamically changing relationship amongst the processes.
In order to allow a designer to specify constraints over associations, we extend our
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Student InstructorCourse
10 5 2 1
isTaughtByenrolled
Figure 4-7: Class diagram- Course Management System.
language of SMSCs to include the following three types of constructs– i) an insert
constraint for establishing association links between various processes, ii) a check
constraint to restrict the pairs of communicating processes to be linked via a given
association, and iii) a delete constraint for removing the existing association links
between processes. Note that, the insert and delete constraints are only required in
the case of dynamic associations. In the case of static associations we can only apply
the check constraint. In the following, we first describe a case study which is used later
while discussing the associations. Then, we discuss various association constraints in
detail and present an extended SMSC execution semantics incorporating associations.
4.6.1 Case Study– A Course Management System
In this case study we model the key aspects of a university course-management system
(CMS) at a high level. It consists of three process classes– i) Instructor, ii) Course and
iii) Student. The class diagram for this example is shown in Figure 4-7. A student
can enroll in a maximum of 5 courses, while a course can be taken by a maximum
of 10 students. Similarly, an instructor can teach up to 2 courses at a time and a
course can be taught only by a single instructor. The HSMSC behavioral description
for this case study appears in Figure 4-8.
We assume a fixed pool of courses, from which an instructor can select a course







Figure 4-8: HSMSC specification- Course Management System.
to teach (if it has not already been taken up). This selection occurs in the HSMSC
node labeled Initialize (see Fig. 4-8). Once a course has been initialized, students can
register for this course on a first-come first-serve basis. A successful registration occurs
at the node labeled Register. Students can register for a course until its maximum
capacity (i.e. 10) is reached. Once registration is over, some students might choose
to drop the course as well (node labeled Drop, Fig. 4-8), and a course gets canceled
(node labeled Cancel) if less than 3 students remain registered. Otherwise, the course
is assumed to complete successfully as indicated by the node labeled Complete.
The SMSCs corresponding to the HSMSC nodes labeled Initialize and Drop are













Figure 4-9: SMSC Initialize
4.6.2 Association constraints
For our purpose, we consider only binary associations relating pairs of process classes.
In a SMSC system model, an association constraint is specified below a message ar-
row, representing a constraint over process pairs executing the corresponding message
send/receive events.
Association Insert An association insert constraint is specified as insert(asc),
where asc is the name of an association, and appears as a post-condition written
below a message m in a SMSC. It results in the insertion of object pairs, executing
the send and receive events corresponding to message m, in the binary relation asc.
For example, in SMSC Initialize (shown in Figure 4-9) from the course-management
system (CMS) described earlier, message arrow done is labeled with a post-condition
insert(isTaughtBy). Thus, during execution, an object pair (Oc, Oi) will be inserted
in the binary relation isTaughtBy, such that Oc is the Course object sending the done
message and Oi is the corresponding Instructor object receiving the done message.
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< count’= count - 1>
Figure 4-10: SMSC Drop
Association Check For an association asc, the check constraint is specified as
a pre-condition check(asc), and appears below a message m in a SMSC. This con-
straint requires that the object pairs selected for executing the send and receive events
corresponding to message m, are in the asc relation. For example, in SMSC Drop
appearing in the CMS example (see Figure 4-10), message arrow drop is labeled with
the pre-condition check(enrolled). This pre-condition requires that the object pair
(Os, Oc) is in relation enrolled, where Os and Oc are Student and Course objects,
respectively executing send and receive events corresponding to the message drop.
Association Delete Similar to an association insert, a delete constraint over an
association asc is specified as a post-condition delete(asc) annotating a message, say
m, in a SMSC. Further, this constraint implicitly requires a check(asc) constraint to
be imposed as a pre-condition for message m. As the name suggests, the effect of a
delete(asc) constraint labeling a message m is to remove the object pairs executing
the send and receive events corresponding to message m from the binary relation
asc. For example, in SMSC Drop shown in Figure 4-10, message ok is annotated with
the delete constraint- delete(enrolled). Thus, the object pair chosen for executing
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the send and receive events for message ok, is required to be in the enrolled relation.
Moreover, this object pair will be removed from the enrolled relation after executing
the above events.
In the following, in order to simplify our discussion, we assume that the send
and the receive events corresponding to a message annotated with an association
constraint, occur synchronously — that is, the receive event occurs immediately after
the corresponding send event. Later in Section 4.10, we discuss some of the main issues
that arise in association handling if we follow the usual asynchronous semantics. Let
es = out(osi, osj, m, pc1) and er = in(osi, osj, m, pc2) be the send and receive events
corresponding to message m annotated with an association constraint ctr. Then,
synchronous execution of es and er is captured as a single synchronous event given
by synch(osi, osj, m, pc1, pc2, ctr). Let Asynch denote the set of all such synchronous
events. We extend the set of SMSC events ASMSC (see Defn. 8) to also include the
events in Asynch. Further, while translating a SMSC to the corresponding process term
(as described earlier in Section 4.4.1), a synchronous event representing message m
is added to the process term using the weak sequential operator ◦, such that, all the
events preceding send and receive events corresponding to message m in the SMSC
event ordering (see Defn. 9) have already been added.
In the case of concrete execution semantics, the handling of associations is straight-
forward and follows the approach described in the preceding. However, recall that
in case of our abstract execution semantics, we do not represent various objects as
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p q
cp cqasc
Figure 4-11: Example class diagram.
independent entities, but rather group them together in to behavioral partitions (ref.
Section 4.4.4). Thus, maintaining associations in the presence of abstract execution
semantics poses a challenge. We present one possible approach towards this end in
the following Section.
4.7 Abstract execution semantics with Associations
To integrate associations with our abstract execution semantics, where various objects
are grouped in to behavioral partitions, we maintain association relations between
behavioral partition pairs instead of object pairs. Intuitively, if in a concrete execution
two objects, say O and O′, are present in a binary relation asc after executing a
sequence of events σ. Then, in the abstract execution, following the same event
execution sequence σ, the behavioral partition pair (B,B′) will be present in the asc
relation, such that B (B′) is the behavioral partition containing the object O (O′) in
the abstract execution of σ.
Let A denote the set of all associations and asc ∈ A be an association between
process classes p and q. Further, let cp and cq be the count annotations labeling
association asc at class p’s and q’s end respectively (see class-diagram in Fig. 4-11).
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We now define the function maxasc : N ∪ {ω} × N ∪ {ω} → N ∪ {ω} such that for
n1, n2 ∈ N ∪ {ω}:
maxasc(n1, n2) =MIN{n1 × cq, n2 × cp, n1 × n2}, (4.10)
where we assume ω × = ω.
The value returned by maxasc(n1, n2) is the maximum number of asc links that
can be established between n1 p-objects and n2 q-objects. The first term n1×cq in the
MIN expression in Eq.(4.10) gives the maximum number of asc links that n1 objects
of class p can establish with (sufficient number of) objects of class q. Second term
of the MIN expression gives the similar quantity for n2 objects of class q. Finally,
the third term gives maximum number of links that can be established between n1
and n2 objects. Thus, a minimum of these three quantities determines the maximum
possible asc links that can be established in the given setting. We now define the
notion of an extended abstract configuration.
Definition 18 (Extended Abstract Configuration). Let each process class p con-
tain Np objects, T={(Vp, Rp)}p∈P be a signature, and A be the set of all associ-
ations. An extended abstract configuration over T and A is defined as cfgx =
({countp}p∈P , {acountasc}asc∈A) where
1. countp : BEHp(Vp, Rp)→ N ∪ {ω} is a mapping s.t. Σb∈BEHp(Vp,Rp)countp(b) =
Np, and
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2. acountasc : BEHp(Vp, Rp) × BEHq(Vq, Rq) → N ∪ {ω}, where asc ∈ A is
an association between process classes p and q and ∀(b, b′) ∈ BEHp(Vp, Rp) ×
BEHq(Vq, Rq). acountasc(b, b
′) ≤ maxasc(countp(b), countq(b
′)).
The set of all extended abstract configurations over signature T and associations
A is denoted as CTA.
Thus, besides maintaining the object count in each behavioral partition of various
process classes, an extended abstract configuration also keeps track of count of object
pairs in various behavioral partition pairs for each association.
We now discuss operational semantics of SMSCs in the presence of associations.
Various semantic rules describing execution of SMSCs in the absence of associations
(ref. Section 4.3, Tables 4.1 and 4.2), remain unchanged in the presence of associ-
ations, except for rule Const2, Table 4.1, which is modified as follows– (i) the con-
figurations C,C ′, now represent extended abstract configurations from CTA instead of
simple object configurations from CT , and (ii) the supports and migrates to methods
are replaced by their extended versions– supportsext and migrates toext respectively to
take associations into account. Hence, supportsext and migrates toext methods form
the core of our association handling in the abstract semantics. In the following, we
discuss these methods for different association constraints.
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4.7.1 Association Insert
An insert constraint insert(asc) is taken into account when executing a synchronous
event of the form e = synch(osi, osj, m, pc1, pc2, insert(asc)). Let es =
out(osi, osj, m, pc1) and er = in(osi, osj, m, pc2) denote the send and receive events
constituting the synchronous event e, and C ∈ CTA be a given extended abstract con-
figuration. Then the method call C.supportsext(e) returns true if there exist witness
partitions (see Definition 16, page 122) for both es and er at C. Note that, in case
a common behavioral partition, say beh ∈ BEHp, is chosen as a witness partition
for both es and er, we require that countp(beh) > 1. This is to ensure that distinct
objects execute es and er. If this is possible, then C.migrates toext(e) returns a set of
possible destination configurations considering the effect of postconditions pc1, pc2,
and the insert(asc) constraint at C.
Let C ≡ (cfg = {countp}p∈P , acfg = {acountasc}asc∈A), WPs = Witness(es, cfg)
and WPr = Witness(er, cfg). Here WPs and WPr represent the set of possible
witness partitions for the events es and er at C. To simplify our discussion we assume
that the send and receive events (i.e. es and er) are executed by two different process
classes, say p and q s.t. p 6= q, and hence, WPs ∩WPr = ∅.
We now discuss the effect of migrates toext method, which depends on the abstrac-
tion modes of the send and receive events (i.e. mode(osi) and mode(osj)), giving rise
to the following three cases–
1. (mode(osi), mode(osj)) = (∃, ∃), i.e. both send and receive events have existen-
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tial abstraction modes.
2. (mode(osi), mode(osj)) = (∃, ∀) or (mode(osi), mode(osj)) = (∀, ∃), i.e. one of
the send or receive events has existential abstraction mode, and the other has
universal abstraction mode.
3. (mode(osi), mode(osj)) = (∀, ∀), i.e. both send and receive events have universal
abstraction modes.
In the following, we discuss Case-2 from above in detail, the other two cases are
handled in a similar manner.
One of the event (send or receive) has existential mode and the other one has universal
mode- (∃, ∀). Let ex and ea represent the events having existential and universal
execution modes respectively. Without any loss of generality, we assume that ex is
executed by an object of process class p, while ea is executed by the objects of class q.
Further, let WPx/WPa be the set of possible witness partitions corresponding to the
event ex/ea. Recall that, when there are no association constraints, we can choose all
objects from all the witness partitions in WPa to execute ea, and for executing ex,
we can select any partition from WPx and an object from that partition. However,
due to the insert constraint, the number of objects that can execute ea is bounded.
In this case we need to take in to consideration the count annotations for association
asc between classes p and q (e.g. see class diagram in Figure 4-11). This is used to
determine the maximum number of objects of the class q that can be linked with a
single object of the class p via asc (which is cq in this case), and hence the maximum
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number of q-objects that be chosen to execute ea. For illustration, consider the class
diagram for the CMS example shown in Figure 4-7. If p (q) corresponds to Student




countp(b) ≤ cq then we can select all objects from all partitions in
WPa to execute ea. Otherwise, we may have different choices for– a) selecting a subset
of witness partitions fromWPa for executing ea, and b) choosing the number of objects
to execute ea from each selected witness partition. Since, these non-deterministic
choices may lead to a large number of alternatives, we over-approximate and consider
all possible choices in a single execution step. For each partition b ∈WPa, we compute
a minimum min(b) and a maximum max(b) number of objects that can be chosen to
execute ea. Clearly, for any partition b ∈WPa,
max(b) = MIN{countp(b), cq} (4.11)




′)}. Essentially, min(b) is 0 if it is possible to select cq objects
from other partitions in WPa. Otherwise, there are not enough number objects in





objects are required from b. Note that, when
∑
b∈WPa
countp(b) ≤ cq, for all b ∈ WPa
we set min(b) = max(b) = countp(b). Let DPa = {d| b ∈ WPa ∧ d = dest(b, ea)}
represent the set of destination partitions corresponding to WPa. For a destination
partition d ∈ DPa, we define B(d) = {b| b ∈ WPa ∧ dest(b, ea) = d}. In case of








Figure 4-12: The (∃, ∀) case for associations.
existential event ex, we do not over approximate and choose any partition bx ∈WPx
as a witness. Let, dx = dest(bx, ex) be the corresponding destination partition.
The count of various behavioral partitions is updated via migrates toext method
as follows. For each witness partition b ∈ WPa we decrement its count by min(b),
i.e. count′p(b) = countp(b) ⊖min(b). In case of a destination partition d ∈ DPa, we





Then we compute count′p(d) = countp(d) ⊕ incr(d). The counts of bx and dx are
updated as follows– count′q(bx) = countq(bx) ⊖ 1 and count
′
q(dx) = countq(dx) ⊕ 1.
The object counts of all other partitions remain unchanged.
Next, we discuss the update of asc relation content which also occurs via mi-
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grates toext method in our operational semantics. Consider the illustration shown
in Figure 4-12, depicting various behavioral partitions involved in the execution of
ex/ea and possible asc links existing among them. These links are classified into the
following four categories, based on the pair of behavioral partitions involved in a link–
(i) 〈wpx, wp〉, wp ∈WPa (linked via plain lines),
(ii) 〈dpx, dp〉, dp ∈ DPa (linked via curved lines),
(iii) 〈wpx, dp〉, dp ∈ DPa (linked via dashed lines), and
(iv) 〈dpx, wp〉, wp ∈ WPa (linked via double lines).
We now describe the update of association counts for tuples in (ii) above, i.e.
〈dpx, dp〉, dp ∈ DPa (linked via curved lines). Association count updates for various
other tuples follow the similar approach.
acount′asc(dpx,dp),dp ∈ DPa: From the association links shown in Figure 4-12,
we observe that there three potential sources from which asc links can be added
to the tuple 〈dpx, dp〉. These are– (a) 〈wpx, dp〉, (b) 〈wpx, wp〉, wp ∈ B(dp), and
(c) 〈dpx, wp〉, wp ∈ B(dp). We now determine the contribution from each of these
sources–
From (a). x1 = MIN{cq − 1, acountasc(wpx, dp)}. Assuming that the object
executing ex is inserted in asc link with at least one object executing ea, it can
not be linked to more than cq − 1 objects in dp.
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From (b). x2 = MIN{cq,
∑
wp∈B(dp)max(wp)}, where max(wp) is computed
as defined earlier in Eq. (4.11). The summation term in the MIN expression
here computes the maximum number of objects that can migrate in to dp, and
it can not be greater than cq objects. Note that, this quantity is same as the
value x computed in Eq. (4.13).
From (c). Let n =
∑
wp∈B(dp)max(wp), i.e. the maximum number of objects
that can possibly migrate into dp. If n ≤ cq, then all these objects are chosen
to move to dp, and their contribution to asc count from tuples 〈dpx, wp〉, wp ∈




MIN{acountasc(dpx, b), max(b)× (cp − 1)}.
We know that for each b ∈ B(dp), all objects in b executing ea will be inserted
in association asc with the object executing ex. Hence, each such object in b
can not be linked to more than cp − 1 objects in dpx.
In case n > cq, we compute the maximum possible asc link contribution from
any cq objects out of these n objects. For this, we first compute for each
b ∈ B(dp)– s(b) = MIN{acountasc(dpx, b), max(b) × (cp − 1)}/max(b). The
term s(b) determines per object asc link contribution for a given partition b. Let
Bs = 〈b1, . . . , b|B(dp)|〉, such that 1 ≤ u < v ≤ |B(dp)| =⇒ s(bu) ≥ s(bv). Next,
we determine the index value i, such that
∑i
r=1max(br) < cq <
∑i+1
r=1max(br),









max(br))× (cp − 1), acountasc(dpx, bi+1)}






x = acountasc(dpx, dp) + x1 + x2 + x3.
A set of configurations will be returned by the migrates toext method due to choice
in the selection of a witness partition for existential event ex.
4.7.2 Association Check/Delete
We discuss the association check and delete constraints together since, a delete con-
straint delete(asc) specified as a message m’s post-condition in a SMSC specification,
implies a check constraint check(asc) as message m’s pre-condition.
The check(asc) constraint requires that the object pairs selected to synchronously
execute the send and receive events corresponding to message m, are related via asc.
On the other hand, delete(asc) constraint removes the object pairs related via asc
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from the asc relation. A check constraint is taken into account when executing a
synchronous event e with check or delete as the association constraint. Again, let
es and er be send and receive events corresponding to the synchronous event e, and
C ∈ CTA be the extended abstract configuration when executing e. Then the method
call C.supportsext checks whether there exist two (disjoint) sets of objects that can
execute es and er at C, such that objects across the two sets are related via asc. If
this is possible, then witness behavioral partitions for both these events are selected
and corresponding destination partitions are updated by the migrates toext method.
In addition, migrates toext updates the asc relation contents of various witness and
destination partitions participating in the execution of e.
Similar to the insert constraint, handling of check and delete constraints depends
on the abstraction modes of the send and receive events. Letmode(osi) andmode(osj)
be the abstraction modes for the send (es) and receive (er) events respectively. Then,
the following three cases arise.
1. (mode(osi), mode(osj)) = (∃, ∃), i.e. both send and receive events have existen-
tial abstraction modes.
2. (mode(osi), mode(osj)) = (∃, ∀) or (mode(osi), mode(osj)) = (∀, ∃), i.e. one of
the send or receive events has existential abstraction mode, and the other has
universal abstraction mode.
3. (mode(osi), mode(osj)) = (∀, ∀), i.e. both send and receive events have universal
abstraction modes.
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We now describe handling of check and delete constraints for the case with one
of the send or receive events having existential mode, and the other universal. Other
cases are handled similarly.
Let ex and ea denote the events having existential and universal abstraction modes
respectively. Without any loss of generality, we assume that ex is executed by an
object of process class p, while ea is executed by the object(s) of class q. Further,
let WPx/WPa be the set of possible witness partitions corresponding to the event
ex/ea, such that for each partition wp in WPx (WPa) there is a partition wp
′ in
WPa (WPx) with asc links between wp and wp
′, i.e. acountasc(wp,wp
′) > 0. Then,
we can choose any behavioral partition from WPx, say wpx, to act as the witness
partition for ex; and the subset of partitions WP
x
a ⊆ WPa for ea, such that ∀wp ∈
WP xa .(acountasc(wpx, wp) > 0).
Let dpx be the resulting destination partition corresponding to wpx after exe-
cuting ex. Then migrates toext will decrement the object count of wpx by 1 (i.e.
count′p(wpx) = countp(wpx) ⊖ 1) and increment the object count of dpx by 1 (i.e.
count′p(dpx) = countp(dpx) ⊕ 1). Now, in the case of ea, in order to satisfy the
check(asc) constraint we can only select objects in WP xa which are linked via the
asc association to the object executing ex. However, due to over-approximation in
maintaining the association links– (a) the existence of linked object pairs in two be-
havioral partitions b and b′ can not be guaranteed, even if acountasc(b, b
′) > 0, and
(b) we loose the precise structure of association links between objects. Thus, for each
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partition wp ∈ WP xa we determine a minimum min(wp) and a maximum max(wp)
number of objects that can potentially execute ea. From condition (a) above we get
min(wp) = 0, i.e. there might be no object in wp linked with the object executing
ex. Further, we compute
max(wp) = MIN{cq, countq(wp), acountasc(wpx, wp)}. (4.12)
Above, first term in the MIN expression is cq, which is the maximum number of
q-objects, that an object of class p executing ex can be linked with. However, from
wp we cannot choose a number of objects greater than its count, i.e. countq(wp), or
greater than the number of asc links between wpx (partition from which object to
execute ex is chosen) and wp. Thus, max(wp) is computed as the minimum of these
three quantities.
We compute the new count of each partition wp ∈WP xa as count
′
q(wp) = countq(wp)⊖
min(wp), which is same as countq(wp). Let DP
x
a be the set of all destination parti-
tions corresponding to the partitions inWP xa with respect to the execution of ea. Con-
sider a behavioral partition dp ∈ DP xa . Let B(dp) = {wp|wp ∈WP
x
a ∧ dest(wp, ea) =





as the maximum increment in the object count of dp. Note that, due to association
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check constraint we are sure that no more than cq objects can migrate to a destination
partition. Finally, count′q(dp) = countq(dp)⊕ x.
Next, we discuss the update of asc relation content which occurs via migrates toext
method in our operational semantics. Consider the illustration shown in Figure 4-12,
depicting various behavioral partitions involved in the execution of ex/ea and possi-
ble asc links among them. As mentioned earlier, these links are classified into the
following four categories, based on the pair of behavioral partitions involved in a link–
(i) 〈wpx, wp〉, wp ∈WP
x
a (linked via plain lines),
(ii) 〈dpx, dp〉, dp ∈ DP
x
a (linked via curved lines),
(iii) 〈wpx, dp〉, dp ∈ DP
x
a (linked via dashed lines), and
(iv) 〈dpx, wp〉, wp ∈ WP
x
a (linked via double lines).
The association counts for tuples in (ii) above are updated as described in the
following; updates for other cases are handled in a similar manner.
acount′asc(dpx,dp),dp ∈ DP
x
a: From the association links shown in Figure 4-12,
we observe that there three potential sources from which asc links might be added
to the tuple 〈dpx, dp〉. These are– (a) 〈wpx, dp〉, (b) 〈wpx, wp〉, wp ∈ B(dp), and
(c) 〈dpx, wp〉, wp ∈ B(dp). We now determine the contribution from each of these
sources–
From (a). x1 = MIN{cq − 1, acountasc(wpx, dp)}. Assuming that the object
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executing ex is linked via asc to at least one object which is executing ea, it can
not be linked to more than cq − 1 objects in dp.
From (b). x2 = MIN{cq,
∑
wp∈B(dp)max(wp)}, where max(wp) is computed
as defined earlier for a witness partition. The summation term in the MIN
expression computes the maximum number of objects that can migrate in to
dp, and it can not be greater than cq objects. Note that, this quantity is same
as the value x computed in Eq. (4.13).
From (c). Let n =
∑
wp∈B(dp)max(wp), i.e. the maximum number of objects
that can possibly migrate into dp. If n ≤ cq, then all these objects are chosen
to move to dp, and their contribution to asc count from tuples 〈dpx, wp〉, wp ∈




MIN{acountasc(dpx, b), max(b)× (cp − 1)}.
We know that for each b ∈ B(dp), all objects in b executing ea are linked via
asc to the object executing ex. Hence, each such object in b can not be linked
to more than cp − 1 objects in dpx.
In case n > cq, we compute the maximum possible asc link contribution from
any cq objects out of these n objects. For this, we first compute for each
b ∈ B(dp)– s(b) = MIN{acountasc(dpx, b), max(b) × (cp − 1)}/max(b). The
term s(b) determines per object asc link contribution for a given partition b.
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Let Bs = 〈b1, . . . , b|B(dp)|〉, such that 1 ≤ u < v ≤ |B| =⇒ s(bu) ≥ s(bv). Next,
we determine the index value i, such that
∑i











max(br))× (cp − 1), acountasc(dpx, bi+1)}
Finally, if there is no delete(asc) constraint present, the asc count for the tuple






x = acountasc(dpx, dp) + x1 + x2 + x3.
Otherwise, in the presence of the delete(asc) constraint, we do not consider the
asc link contribution from the tuples 〈wpx, wp〉, wp ∈ B, and compute x above as–
x = acountasc(dpx, dp) + x1 + x3.
4.7.3 Default case
In general there might be no association constraints specified with a message in a
SMSC specification. Then the execution of associated send and receive events remains
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asynchronous, and the object counts of the witness and the destination partitions are
updated as in the case of no associations. However, if the witness partition(s) chosen
for executing the event are involved in any association links, then we accordingly
update the association contents.
4.8 Exactness of Abstract Semantics
In this Section, we first show that any concrete execution of SMSCs can be realized
by our abstract execution semantics, but the converse, in general, is not true. We
also discuss an approach towards checking whether an abstract execution run is a
spurious one.
Theorem 7. Let σ be a finite sequence of events that can be exhibited in a the con-
crete execution of a SMSC model Spec. Then σ can also be exhibited in the abstract
execution of Spec.
The proof of Theorem 7 proceeds by induction on N , the length of the event
execution sequence σ. The detailed proof appears in Appendix C.1
We next note that the converse of the above theorem holds in the absence of
associations with various process classes having a fixed number of objects.
Theorem 8. Let Spec be a SMSC model without any association constraints and a
fixed number of processes in each process class. Then every finite sequence of events
under the abstract execution semantics is also an execution sequence under the con-
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crete execution semantics.
Proof. The proof follows by a straightforward induction on the length of abstract ex-
ecution run. The induction hypothesis is: Let σ be a finite sequence of events allowed
in the abstract execution semantics of a SMSC model Spec. Let beh ∈ BEHp be a
behavioral partition of class p with n objects after the abstract execution of σ. Then
σ is also possible in concrete execution. Furthermore, after the concrete execution of
σ there exists exactly n concrete objects of class p which reside in behavioral partition
beh.
Let σ = σprev · e and the induction hypothesis holds for σprev. In the induction
step, we need to show that the above holds after the execution of σ = σprev · e as
well. Since, there are no association constraints all events in Spec will be executed
asynchronously. Let beh1, . . . , behk be the witness behavioral partitions in the abstract
execution of e, such that ni objects are chosen from partition behi to execute e.
By the induction hypothesis, for i ∈ 1 to k, we have concrete objects o1, . . . , oni
whose state is given by the behavioral partition behi to participate in the concrete
execution of e. Furthermore, if beh′i is the destination partition of behi after the
abstract execution of e, we are guaranteed that o1, . . . , oni will move to beh
′
i after
the concrete execution of e. This follows from- (a) the definition of a destination
partition, Def. 17 and (b) the method for computing the new state of an object in
concrete execution semantics (Section 4.4.2). Now, in abstract execution, the object
count of each of the witness (destination) partition behi (beh
′
i) will be decremented
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c) Abstract associations 1
Figure 4-13: Example illustrating a spurious case.
(incremented) by ni after executing e. Similarly, after the concrete execution of e, the
number of objects whose state is given by the behavioral partition behi (beh
′
i), will
be decremented (incremented) by ni. Thus, the induction step is established.
4.9 Spurious abstract executions
In the following, we illustrate the presence of spurious runs in our abstract execution
semantics with the help of an example, and also discuss an approach for their detec-
tion. Consider two process classes P and Q, each having two objects, such that P has
an integer variable i and Q has an integer variable j. Let initial system configuration
be as shown in Figure 4-13(a), where p1 (q1) represents a behavioral partition of pro-
cess class P (Q) containing all its objects with variable valuations shown below, i.e.
〈i = 0〉 (〈j = 0〉).
Now for the SMSC S shown in Figure 4-13(b), we consider the following event ex-
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ecution sequence– e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e6, e7, e8. Various constraints involving association
asc appear in S. Assume that each P object can be associated with two Q objects
via asc and vice-versa. Then, after the abstract execution14 of the first two events
e1 and e2, the asc relation will have association count 1 for the behavioral partition
tuple 〈p2, q2〉. Here, partitions p2 and q2 of classes P and Q correspond to variable
valuations i = 1 and j = 1, respectively. Further, after executing events e3 and e4,
the asc count of tuple 〈p2, q3〉 will also become one, where partition q3 of class Q
corresponds to valuation of j = 2. The resulting association structure is pictorially
shown in Figure 4-13(c). At this point, we know that actually one of the P objects
in partition p2 is related via asc to a Q object in q2, while the other P object in p2
is related to the other Q object in q3 via asc. However, from the contents of asc
relation in the abstract execution it is not possible to determine whether the same or
different P objects in partition p2 are related via asc to Q objects in partitions q2 and
q3 respectively. Hence, in abstract execution the association information will be over
approximated in order to consider all the possibilities. That is, association asc may
refer to the same or different P objects in partition p2 appearing in the two tuples
〈p2, q2〉 and 〈p2, q3〉, as described above. The two corresponding concrete association
structures are shown in Figure 4-14 (a) and (b).
Now consider the execution of events e5 and e6, which cause an object following
association asc to move from partition p2 to p3, where p3 corresponds to i = 2. In
14We assume synchronous execution of events corresponding to a message annotated with an
association constraint.



























Figure 4-14: Various associations.
addition to the existing asc content in the abstract execution, the asc count of tuple
〈p3, q2〉 will become 1 after execution of e5 and e6. The resulting structure for asc,
arising due to the loss of precise association information in the abstract execution as
shown earlier, is shown in Figure 4-14 (c). From this, it is easy to see that events e7
and e8 can also be successfully executed in the abstract execution, hence resulting in
a spurious run.
4.10 Associations with Asynchronous semantics
As described in the preceding sections, we assume synchronous execution of messages
annotated with association constraints. We observe that handling of associations
becomes quite complex if we continue to follow asynchronous SMSC execution se-
mantics, as discussed in the following.
Assuming that the execution remains completely asynchronous, for a message an-
notated with an association insert constraint, we will need to keep track of the objects
executing the send event until the corresponding receive event is executed. This is
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required in order to relate the appropriate object pairs via the given association.
Moreover, until the matching receive event is executed, the objects being kept track
of may execute other events involving association constraints and move to different
partitions, thus adding further complexity to this process. Also, if both the send and
the receive events have universal abstraction mode, then it is not clear how to deter-
mine the set of objects for executing the send event. This is because, the objects that
can execute the corresponding receive event may not be determined at the time of
executing the send event. And, we need this information, since the number of objects
chosen to execute the send and receive events need to follow the association count
constraints, as discussed earlier in Section 4.7.1.
Similar problems arise in the case of association check constraint if we follow the
asynchronous semantics. Again, it may not always be possible to determine the set of
objects to execute the send event, since the objects that can execute the corresponding
receive event cannot be determined a priori. Furthermore, after the execution of the
send event we will need to keep track of the objects that have executed the send
event. Then, at the time of executing the matching receive event we can determine
the objects that are related to objects that have executed the send event via the given
association. An association delete constraint will be handled in a similar manner as
the association check, except that the related pairs will be removed from the given
association once the receive event is executed.
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4.11 Discussion
In this chapter, we have presented Symbolic Message Sequence Charts (SMSCs) as
a lightweight syntactic and semantic extension to conventional MSCs. SMSCs are
particularly suitable for behavioral description of systems with many behaviorally
similar objects. In such systems, similar MSC specifications become too voluminous
for human comprehension. First, we presented an abstract execution semantics for
SMSCs without involving associations, in which objects are dynamically grouped to-
gether and executed following a process theory based operational semantics. Our
approach was validated through a detailed case study and experiments involving a
non-trivial weather controller specification. We then extended the notation of SM-
SCs with various association constraints and discussed in detail the abstract SMSC
execution semantics in the presence of associations.
We observe that there are several extensions of SMSCs which add substantial
modeling power but involve minimal changes in the execution semantics. One ex-
tension will be to handle requirements of the form “at least (or at most) 10 objects
will play a certain role”. We can handle it by exploiting the delayed choice operator
in our process algebra. Yet another kind of requirement might be “some objects (an
unknown number) will play a certain role”. If the total number of objects is bounded,
our execution semantics requires minimal modification to handle such requirements.
In future, we will investigate other requirement templates involving similar processes
and integrate/support them systematically in our framework.
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Finally, in Section 4.9 we showed the presence of spurious execution runs in ab-
stract execution of SMSCs. A procedure for detecting the spurious runs can be
developed in a similar manner as in the case of IPC (ref. Section 3.6.3). Given an
event execution trace, concrete execution semantics can be used to test whether the
given trace is valid or not. Further, heuristics can be used for the concrete simulation
of the given trace with possibly a fewer number of objects for various process classes,
than specified for the abstract system from which the given trace is generated (via
abstract execution). For instance, let nump denote the total number of events exe-
cuted by a process of type p in an abstract execution trace. Then, for the concrete
simulation of the given trace, we can set the number of processes of type p to nump,
if nump is less than the number of p processes in the abstract execution.
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Chapter 5
A comparative study of IPC and
SMSC notations
In this chapter, we present a comparative study between our IPC and SMSC modeling
frameworks, which were discussed earlier in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively.
5.1 Local vs Global control
One distinction that can be immediately made when comparing the two notations is
local (IPC) vs global (SMSC) control. While, in the case of IPC, the control flow of
various process classes is explicitly specified by means of a Labeled Transition System,
SMSCs provide a global view of system execution where local control flow of various
process classes may not be inferred. Further, unlike MSCs, where an initial attempt
towards determining local control flow of a process can be made by projecting events
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along the lifelines representing the process (e.g. [114]), in case of SMSCs events along
a lifeline may not even be executed by the same (set of) objects, making it harder to
infer the control flow.
Having said that, we observe that the execution of IPC models is not entirely local
— the transactions are selected for execution in a global manner. This is because,
in an IPC transaction multiple processes can participate, and need to synchronize at
the beginning of a transaction execution. Further, in the Labeled Transition Systems
describing the control flow of various process classes, there may be non-deterministic
choice between several outgoing transitions (labeling a role in a transaction) from a
control state. Hence, problems similar to non-local choice as in case of HMSCs [15]
may arise, with different processes making locally inconsistent choice of executing a
transaction. This issue in IPC needs to be addressed, for instance by means of ad-
ditional synchronization messages from a control process, for obtaining a distributed
system implementation
5.2 Granularity of Execution
A key feature of IPC formalism is that it allows communication among processes
to be specified as short protocol snippets (modeled as transactions), rather than a
single message send or receive; which is a desirable property in modeling of various
control protocols involving bi-directional flow of information. Taking advantage of
this abstraction, the execution of IPC models is defined in terms of transactions
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Figure 5-1: Showing approximation of a SMSC broadcast message in IPC model.
(described using MSCs in our case), in which multiple processes from distinct classes
may participate together. On the other hand, execution of SMSCs is defined at the
level of individual send or receive events, with each event being executed by a subset
of objects from a process class, as determined by the associated event guard. An
exception to this asynchronous event execution in SMSCs occurs in the presence of
association constraints, where the send and receive events corresponding to a message
annotated with an association constraint are executed synchronously.
5.3 Lifeline Abstraction
Another important difference between IPC and SMSC notations is the presence of
symbolic lifelines in SMSCs. A lifeline in an MSC describing a transaction in an
IPC model is always concrete, and represents a single object. While, a lifeline in
a SMSC description can be symbolic, representing a subset of objects belonging to
the process class represented by that lifeline. Further, the universal (∀) abstraction
mode associated with an event appearing along a symbolic lifeline in a SMSC, allows
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specification of broadcast messages in a more direct and natural manner. The similar
behavior cannot be captured exactly in our IPC framework. Though, in some cases it
is possible to approximate the broadcast in IPC by repeatedly sending the broadcast
message using loops in the transition systems of the involved process classes. For
illustration, consider a system consisting of a process-class P containing a single
object, and a process class Q containing a fixed number of objects. The SMSC
shown in Figure 5-1(a) depicts the broadcast of message m by the P object to all
processes of type Q satisfying the boolean guard G1. In Figures 5-1(b) and (c), we
depict a possible way to model the broadcast of message m (shown in the SMSC in
Fig. 5-1(a)) in a IPC model. An IPC transaction γ in Figure 5-1(b) captures the
sending of message m from a process of type P to a process of type Q. The lifeline
Qr2 of transaction γ (in Fig. 5-1(b)) is guarded using the same boolean guard G1,
as appearing in the guard of receive event for message m in the SMSC shown in
Figure 5-1(a). Partial transition systems for process classes P and Q in a IPC model
are also shown in Figure 5-1(c). The loop shown in the partial transition system of
process class P (labeled with role γr1) enables repeated sending of message m by the
P process to the processes of type Q. The number of times the P object will execute
this loop is controlled using the guard G2 and local action A appearing along lifeline
Pr1 in transaction γ in Figure 5-1(b).
A more robust approach in this direction is to introduce the notion of a universal
lifeline in IPC, such that, rather than representing a single object, a universal lifeline
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will represent all the objects of a class satisfying the lifeline guard. However, unlike
the case of SMSCs where abstraction mode is applied to a single event, here the
universal abstraction will apply to all the events appearing along a universal lifeline.
Hence, the events appearing along a universal IPC lifeline will be executed by all
the objects chosen as per the lifeline’s guard. Further, association handling in IPC
will need to be appropriately modified, following a similar approach as in the case of
SMSCs for maintaining and updating the association counts.
Finally, in a IPC transaction, we have the notion of roles that can be played by
different objects from the same class. On the other hand, in the case of SMSCs,
different events along a symbolic lifeline can be executed by different sets of objects
depending upon the event guards. The explicit notion of roles can be easily introduced
in SMSCs by assigning specific roles to different lifelines from the same process class,
and having distinct objects execute the events appearing along different lifelines from
the same class.
5.4 Associations
Ability to specify association related constraints is one of the key features in our IPC
and SMSC notations. As described earlier in Section 4.6, in SMSCs the association
constraints are specified across a message send and receive event pair. Whereas,
in IPC, association constraints are more expressive in nature and can be used to
constrain process pairs participating in multiple roles and events in a transaction









Figure 5-2: An IPC transaction.
(ref. Section 3.5).
For illustration, consider an IPC transaction shown in Figure 5-2, with the follow-
ing two association constraints: (i) check (Ar1, Br2) is in Asc1, and (ii) check (Ar1,
Cr3) is in Asc2. Note that, the constraints of the form above may not be imposed
in a SMSC specification. For instance, in the IPC transaction shown in Figure 5-2,
using association constraint (ii) above, we are able to restrict the objects playing the
roles Ar1 and Cr3, which are not even communicating directly, to be related via Asc2
association.
5.5 Which requirements documents are suitable
for which language
In this section, we study different kinds of informal requirements and their charac-
teristics, suited for modeling via IPC or SMSC. Again, we focus on the requirements
targeting reactive systems consisting of several interacting processes.
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5.5.1 Requirements capturing overall system scenarios via
MSCs
In these type of requirements documents, MSCs are used for describing various system
scenarios. Usually, the intra-process control flow for each process in the system is
presented at a very high level using state machine like notation. While, snippets of
typical interactions between processes (as well as interactions between processes and
environment) are presented as MSCs.
The informality in these kind of requirements stems from the per-process state
machines not being detailed enough, and all possible system interactions not being
given (only important use-cases are captured).
We have had some experience in system modeling from such documents, the most
notable being the requirements document of Media-oriented Systems Transport or
MOST. The MOST [79] is a networking standard that has been designed for in-
terconnecting various classes of multimedia components in automobiles. It is cur-
rently maintained by the “MOST Cooperation”, an umbrella organization consisting
of various automotive companies and component manufacturers like BMW, Daimler-
Chrysler and Audi. It has been designed to suit applications that need to network
multimedia information along with data and control functions. The processes in this
system consist of a network master and several network slaves. From our experi-
ence in modeling MOST, we found that the hybrid nature of the Interacting Process
Classes (IPC) model makes it suitable for this kind of requirements documents. In
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particular, the IPC model captures both state machine like and MSC like notations
albeit at different levels the state machine like notation at the top level and the
MSC like notations at the lower level. Thus, we could obtain the high-level Labeled
Transition Systems (LTSs) of the processes by elaborating the control flow described
in the requirements document. Similarly, the MSCs appearing in the requirements
documents (system scenarios) will typically be broken into several MSCs appearing
in the IPC model (these are the MSCs which are mentioned in the action labels of
the LTSs). This process is of course manual, but the system scenarios in the require-
ments document form a useful guide about the alphabet of MSCs appearing in the
IPC model. A more detailed description of IPC modeling of MOST requirements
appears later in Section 7.1.
Since SMSCs suppress intra-process control flow, obtaining a SMSC specifica-
tion from such requirements documents involves a higher-level of human ingenuity.
It involves understanding the global control flow from the per-process control flow
described in the documents and encoding the global control flow in the form of a
HSMSC.
5.5.2 Requirements describing system behavior as global con-
straints
Certain requirements documents structure the system behavior into phases. Usu-
ally, these documents model a system with a central controller which manages the
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communication between processes as well as with the environment. The system be-
havior is then given from the perspective of the controller, trying to split its possi-
ble behaviors into phases; for each phase the pre-condition for entering that phase
as well as the actions to be executed in that phase are specified. We have had
experience in developing system specifications from such documents, the most no-
table being the weather-update controller from Center TRACON automation sys-
tem (CTAS) tools developed by NASA to manage incoming air traffic in busy air-
ports [26]. The weather-update controller in CTAS consists of a central commu-
nication manager (CM) and several weather-aware clients. The CM manages the
communication of weather updates to the clients. In the CTAS requirements doc-
ument1, the requirements are given from the view-point of the CM describing its
behavior under given preconditions. A sample CTAS requirement is shown below.
Requirement 2.6.2: The CM should perform the following actions when a
weather-aware client attempts to establish a socket connection to CM...
(a) set the weather-aware clients weather status to pre-initializing
(b) set the weather-cycle status to pre-initializing
(c) disable the weather control panel ....
Requirements of the form shown above can be directly modeled using SMSCs.
Modeling of CTAS requirements using SMSCs was described in detail earlier in Sec-
tion 4.2. For modeling such requirements using IPC, a bit more work is required.
Roughly speaking, the MSCs appearing in the IPC model will correspond to the
1http://scesm04.upb.de/case-study-2/requirements. pdf
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requirements, such as the one shown in the preceding. The pre-conditions in these re-
quirements basically convey which system phase can follow which phase a high-level
global control flow information. In the case of the IPC model, this is encoded via
the intraprocess control flow as shown by the high-level Labeled Transition Systems
(LTSs) of the processes in the system. Obtaining the LTSs for various process classes








Model-based testing is a well-known software development activity. The key idea
in model-based testing is to develop an explicit behavioral model of the software
from informal requirements. The system model forms a precise specification of the
software’s intended behaviors. Apart from a behavioral model of the system require-
ments, another important input to a test generation framework is a user-provided
test specification (also known as test-purpose). A test specification aids in selecting
interesting behaviors from a system model against which the user wishes to test a
system implementation.
Given a system model and a test specification, the test generation typically in-
volves a guided search of the system model to obtain test cases meeting the given
test specification criteria. Various approaches to model-based test generation differ
in the notations used for system modeling and/or test specification, and the actual
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test generation procedures. The test cases obtained from the system model are tried
on the software (which might have been constructed manually or semi-automatically)
to check the software’s behaviors and match them with the intended behaviors as de-
scribed by the model. A collection of contributions in this area appears in the book
[20].
Researchers have studied the methodological and technical issues in model-based
test generation, focusing on how a given model can be best exploited for constructing
test suites of real applications. In these works, different kinds of state machine like
executable models have been used. Each process of the system-under-test is modeled
as a (finite) state machine or I/O automata, or as a process algebraic expression
(which can be compiled into a state machine). A common thread linking all these
works is that they rely on intra-process behavioral models.
However, there has been little effort in utilizing inter-process behavioral models,
such as the ones using Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) [62] based notations, for
the purpose of test generation. Visually, a Message Sequence Chart depicts commu-
nicating processes as vertical lines; communication between processes are shown by
horizontal or downward sloping message arrows between these vertical lines. Thus,
MSCs emphasize inter-process communication. In the following we discuss related
work in the domain of model-based testing. In the next two chapters, we study
test generation from our notations of Interacting Process Classes (Chapter 7) [43]
and Symbolic Message Sequence Charts (Chapter 8) respectively, presented earlier in
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Chapters 3 and 4.
6.1 Related Work
Majority of model driven test generation approaches use state-based notations, which
are more suited for detailed and complete system descriptions. On the other hand,
there are relatively few scenario based notations suited for complete behavior descrip-
tions [42]. Note that, our current work falls in the latter category.
6.2 State-based
These approaches use some variant of state-based notations for modeling system be-
haviors. In [93], underlying system behavior is described using Extended Finite State
Machines (or EFSM) — the test generation involves translating the system model
into a Constraint Logic Programing (CLP) specification, adding in constraints corre-
sponding to a test-purpose, and executing resulting CLP program. Specifications in
AutoLink [70] are written in SDL [2], wherein a system is specified as a set of intercon-
nected abstract machines which are extensions of finite state machines. On the other
hand, a test-purpose in [70] is described using a MSC– the test generation proceeds by
state space exploration of system model, while trying to satisfy the test-purpose. The
notation of Labeled Transition Systems (or LTS) and its derivatives, such as IOTS
(Input-Output LTS), are used for formally describing specifications, implementations,
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as well as test-purposes in [112, 64]. The test-generation is automated and driven by
a conformance relation, which formally defines the notion of an implementation being
correct with respect to a given specification. The state space explosion problem due
to the presence of data variables is addressed in [104, 35]. They introduce symbolic
versions of IOTS, called IOSTS (Input Output Symbolic Transition Systems), which
include explicit notion of data and data-dependent control flow.
Statecharts [48] and its UML variant are popular notations widely used for be-
havioral system description. As such, there is a large body of work dealing with test
generation from them; here we mention a few of them. An initial work in this di-
rection is [86], involving test generation based on coverage criteria such as transition
and predicate coverage. In [56] Statecharts are transformed into flow-graphs captur-
ing both control and data flow in a Statechart. Tests are generated from resulting
flow-graphs based on conventional data (control) flow analysis techniques. A com-
plementary approach in [57] uses symbolic model checking for test generation from
Statecharts. In TesTor [88], test cases are generated from UML state diagrams by
recovering missing information in partially specified test-purposes, represented using
sequence diagrams. UML state machines are used for specifying a system model in
[89], and a test-purpose consists of a set of Accept and Reject scenarios, respectively
specifying positive and negative criteria for generating test-cases. Interaction test-
ing among classes modeled as state-machines, also taking into account the states of
collaborating objects, is studied in [36, 5].
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6.3 Scenario-based
In TOTEM [19], test cases are derived from use cases, which are structured and
detailed using UML activity and sequence diagrams. Sequence diagrams are used
in SeDiTeC [34] and SCENTOR [120] for describing test specifications, which are
extended with method parameters, and return values for method calls for actual
testing. COWSuite [12] uses UML sequence diagrams for describing system use-
cases. Corresponding to each use case, a set of test cases for testing that use case are
then derived. The UBET tool [113] supports test generation from a HMSC model, in
which test generation is primarily driven by the edge-coverage criteria in a HMSC. In
[73], the play-engine tool for Live Sequence Charts (LSCs), which are an extension of
MSCs, has been extended to support testing of scenario-based requirements.
6.4 Combined notations
A testing framework involving use of state and scenario based notations is presented
in [17]. A multi-paradigmatic approach towards model based testing was proposed
in [46], which, besides state/scenario based notations, also allows models to be de-
scribed using other diagrammatic notations and/or program fragments.
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6.5 Symbolic Test Generation
A number of model-based testing approaches support symbolic test generation from
system specifications involving data variables [104, 92, 35]. All these approaches
use state-based description of system behaviors and involve abstraction over data-
domains as a means for avoiding state-explosion during test generation for data-
intensive systems. However, various processes in a system are still represented in
a concrete manner as individual entities. Hence these approaches do not scale as
the number of processes (say of a class) is increased. One cannot directly use these
approaches for symbolic test generation of systems with large number of behaviorally
similar processes.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing work dealing with symbolic test
generation for systems with large number of behaviorally similar processes. Various
approaches towards symbolic testing via data abstraction address a different problem
— explosion in number of tests due to large number of data values.
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Test Generation from IPC
As described earlier in Chapter 3, in the IPC notation we describe each process-class
(i.e. a collection of processes) in the system-under-test as a labeled transition system.
However, each action label in a labeled transition system denotes a guarded Message
Sequence Chart (MSC) instead of an atomic action, such as a message send or receive.
Thus, if a MSC γ involves processes p and q, γ will appear in the action labels in
the transition systems for process p and process q. A global system execution trace in
this model is a sequence of MSCs. Further, we can symbolically execute such models
without maintaining the states of individual processes in a process class.
One of the main advantages of using such MSC-based models over State-based
models for test generation is that, we can represent test cases and test case specifica-
tions at a higher level than conventional model-based test generation methods. A test
case specification is a user input used for guiding the test generation process [112].
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Given an IPC system model where the set of all MSCs appearing in the model is
Γ, we present a test case as a finite sequence of MSCs drawn from Γ. A test case
specification is also a sequence of MSCs drawn from Γ where any sequence of charts
containing the test case specification as a subsequence is said to satisfy the test case
specification. This high level view of a test case can be helpful in providing a quick
and intuitive understanding of its behavior. The user can get a fairly good idea of
a test case behavior by looking at the sequence of MSCs it contains, rather than
having to examine the low level details involving message send/receive events or local
computations.
Also, since our IPC models can be executed symbolically, we can efficiently gen-
erate symbolic test cases for process classes with many (active) objects. As we have
already mentioned earlier, such interacting process classes are common in many ap-
plication domains — telecommunication (phone and switch classes), avionics (class of
aircrafts being controlled) and automotive infotainment (class of multimedia devices
operating inside a car). We note that, our notion of symbolic test case groups to-
gether various concrete test-cases with similar behavior, differing only in the identities
of objects of various classes participating in a test case. This makes our technique
particularly suitable for testing control systems with many similar interacting pro-
cesses.
Finally, since our behavioral model itself is MSC-based, we are able to exploit
the (fragments of) MSCs present in the requirements as MSCs in the behavioral
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model. This establishes a tighter connection between informal software requirements,
formal software models, and the test cases generated from such models. Such rela-
tionships enable easy traceability of the test execution results back to the original
requirements [42].
Finally, we would like to mention that our focus in the current chapter is on the
test case generation in the form of MSCs from the MSC-based executable models of
process classes. There are existing works (e.g. [89] ) covering test case execution and
assigning test verdicts for the test cases derived in the form of MSCs.
7.1 Case Study – MOST
In the following, we first present a case-study which is used as a running example
in our following discussion. The MOST (Media Oriented Systems Transport) [79] is
a networking standard that has been designed for interconnecting various classes of
multimedia components in automobiles. It is currently maintained by the “MOST
Cooperation”, an umbrella organization consisting of various automotive companies
and component manufacturers like BMW, Daimler-Chrysler and Audi. The MOST
network employs a ring topology, supporting easy plug and play for addition and
removal of any new devices. It has been designed to suit applications that need to
network multimedia information along with data and control functions.
A node (or the device) in the MOST network is a physical unit connected to
the network via a Network Interface Controller (NIC). A MOST system may consist
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of up to 64 such nodes with identical NICs. A network device generally consists
of various functional blocks, such as a tuner, an amplifier, CD player etc. Each
such functional block provides a number of functionalities which may be directly
available to user via human-machine interface or for use by other devices in the net-
work; for example, a CD player provides Play, Stop and Eject functions. A special
function block called the NetBlock is present in all the devices and provides func-
tions related to the entire device. Various specification documents for MOST are
available at http://www.mostcooperation.com/publications/ One of the specifi-
cations, namely the ‘MOST Dynamic Specification’, presents the general description
of the dynamic behavior in a MOST network, encompassing: a) Network Manage-
ment, b) Connection Management, and c) Power Management. Network management
ensures secure communication between applications over the MOST network by main-
taining and providing most recent information about various nodes, whereas Connec-
tion Management deals with the protocols for establishing communication channels
between nodes in the network. Network wake-up and shutdown are handled by the
Power Management component.
For our experiments, we modeled only the Network management part of MOST.
From the network management perspective the system consists of: (i) Network Mas-
ter (NM), a specific node which maintains the central registry containing network
address information about various devices and their functional blocks in the network,
and (ii) Network Slaves (NS), which are the remaining nodes in the network. The
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NM has two main functions: (a) maintaining the central registry with most up-to date
information, and (b) providing this information to various nodes when requested. The
requirements document describes the NM using two parallel processes: one requests
the configuration from NS when required, and other receives the registration infor-
mation sent by them. The configuration information received from slaves is checked
for various errors, such as invalid or duplicate functional block addresses etc. The
validity of the central registry is reflected in the NM variable ‘System State’ which
is set to ‘OK’ when registry is valid and ‘NotOK’ otherwise. At system startup the
state is always ‘NotOK’, and subsequently becomes ‘OK’ once NM is able to com-
plete the network scanning and update the central registry without any errors. Also,
some network slave may enter/leave the network resulting in ‘Network Change Event’
(NCE), which causes the NM to re-scan the network and communicate the changes
in the registry, if any.
Modeling MOST. The behavior description in the requirements document for
MOST is given in the form of “high-level MSCs from the view-point of a partic-
ular process”. Interestingly, the “high-level MSCs” in the requirements document
are actually not HMSCs. In reality, they are rather mistakenly called as “high-level
MSCs”, and they reflect -at a very high level- the control flow within a process. In
addition, several “scenario MSCs” in system execution are provided in the require-
ments document. The “scenario MSCs” of the requirements document correspond to
a sequence of MSCs in our modeling, that is, a scenario in system execution. Using































Figure 7-1: Transition system fragments: (a) Network Slaves: TSNS, and (b) Net-
work Master process responsible for receiving configuration from slaves: TSNM−B.
Transaction roles are not shown in action labels to reduce visual clutter.













Figure 7-2: MSCs (a) FBRcvDuplId, (b) FBInvldSetNotOK.
these scenarios, we elaborated on the very high-level per-process control flow given
by the “high-level MSCs” of the document. This gave us the labeled transition sys-
tem for each process class and the MSCs corresponding to the action labels of these
transition systems. There was however some additional work involved in our mod-
eling since the requirements document used both message passing as well as shared
variables for inter-process communication, whereas our modeling language does not
support shared variables.
As described earlier (Section 7.1), the MOST system consists of a network-master
NM and several network-slaves (NS). We modeled NM using two process classes:
‘NM-A’, for requesting configuration from slaves and ‘NM-B’ for receiving responses
from slaves. Also, environment is modeled as a separate process class, which takes
part in network on/off events and causes the network change event (NCE) whenever
a node leaves or joins the network. All network slaves are modeled as a single process
class ‘NS’; the number of slaves can be varied easily by changing the number of objects
of this class.
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Fragments of the transition system descriptions of the NS class, and the NM-
B (process responsible for receiving the configuration information from slaves), are
shown in Figure 7-1. The edges in these transition systems are labeled with transac-
tions or guarded MSCs. Recall that the edges in the high-level transition systems of
a process class in our IPC model are labeled with (transaction, role) pairs; here we
have not shown the roles in each transaction to reduce visual clutter. The transac-
tions corresponding to various transitions were easily obtained from the descriptions
given in the requirements document. However obtaining the control flow for the per-
process transition systems was not so straightforward. The “scenario MSCs” in the
requirements document (which correspond to sequences of MSCs describing overall
system behavior) were helpful in modeling the per-process control flow correctly.
For illustration, two transactions– FBRcvDuplId and FBInvldSetNotOK, from the
MOST example are shown in Figure 7-2. Transaction FBRcvDuplId (Fig. 7-2 (a))
represents a scenario in which the address information provided by a network slave
clashes with that of another slave which has replied earlier. Note that, in this trans-
action lifeline NM-B has a boolean guard InitScan = false. Thus, in order to execute
this transaction, NM-B’s local variable InitScan must be false. In case of transac-
tion FBInvldSetNotOK (Fig. 7-2 (b)), a network slave replies with an invalid address
information. This represents an error situation, such that NM-B keeps track of the
error count using variable NumErr. If NumErr < 2, then this transaction is executed
setting the system state to ‘NotOK’.
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Overall, the IPC specification for MOST comprises of 53 transactions (or guarded
MSCs) with process classes NS, NM-A and NM-B containing 18, 6 and 21 control
states respectively.
Example For illustration, consider process class NS with 50 network-slaves in a
MOST network. Assume that currently all slaves are residing in the control state S8
of its transition system TSNS in Figure 7-1 (a), while process NM-B is in the control
state RcvRegist of its transition system TSNM−B (Fig. 7-1 (b)). Let the values of
NM-B’s local variables InitScan and NumErr be false and 0 respectively. Further,
assume that there are no local variables in the NS class and no regular expression
guard for any transaction. Then, this configuration corresponds to
c = {〈S8→ 50〉, 〈(RcvRegist, InitScan = false,Numerr = 0)→ 1〉}.
For process class NS, its behavioral partition is described using only the control state
S8 from TSNS. For process class NM-B, a behavioral partition consists of control state
RcvRegist from TSNM−B and the values of its local variables InitScan and NumErr.
Note that we have only shown behavioral partitions with non-zero objects, which is
how we keep track of them during simulation. Also, we have omitted NM-A’s state for
the purpose of illustration. We can now execute the transaction FBInvldSetNotOK
(transition S8 → S4 in Figure 7-1(a) and RcvRegist → S1 in Figure 7-1(b)) which
is shown in Fig. 7-2 (b), with any one slave object executing the lifeline marked NS.
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The resulting configuration is
c′ = {〈S4→ 1, S8→ 49〉, 〈(S1, InitScan = false,Numerr = 1)→ 1〉}.
Thus, the slave object participating in FBInvldSetNotOK moves to control state S4
in TSNS, while NM-B moves to control state S1 in TSNM−B with the value of its
variable NumErr getting updated to 1. This captures the basic idea in our symbolic
execution semantics (note that we did not maintain the local states of 50 slave objects
separately).
7.2 Meeting Test Specifications
In this section we describe the automatic generation of test cases from an IPC model
based on a user-provided test case specification. The user gives a sequence of trans-
actions, as a test specification. The test generation procedure makes use of guided
search to generate a transaction sequence containing the user-provided test specifi-
cation sequence as a subsequence. Note that it is possible that there is no execution
sequence that can satisfy a given test specification.
7.2.1 Problem Formulation
The user gives a sequence of transactions τ1, τ2, . . . , τn as the test specification. The
test-case generation procedure aims at producing one or more test sequences of the
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form– τ 11 , . . . , τ
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1 , τ1, τ
1
2 , . . . , τ
i2
2 , τ2, . . . , τ
in
n , τn.
This problem can be viewed as finding a witness trace in the IPC model satisfying
the Linear-time Temporal Logic (LTL) [23] property F(τ1∧F(τ2∧(. . . (Fτn) . . .))).We
always generate only finite witness traces (i.e., a finite sequence of transactions) such
that any infinite trace obtained by extending our finite witness trace will satisfy the
above-mentioned LTL property. This can be accomplished by standard search strate-
gies like breadth-first or depth-first search. Breadth-first search produces shortest-
possible test traces (the sequence of MSCs generated), but it is expensive in time
and memory. On the other hand, depth-first search can help us find test-cases effi-
ciently, but the generated sequence of MSCs may not be optimal in length. Hence,
we investigate intelligent search heuristics for this problem.
7.2.2 A∗ search
Various well-known heuristic search strategies such as best-first, and A∗ (pronounced
A-star) [84] have been shown to be useful in test-case generation [92], and model
checking [29]. The heuristics mainly differ in the evaluation function used by them,
which gives the “desirability” of expanding a node in the state graph. The search pro-
ceeds by expanding the graph choosing the most desirable node first. The evaluation
function f(s) used in A∗, which evaluates the state s during state-space exploration
(lower score is better), consists of two parts– (i) g(s), giving the shortest generating
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path length for state s, i.e. length of the shortest path from start-state to s, and (ii)
h(s), the estimated cost of the cheapest path to the goal state from s. The evaluation
function f(s) = g(s) + h(s) gives the estimate of cheapest path from start state to
the goal state, passing through s. If h∗(s) is the actual cost of the cheapest path from
a state s to the goal state and h(s) ≤ h∗(s), for all states s, then the heuristic is said
to be admissible and guarantees to find the shortest path to goal state, if one exists.
We adapt and modify the A∗ algorithm to guide our test-selection process. While
searching for witness traces, we break the search into steps, such that each step aims
at generating a transaction sequence up to the next uncovered transaction in the test
specification. So if the test specification is τ1, τ2, . . . , τn and so far the search has
produced a witness for τ1, . . . , τi−1 (where i ≤ n), the “goal” is the next transaction
in the test specification — τi. The search for this “goal” will of course start from a
state appearing at the end of the witness trace found for τ1, . . . , τi−1. Then, for a state
s visited while searching for a path to τi, the value of function g(s) in A
∗’s evaluation
function determines the length of the shortest path to s seen so far from the initial
state, and covering the test specification transactions that have already executed (in
the order of their occurrence). While, for computing the h function, we only focus on
the next goal (τi) instead of the whole remaining sequence to be covered (τi, . . . , τn).
During the search we maintain a global search tree T capturing the states visited
so far. A global state and the successor of a global state, appearing in T during
the test generation are defined as follows.
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Definition 19. Global state Given an IPC system model and a test case specifica-
tion τ1, . . . , τn, a global state s = (c, i) consists of: (i) an abstract system config-
uration c in the IPC model (see Section 3.4) and (ii) i, the index of the next goal
transaction τi (while searching for the test case) in the test case specification, where
1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Definition 20. Successor state Given a global state s = (c, i) as defined above,
a global state s′ = (c′, i′) is a successor state of s if and only if: (i) c′ is obtained
from c in our symbolic execution semantics by executing some transaction τ ′, and (ii)
i′ = i + 1 if τ ′ = τi (i.e. the next goal transaction), and i
′ = i otherwise. We use
Succ(s) to denote the set of all possible successors of s.
In the search tree T , each edge from a state s to its successors is labeled with
the transaction name that was executed at s leading to that successor. Also for each
state s in T we maintain the values g(s) and h(s).
Computation of heuristic function h. To compute h(s) for a given a state
s = (c, i), we consider the process classes involved in the transaction τi, that is, the
process classes whose objects should appear as the lifelines of the MSC in τi (the
next goal transaction). Let this set of classes be classes(τi). For each process class
p ∈ classes(τi), we determine the length of the shortest path in TSp from current
control state(s)1 of p-objects to the source state(s) of the transition(s) which appear
1TSp is the transition system describing process class p.











Figure 7-3: Transition system fragment for process class p1
as a lifeline in τi. Note that, we pre-compute the shortest paths between all state-pairs
in the Labeled Transition Systems (LTSs) of different process-classes once and for all,
at the beginning of the test generation. Clearly, different objects of a process class
p can be in different control states — so we need to consider all the control states
in which any object of a process class p is currently in. Let the shortest distance
computed in this way for process class p be denoted as dτip .
For illustration, consider a fragment of transition system describing a process
class p1 as shown in Figure 7-3. Assume that p1 has np1 objects such that n1 (> 0)
p1-objects are currently in control state s1, while remaining np1 − n1 objects are in
control state s2 (see Fig. 7-3). Let the next goal transaction be γ and (p1, ρ) be the
only lifeline involving process class p1 in transaction γ (i.e. p1 ∈ classes(γ)). Now,
in the transition system of p1 (fragment of which is shown in Fig. 7-3), the shortest
paths to the control state(s) with an outgoing transition γρ from states s1 and s2
respectively are— s1.s3 and s2.s4.s5, having path lengths one and two (see Fig. 7-3).
Hence, we get dγp1 = 1.






p and f(s) = g(s) + h(s) (7.1)
Intuitively h gives a lower bound on the trace length required to execute τi from s,
and therefore, gives us an admissible heuristic.
7.2.3 Test generation Algorithm
We now discuss the overall test generation procedure described using two functions,
one top level or driver function genTest presented in Algorithm 1 which makes use
of the second function genTrace described in Algorithm 4 (appears in Appendix B).
In particular, the function genTest (Algorithm 1) takes as input three parameters: a
set S of global states, i is the index of the current goal transaction and n is the length
of the test-case specification τ1, . . . , τn. During test generation, states s = (c, i) from
the set S are evaluated (i.e. f(s) is computed using Equation 7.1), and the one with
the minimum value of function f is chosen and explored (i.e. all its successors are
generated). The initial call to this procedure is genTest({sinit},1,n) where sinit =
(cinit,1), cinit is the initial configuration in our IPC system model. The search tree T
is also initialized, having a single root node sinit.
For finding a trace from states in the set S to the next goal transaction τi, genTest
calls genTrace(S,τi) (line 2 of Algorithm 1). The function genTrace described in
Algorithm 4 then tries to find a path leading to the execution of transaction τi from
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Algorithm 1: genTest(S,i,n)
1: while S 6= φ do
2: 〈GoalStates, UnExplored〉 ← genTrace(S,τi)
3: if GoalStates = ∅ then
4: if i = 1 then




9: else if i < n then
10: genTest(GoalStates,(i + 1),n)
11: S ← UnExplored
12: else
13: output witness(GoalStates) and Exit /*i = n*/
14: end if
15: end while
states in S (see Appendix B). It returns: (a) GoalSet, the set containing the states
reached after successfully finding a path from a state in S to the transaction τi, and
(b) the set UnExplored, which contains states that were reached but not explored
when searching for the trace. If GoalSet is empty, this means that genTrace failed
to generate a trace from S reaching τi. In this case, if i = 1, the genTest algorithm
reports failure and exits, since it cannot find any trace up to the first transaction in the
test specification; otherwise, the genTest algorithm backtracks (line 7 of Algorithm 1)
and tries to find another trace for the previous goal transaction using the remaining
unexplored states from that step. This occurs by assigning the set Unexplored to S
when a failed recursive call returns (line 11 of Algorithm 1). The new S is explored
further due to outermost while loop. If GoalSet is not empty, genTest is called
recursively using the set GoalSet as the starting states for finding the next transaction
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(τi+1) in the test specification. In this way if we have encountered τn and GoalSet is
still not empty, a witness trace satisfying the test specification has been found. The
genTest algorithm then outputs the witness trace and exits.
7.3 Experimental Results
We now discuss various results from the experiments we performed for (a) generating
test cases corresponding to various test specifications, and (b) comparing test case
generation for symbolic vs concrete model execution for a given test specification.
Witness trace generation. Besides the MOST network-management protocol, we
also performed experiments using the following four examples, which were discussed
earlier in Section 3.7– Telephone Switch, Rail-Car, Automated Shuttle, and Weather
Controller. For the purpose of experiments, we considered three test specifications for
all examples modeled, each attempting to cover a meaningful use-case. Test cases were
successfully derived for these test specifications using the A∗-based heuristic approach.
Experimental results showing the witness trace lengths and test-generation times
corresponding to various test specifications are shown in Table 7.1 in the columns
under ‘RESULTS A’. Recall that each witness trace contains the corresponding test
specification as a subsequence. All experiments were performed on a machine with
3GHz CPU and 1 GB of memory.
We also generated witness traces for the same test specifications using breadth-
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first (BFS) and depth-first strategies (DFS). In most of the cases A∗ based approach
generated optimal length traces, i.e. same as those generated using BFS2, taking only
a fraction of time. On the other hand, test cases generated using DFS were up to 3
times longer than those generated using A∗ heuristic.
RESULTS A RESULTS B
Example Test Spec. Witn. trace Test gen. Expl. # Witnesses Exec. Times(sec)
# Length length Time(sec) Depth S C S C
MOST 1 2 28 67 30 16 – 272 > 10 min.
(3 slaves) 2 2 19 4.5 19 7 21 28 480
3 3 32 312 32 4 – 460 > 10 min.
Telephone 1 2 4 0.04 5 70 560 1 28
Network 2 4 14 8.1 14 – – > 10 min. > 10 min.
(5 phones) 3 4 9 1.42 9 12 80 17 212
RailCar 1 3 17 136 18 6 – 380 > 10 min.
(6 cars, 2 3 12 5 15 32 – 19 > 10 min.
3 terminals) 3 3 11 4 15 62 – 19 > 10 min.
Automated 1 4 14 0.1 15 5 11 0.7 15
Shuttle 2 3 12 0.07 15 9 18 0.72 15
(5 shuttles) 3 4 23 0.91 23 12 – 78 > 10 min.
Weather 1 2 4 0.02 20 5 129 0.1 2.5
Controller 2 3 13 0.03 20 2 3 0.1 2.5
(10 clients) 3 3 15 0.03 25 3 7 0.15 12
Table 7.1: RESULTS A: Witness test generation– test lengths & generation times.
RESULTS B: Comparing Symbolic/Concrete test generation, S ≡ Symbolic, C ≡
Concrete.
For illustration, let us consider the following test specification from our mod-
eling of MOST protocol (corresponding to the first test specification for MOST in
Table 7.1): FBRcvDuplId, ConfigStatusOk. As discussed in Section 7.2, for a given
test specification (given as a sequence of transactions), test generation procedure at-
tempts to find a witness trace (another sequence of transactions) containing the test
2Given a test specification τ1, . . . , τn, we employ A
∗ based search to find a smallest path to τ1,
search from that occurrence of τ1 to find a smallest path to τ2 and so on. Clearly, adding up these
smallest paths may not produce the minimal path containing τ1, . . . , τn as a subsequence.
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specification as a subsequence. The transaction FBRcvDuplId (transition S8 → S8
in Figure 7-1(a) and RcvRegist→ RcvRegist in Figure 7-1(b)) corresponds to the sce-
nario shown in Figure 7-2 (a)– which takes place when the configuration information
sent by slave to master clashes with the configuration information for some other
slave node already registered with the master. In response, when it is not the first
time that the system is being scanned after the network was powered on (as indicated
by the guard ‘InitScan = false’ of lifeline NM-B in Figure 7-2 (a)), network master
assigns a new id for this slave and sends this value for acceptance to the slave via
message FBlockIDs.SetGet. This new value may be accepted or rejected by the slave
node. In case it is accepted, then the new value is entered in the central registry by
NM-B. The transaction ConfigStatusOk (whose MSC is not shown here) corresponds
to the communication of ‘SystemState = OK’ by network master to the slave nodes,
once all the nodes have responded correctly. As shown in Table 7.1, a test-case MSC
sequence of length 28 was obtained within 67 seconds for this test specification. In
this manner, the test specifications, though small in length, can be used to derive test
cases representing complex system behaviors.
Symbolic nature of our tests. Recall that our IPC models inherently support
symbolic execution of process classes (Section 3.4) and hence generation of symbolic
tests where processes are grouped together in terms of behavior. To evaluate the
advantage of symbolic test generation, we generated all possible witness traces corre-
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sponding to the given test specifications using both symbolic and concrete3 execution
semantics. This was done by exploring various system models up to a given depth
bound. For a given test specification, in order to guarantee the generation of at least
one witness trace during exploration, the length of its witness trace derived from
A∗-based test generation was used as a cut-off for the depth bound.
The results comparing the test-suite size and test generation times appear in
Table 7.1 in the columns under ‘RESULTS B’. As we can observe, the time to generate
the test cases is much lower in symbolic execution as compared to concrete execution.
In fact, for almost half of the cases the concrete execution did not even terminate
within 10 minutes (shown as ‘–’ in Table 7.1 under RESULTS B). More importantly,
using symbolic execution many behaviorally similar tests were grouped together into
a single test case. For example, in case of the first test specification for the Telephone
Network example (see Table 7.1, RESULTS B), 560 concrete test cases are grouped
into 70 symbolic tests. Note that the number of concrete tests is not always an exact
multiple of the number of symbolic tests. This is because different symbolic tests may
be blown up into different number of concrete tests.
Use of our tests We note that the tests generated from our IPC model can be
executed on a distributed system implementation, that is, executable code in a pro-
gramming language. This is the case where the system implementation is generated
manually using the informal system requirements as a guide. In this case, the tests
3The state of each object is maintained separately in concrete execution semantics.
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increase our confidence in system implementation. Alternatively, it is conceivable
that the system implementation is generated from the system model, and so are the
test cases. In this case, the tests can be used to increase our confidence in the sys-
tem model itself (which is generated manually from the informal requirements). For
more detailed discussion on the use of model-based tests in model-driven software
development, the reader is referred to [42].
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Chapter 8
Test Generation from SMSC
In this chapter, we present a method for model-based testing of reactive systems
of process classes based on Symbolic Message Sequence Charts (SMSCs). Various
challenges arise in the model-based test case generation of distributed reactive systems
involving process classes, or collections of behaviorally similar interacting objects. In
general the requirements specification for such systems only describe the interactions
between classes of objects and do not constrain their size, which may be large and
can even vary dynamically with time. Therefore, to begin with, there is the need for
flexibility; we cannot impose an artificial limit on the number of process class objects
in the requirements specification and derive test cases only for that configuration,
as the runtime configuration can differ. Secondly, test cases need to be reusable;
if objects are added or removed, then we should not have to regenerate test cases
from scratch provided the test-purpose (or, property to be tested), remains the same.
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Finally, the set of test cases should be optimal: they should include all interesting
behaviors corresponding to the test-purpose, but at the same time, the test cases
should be behaviorally distinct. This last property is important because process class
objects being behaviorally similar, there is always a possibility of redundant test
cases - depicting the same interaction pattern but involving different combinations of
objects - being generated. This may lead to significant wastage of resources, both in
the generation of redundant test cases, as well as their subsequent detection/removal
or their execution.
Our approach begins with modeling process class requirements (which typically
focus on inter-class communication) using SMSCs. As discussed earlier in Chapter
4, SMSCs extend Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) with the concept of a symbolic
lifeline. Unlike MSCs, where a lifeline represents a concrete object, a symbolic lifeline
in SMSCs may represent a group of objects from a class. This extension, along with an
abstract execution semantics, allows SMSCs to succinctly specify and simulate inter-
process behavior in systems consisting of classes of large (even unbounded) number
of objects. Apart from a SMSC-based system model, a second input to our testing
framework is a user-provided test-purpose that aids in selecting interesting behaviors
against which the user wishes to test a system implementation. The test-purpose,
which may include negative messages denoting forbidden behavior, is also modeled
using SMSCs.
Given a system model and test-purpose, our test generation method first auto-
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matically generates a set of abstract test cases that satisfy the purpose. These are
generated by exploring the system model to determine execution traces that contain
all the test-purpose events (except the negative events) in the appropriate order, pos-
sibly interspersed with other events from the model. Next, we perform a novel step
called template generation. Here, an abstract test case is refined into set of templates,
where each template represents a behaviorally distinct realization of the abstract
test case and also encodes the minimum number of concrete objects of each class that
would be needed to realize the test case fully. Moreover, taken together, the generated
templates represent all possible realizations of the abstract test case that may occur
in practice. The templates thus bring to our test generation framework the much
desired characteristics of flexibility, reusability and optimality – they do not impose
any limit on the number of process class objects, they may be re-used to generate
concrete test cases for different configurations, and they are behaviorally distinct from
each other, while together representing all system behaviors that satisfy the abstract
test case. Finally, for generating a set of concrete test cases, the user has to provide
a set of concrete objects for various process classes. A minimal set of concrete test
cases corresponding to the test-purpose is then generated by instantiating lifelines
in the templates with concrete objects. Further, all possible concrete test cases can
be generated from the minimal set by simply exchanging different object identities.
The concrete MSC test cases are used for testing the system implementation, which
is derived either manually, or generated (semi-automatically) from a system model
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different from the one used for test-case generation.
To summarize, the main technical contribution of the current chapter is a model-
based testing methodology, targeting reactive systems consisting of many behaviorally
similar objects. It consists of automated generation of abstract test cases, their step-
wise refinement to concrete test cases through template generation and test execution.
Our approach avoids (a) deriving different system models representing different con-
figurations for test generation and, (b) redundant generation of behaviorally similar
test cases.
Organization In the next section, we introduce the case-study used for illustrating
our approach and also describe our test-purposes, while Section 8.2 provides an end-
to-end view of our test generation process using a running example. Section 8.3
discusses the technical details of our approach, including test generation algorithms.
In Section 8.4 we elaborate our test execution setup and provide empirical validation
of our approach in Section 8.5 on a real life case-study.
8.1 Test-purpose specification
In this section, we first present the CTAS case-study, which is used as a running
example throughout the chapter. We then discuss a test purpose, which is specified
using an extended version of SMSCs, and is used for selecting the relevant test case(s)
from a SMSC model. A SMSC model and test purpose are the two inputs to our test
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generation method.
8.1.1 CTAS Case Study
Note that, the CTAS case study was discussed earlier in Section 4.2, while discussing
the SMSC notation. For the purpose of our discussion, we briefly describe it again in
the following.
The CTAS or Center TRACON Automation System is a set of tools developed at
NASA to aid the air traffic controllers in managing high volume of air traffic flows
at large airports. Various processes such as TS (Trajectory Synthesizer), RA (Route
Analyzer) etc. in the CTAS system require latest weather updates for their function-
ing. The weather updates are provided to these processes by WCP (Weather Control
Panel) via the CM (Communications Manager) which is the central controller respon-
sible for communications among these processes. Both WCP and CM are also part of
the CTAS system. We refer to various processes requiring the weather updates sim-
ply as Clients. Thus, we consider the CTAS system to be consisting of three classes
of objects– (i) WCP and (ii) CM classes with one object each, and (iii) Client class
consisting of multiple client objects.
The CTAS requirements for the weather control logic are described informally in
English in [1]. The requirements are structured as short snippets, describing com-
munication scenarios among CM, WCP and Client objects. Each such requirement

























(c) MSC - CTAS Requirement 2.8.13
The CM should perform the following actions when the Weather 
Cycle status is “updating” and any connected weather-aware 
clients have responded No to the CTAS_GET_NEW_WTHR 
messages:
(i) it should set the Weather Cycle status to `post-reverting’.
(ii) it should set the weather status of all connected weather-
aware clients to `post-reverting’.
(iii) it should send CTAS_USE_OLD_WTHR messages to all 
connected weather-aware clients.
Figure 8-1: A CTAS requirement and its modeling as an MSC and a SMSC.
first states a pre-condition, followed by a set of events to be executed when the given
pre-condition holds. For illustration, we partially reproduce a CTAS requirement
(Requirement 2.8.13) in Figure 8-1(a). It describes the events, stated as items (i),
(ii), and (iii), to be executed when the pre-condition (specified in italics) holds true.
As described in Chapter 4, the language of Symbolic Message Sequence Charts
(SMSCs) [101] is a light-weight extension of the MSC notation, having the following
key features– i) the notion of a symbolic lifeline, and ii) an abstract execution seman-
tics. In the case of MSCs, a lifeline can represent only a concrete object [62], thus
making it difficult to capture scenarios with a large number of concrete objects. For
illustration, consider the MSC shown in Figure 8-1(b). It represents a scenario with
3 Client objects corresponding to the CTAS requirement 2.8.13 (Fig. 8-1(a)). Here
one of the client objects (Client1 in this case) replies in negative to a request sent by
the controller CM, with the remaining clients replying in positive. The SMSC corre-
sponding to the CTAS requirement 2.8.13 in Fig. 8-1(a) is shown in Figure 8-1(c).
Comparing with the MSC in Fig. 8-1(b) capturing the same requirement, all Client
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objects are now represented using a unique symbolic lifeline.
The complete CTAS system description is obtained by first deriving SMSCs corre-
sponding to various requirements (as illustrated above) and then composing together
these SMSCs to form a High-level SMSC (HSMSC). The HSMSC for CTAS case-
study appears in Figure 8-2. This HSMSC is flat, i.e. all its nodes represent a SMSC
(and not another HSMSC). For example, SMSC NotRcvWthr shown in Figure 8-1(c)
corresponds to a node (encircled in bold lines) in the CTAS HSMSC.





p }〉, where H is a HSMSC describing the interactions among pro-
cess classes p ∈ P, and Vp denotes the set of variables of a class p with v
init
p giving an
















Figure 8-2: HSMSC for the CTAS case study.
Let CSpec denote the set of all possible abstract system-states
1 of a SMSC model
Spec, ΣSpec be a set of process expressions describing the HSMSC model, and ActSpec
1In our description of SMSCs in Chapter 4, abstract system-states were referred to as abstract
configurations (4.4.4).
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denote the set of events appearing in Spec. Then, in the current chapter, we use
transition relation ‘→Spec⊆ (CSpec × ΣSpec) × ActSpec × (CSpec × ΣSpec)’ to describe
the abstract execution semantics of Spec, moving from one abstract system-state to
another by executing a SMSC event enabled at the current process expression (and
also determining the resulting process expression). The details of SMSC operational
semantics were discussed earlier in Chapter 4.
8.1.2 Test-purpose Specification
Once a system model Spec has been derived from the informal system requirements
using SMSCs, a test-purpose is used to drive the test-generation process. A test-
purpose [112] usually corresponds to an important use-case, or some corner-case sce-
nario more likely to contain errors. In our setting, a test-purpose TP is specified as a
SMSC STP, and represents a template behavior, for which the user wants to generate
the test-case(s). In addition to the usual SMSC elements, a test-purpose SMSC may
contain following elements.
1. A forbiddenmessage, saym, that is not allowed to occur at specified locations in
a test case satisfying the given test-purpose. Visually this corresponds to a cross
appearing on the message m’s arrow. For example, message Done (from CM
to Client) in the test-purpose shown in Figure 8-3(a) is a forbidden message.
2. The guard g of an object selector [m]p.[g] in a test-purpose event can be specified
as ‘*’ (or don’t care), indicating that it represents any guard expression. A test-
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(b) Partial LTS for TP: LTP
t1
t3t2
¬(e1 \/ e3)Client CM WCP
UpdateCM.(cm_status=0) WCP.(enabled=1)
No∃1 Client. * CM.*

























Figure 8-3: A test-purpose and its LTS.
purpose event with a don’t care guard can match multiple events differing only in
guard(s). For example, consider the object selector ‘∃1Client.*’ corresponding
to the sending of message No by lifeline Client in the test-purpose shown in
Figure 8-3(a).
For illustration, consider the test-purpose SMSC shown in Figure 8-3(a). This
test-purpose corresponds to a use-case for an unsuccessful weather update of the
Clients connected to CM in the CTAS system described earlier. The initial Update
message from WCP to CM represents a weather update request initiated by WCP.
The following message No indicates the failure of a Client object to either receive new
weather information, or revert back to using old weather information — eventually
resulting in all Clients getting disconnected (indicated by the Disconnectmessage sent
by CM to all connected Clients). The forbidden Done message appearing between
the exchange of No and Disconnect messages checks against the erroneous possibility
of a Done message being sent by CM to the connected Clients, indicating a successful
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weather update.
For the purpose of test generation, we are checking whether an execution trace of a
system model Spec contains a linearization of the test-purpose STP as a subsequence.
To obtain the test-purpose linearizations we consider the operational semantics for
MSCs [62, 98], and extend them to handle the forbidden events. All these event
linearizations are captured using a labeled transition system (LTS) LTP. A trace in
LTP either ends with a forbidden send event leading to an invalid state, or it contains
all the test-purpose events except for the forbidden events and ends in an accept state.
Thus, if the send event of a forbidden message is encountered in the system model
(during test generation) and there is an outgoing transition labeling this send event
from the current state of test-purpose LTS LTP, then LTP will move to an invalid end
state. For example, the LTS corresponding to the test-purpose shown in Figure 8-3(a)
appears partially in Figure 8-3(b). In state t7 of the LTS, we see three possibilities —
(a) event e5 occurs (which corresponds to sending of forbidden message Done) leading
the test-purpose LTS to an invalid end state t10, (b) the next non-forbidden event in
the test-purpose, event e7 (sending of message Disconnect) occurs, progressing the
test-purpose eventually to an accept state t9, or (c) any other event occurs, leaving
the test-purpose LTS in its current state t7.
Let ActTP be the set of events appearing in the test-purpose SMSC STP. Then, we
define LTP = (T,→TP, t1, I, A), where T is the set of LTP states,→TP⊆ T×ActTP×T
is the transition relation describing LTP, t1 is the initial LTP state, I ⊆ T is the
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(possibly empty) set of invalid states, and A ⊆ T is the set of accept states such that
I ∩A = ∅.
8.2 Test Generation Overview
In this section, we describe the steps in our test generation methodology (see Fig-
ure 8-4) with the help of an example based on the CTAS case-study discussed earlier
in Section 8.1. The goal is to provide readers with a high-level overview of the end-
to-end process, before the technical details of the approach are presented in Section





p }〉 with each process class p ∈ P having np ∈ N ∪ {ω}
number of objects (ω represents an unbounded number), and (ii) a user provided
test-purpose TP (see Section 8.1). The overall flow of our test generation method
appears in Fig. 8-4. We now briefly discuss the three steps of this method.
8.2.1 Deriving abstract test case SMSC
Given the system model (as an HSMSC) and the test-purpose (as an SMSC), we
first generate a set of abstract test cases in the form of SMSCs. The abstract test
generation procedure (described in Section 4.1) involves execution of system model
Spec guided by the test-purpose TP (oval 1 , Fig. 8-4). An abstract test case
SMSC corresponds to a finite path in HSMSC H describing the system model and
contains all the test-purpose events (except for the forbidden events) according to the



















Figure 8-4: Overall test generation flow.
partial order specified by the test-purpose SMSC (possibly interspersed with other
events appearing in H). For example, an abstract test case SMSC generated from
the CTAS HSMSC corresponding to the test-purpose shown in Figure 8-3(a) appears
in Figure 8-5(a). The message names appearing in bold italics in the test case SMSC
(Fig. 8-5(a)) represent the matching events in the test-purpose (Fig. 8-3(a)). To
reduce visual clutter, we have omitted the object selectors and post-conditions for
certain events. Further, various intermediate messages exchanged are also not shown
in the test case SMSC; these are represented as broken line segments (≈) along
lifelines in Figure 8-5(a). The abstract test case shown in Figure 8-5(a) represents an
unsuccessful weather update scenario for the Clients connected to CM.


















































































   
   
   
   
   




   
   


















Figure 8-5: An abstract test case (corresponding to test-purpose shown in Fig. 8-3(a))
and two templates for it.
8.2.2 Deriving templates
For testing a system implementation, concrete test cases need to be derived in the
form of MSCs from the abstract test case SMSCs. A straightforward approach for
doing this is by executing an abstract SMSC S with an initial configuration com-
prising of concrete objects. During execution, we maintain the individual state of
each object, instead of monitoring only the count of objects in a given state as in
the abstract SMSC semantics (explained in Section 2). We will thereby obtain differ-
ent MSC execution traces that will represent various possible concrete instantiations
of the abstract test case, for the given configuration. In such a concrete test case
MSC, a symbolic lifeline representing process class p in S, is replaced by concrete
lifeline(s) representing the p objects specified in the initial configuration. However,
this approach of directly deriving concrete tests from the abstract test cases suffers
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from several major drawbacks.
First, it may be difficult to determine the minimum number of objects for various
process classes that guarantees generation of at least one concrete test case from an
abstract test case. Note that a single object in a process class may not be able to
execute all the events shown on the process class lifeline.
Second, many of the concrete test cases generated corresponding to an abstract test
case may be redundant, differing only in the identities of objects playing various
lifelines, but representing essentially the same behavior. For example, if we switch
the lifeline names of the 3 clients shown in Fig. 1(b), we will get a new MSC scenario,
which will however, depict the same core behavior (a client object sending a No
message).
Third, the whole test generation has to be repeated each time there is a new object
configuration, consisting of a different number of objects. This will make testing very
inefficient, since it will involve repeated execution of the abstract test case, while
maintaining the individual states of a potentially large number of objects.
In order to avoid the above drawbacks, we introduce an intermediate representa-
tion between abstract and concrete test cases, called templates (oval 2 , Fig. 8-4).
A set of templates derived from an abstract test case represent behaviorally distinct
realizations of the test case, without requiring object identities to be maintained. For
example, let us consider the abstract test case in Figure 8-5(a). It is obtained from
the CTAS model with an unbounded number of Client objects (i.e. nClient = ω) and,
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one object each in the CM and WCP classes (i.e. nCM = nWCP = 1). On the Client
lifeline, the two No events with existential abstraction indicate the possibility of two
distinct ways in which this abstract test case may be realized; in one case, we can
have the same concrete client object executing the two No events, while in the other,
we may have two different client objects for the two events. The exact identities of
these objects are irrelevant, what matters is whether the same or different concrete
object(s) are selected, since from a testing perspective, they represent two different
system behaviors. We capture these behaviors through templates.
The two templates corresponding to the abstract test case in Figure 8-5(a) are
shown in Figures 8-5(b) and 8-5(c). Figure 8-5(b) depicts the case when a single
Client object sends two No messages to the CM. This object is represented by the
concrete lifeline labeled ’Client’. In contrast, Figure 8-5(c) depicts the case when
two different Client objects (both labeled ’Client’) send the two No messages to the
CM. In both these cases, all other Client objects are symbolically represented by the
marked lifeline (’Client+’); they execute the other events shown on the Client lifeline
in the abstract test case, and are behaviorally similar.
Templates offer a number of advantages in generating concrete test cases from
abstract ones:
1. The minimum number of objects required to derive concrete test cases from
each template is evident from the template itself. For each process class, this
is the number of lifelines of that class (including the marked lifeline) present in
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the template. For example, the minimum number of Client objects required to
generate a concrete test case from the template in Figure 8-5(b) is 2, and that
from the template in Figure 8-5(c) is 3.
2. Each template represents a behaviorally distinct realization of the corresponding
abstract test case such that, a concrete test case derived from one template
cannot be derived from another. Further, in Section 4.2 we will present an
algorithm to automatically generate all possible templates from an abstract
test case.
3. Concrete test cases for different object configurations (differing in number of
objects in certain classes) are obtained directly from templates (which need to
be generated only once). This involves simple instantiation of the templates
with concrete objects, and involves no execution of behavior, as explained in
Section 4.3.
We now formally define templates and present some key properties.
Definition 1 (Templates). Let S be an abstract test case SMSC. The templates
derived from S is a set T of MSCs where — a template captures a projection of
events from a symbolic lifeline lp representing process class p in S, to one or more
lifelines from process class p (represented as Cp) such that,
1. The projected events (from lp to lifelines in Cp) follow the top-down event or-
dering along lp.
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2. An existential event from lp appears along exactly one lifeline in Cp, while a
universal event from lp appears along all lifelines in Cp such that– the event se-
quence (from top to bottom) along a lifeline l in Cp captures a feasible execution
path in the control-flow of process class p (i.e. events along l can be executed by
a single p-object).
A lifeline with only universal events projected along it is called a marked lifeline,
while we refer to the remaining non-marked lifelines as concrete lifelines.
Note that, while a concrete lifeline denotes exactly one object, a marked lifeline
from process class p represents all objects of class p other than those representing
the concrete p-lifelines. Consequently, for each class p a template has either one or
zero marked lifeline, depending on whether or not the remaining p-objects (i.e. those
not assigned to any concrete p-lifeline) participate in the given template by executing
some common events.
Since our template generation involves checking feasible control flows, a comment
on this matter is in order. Our template generation procedure does not involve
expensive static checks on infeasible/feasible control flows. Instead, we execute the
abstract test case SMSC (using SMSC operational semantics), and infeasible flows are
found in course of the execution. The detailed description of our template generation
algorithm appears later in Section 8.3.2.
We now state some key properties of our templates.
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Theorem 1. Let S be an abstract test case SMSC and T be the set of templates
derived from S. Then,
1. For a process class p, a template in T contains at most one marked lifeline.
2. The number of lifelines in each template in T is finite.
3. The number of templates in T is finite (i.e. |T | ∈ N).
Proof. Let npe (n
p
u) be the total number of existential (universal) events from process
class p appearing in the abstract test case SMSC S.
1. For a process class p, a template in T contains at most one marked lifeline. We
prove this by contradiction. Let there be more than one marked lifeline from
process class p in a template. Recall that each lifeline in a template represents
a feasible execution path in p’s control flow. Further, events along a marked
lifeline will be executed by all the p-objects other than those assigned to the
concrete (or unmarked) lifelines. Now, all p-objects are initially in the same
execution sate and it is not possible for any p-object to simultaneously execute
along more than one path in p’s control flow. Hence, the contradiction.
2. From the definition of templates (Defn. 1, p. 218) we know that each existential
event in the abstract test case SMSC S appears along exactly one (concrete)
lifeline in a template. Hence, the total number of concrete lifelines from process
class p in a template is bounded by the number of existential p-events in S,
i.e. |npe|. Further, from (1) above we know that there can be at most one
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marked lifeline from class p in a template. Hence, the number of p-lifelines in
a template lie between 1 to 1+|npe|, thus bounding the total number of lifelines
in a template.
3. From (2) above, the existential events from a process class p can appear along
k ∈ [1, |npe|] lifelines in a template corresponding to the abstract test case S.
Further, from the definition of templates (see Defn. 1, p. 218) we know that a
universal p-event appears along all lifelines (including the marked p-lifeline) if
permitted by the p’s control flow. Therefore, to determine an upper bound on
the number of templates of a given abstract test case, it is sufficient to determine
for each process class p all possible ways in which existential p-events can appear
along k ∈ [1, |npe|] lifelines. For a given k we denote this quantity as U
k
p , which
is same as the number of ways in which |npe| distinct objects can be distributed
into k identical boxes such that each box contains at least one object. Value of
Ukp is determined by the expression S|npe |,k defined as follows [67]:
(1) Sn,1 = 1, Sn,n = 1
(2) Sn,m = m× Sn−1,m + Sn−1,m−1





in which existential p-events can appear along concrete lifelines in a template.
Hence, the total number templates is bounded by
∏
p∈P Up where P is the set
of processes appearing in the abstract test case S.
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8.2.3 Deriving concrete tests
The final step in our test generation process involves deriving concrete test case MSCs
from various templates (oval 3 , Fig. 8-4). It takes as input a user provided object
configuration (defined in the following), specifying the number of objects in a process
class p, if the number of objects in p is originally unbounded.




p }〉 be a system
model with np ∈ N ∪ {ω} objects in class p. An object configuration with respect
to Spec is defined as
⋃
p∈P Op, where Op is a set of objects of class p in their initial
state (determined by vinitp ) such that |Op| ∈ N : |Op| = np, if np ∈ N and |Op| ≥ 1
otherwise (i.e. when np = ω).
Given an object configuration
⋃
p∈P Op, a concrete test case MSC is derived from
a template M by simply assigning concrete objects from Op to lifelines corresponding
to class p in the template. For each concrete lifeline l in template M involving p
we assign one concrete p-object. Once the (unmarked) concrete p-lifelines have been
assigned objects, all the remaining p-objects are assigned to the marked lifeline in p
(replicating the marked lifeline and the events appearing along it). Recall that there
can be at most one marked lifeline for a process class p (Thm. 1).
For example, for an object configuration with three Client objects (and one object
each of type CM and WCP) concrete test cases are obtained from the two CTAS
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templates shown in Figure 8-5. In the first template (Fig. 8-5(b)), one Client object
is assigned to the concrete Client lifeline labeled ‘Client’ and, the remaining two
objects are assigned to the marked lifeline labeled ‘Client+’. In the second template
(Fig. 8-5(c)), two objects are assigned to the two concrete lifelines labeled ‘Client’, and
the only remaining Client object is assigned to the marked lifeline labeled ‘Client+’.
We now elaborate on our test generation method.
8.3 Test Generation Method
In the following, we elaborate the various steps in our test generation methodology.
The steps include abstract test generation (oval 1 , Fig. 8-4), template generation
(oval 2 , Fig. 8-4) and concrete test generation (oval 3 , Fig. 8-4).
8.3.1 Abstract test-case generation




p }〉 be a system model with process class p ∈ P having
np ∈ N ∪ {ω} objects, and TP be a user provided test-purpose. Abstract test case
generation involves exploring various paths in the HSMSC H modeling the system
requirements up to a given depth bound. A path in H is reported as a test-case if
it contains all the test-purpose events (except for the forbidden events) according to
the partial order specified by the test-purpose SMSC STP, possibly interspersed with
other events appearing in H .
For generating abstract test cases, we exploit the abstract execution semantics of
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Algorithm 2: testGen(n,C,t,d,p): abstract test generation
Input: n – current node of HSMSC H
Input: C ∈ CSpec – current abstract system-state
Input: t – current state of test-purpose LTS LTP
Input: d – current exploration depth of HSMSC H
Input: p – current path being generated in HSMSC H
Output: Set of abstract test-cases
if d ≤ D then /* D: user given depth-bound */1
(t′, C ′)← execute(t, C, n);2
if t′ = accept then3
addTest(p.n) ; /* Add abstract test-case corresponding to the4
current path in H, obtained by concatenating node n to path
p generated so far */
return;5




forall sn ∈ succ(n) do /* succ(n) returns all successor nodes of10
n in HSMSC H */
testGen(sn, C ′, t′, d+ 1, p.n);11
SMSCs [101]. This allows us to generate abstract test cases for system configurations
with process classes having an unbounded (i.e. ω) number of objects. At the core of
our test generation process is the comparison of test-purpose events with the events
appearing in the system model. Let ActTP, ActSpec denote the set of events appearing
in TP and Spec respectively. We define a relation ‘≈⊆ ActTP × ActSpec’ such that
(a, a′) ∈≈ iff the two events match exactly, or differ only in guards specified as ‘*’
(don’t care) for the test-purpose event a. Recall that, CSpec denotes the set of all
abstract system-states of Spec (see Section 8.1).
The abstract test generation proceeds by exploring paths of increasing lengths





















Figure 8-6: Abstract test case generation.
in the HSMSC H , from length 1 up to a user given depth bound D. A path
l = n0.n1 . . . nk in H corresponds to a sequence of HSMSC nodes (ni’s), where n0
is the initial node. The overall abstract test generation procedure is described in
Algorithm 2. It takes as input five parameters– (i) a node n in the HSMSC H , (ii) an
abstract system-state C ∈ CSpec, (iii) a node t in labeled transition system (LTS) LTP
describing the event linearizations of test-purpose SMSC STP (see Section 8.1.2), (iv)
current exploration depth d of HSMSC H , and (v) current path p (of length d−1) be-
ing generated in H . The procedure is initially invoked using testGen(n0, Cinit, t0, 1, ǫ),
where n0 is the initial node of H , Cinit ∈ CSpec is the initial abstract system-state, t0
is the initial state of LTS LTP and ǫ represents the empty path.
At each step during exploration, when a node ni is visited, the algorithm considers
the SMSC Si associated with node ni, the current abstract system-state C ∈ CSpec,
and current state t in LTP. SMSC Si is then executed at state C following the SMSC
226 CHAPTER 8. TEST GENERATION FROM SMSC
operational semantics (using transition relation →Spec as described in Section 8.1),
resulting in abstract system-state C ′ ∈ CSpec. While executing SMSC Si, the test
generation algorithm tries to find events in Si, which are equivalent (as per the relation
≈) to the test-purpose events emanating from the current state t in the test-purpose
LTS LTP; the execution of these events advances the test-purpose LTS to a new
state t′ (abstracted as line 2 in Algorithm 2). It is possible that none of the events
in Si is equivalent to an outgoing event from t in LTS LTP, in which case t
′ = t.




in Figure 8-6, which represents a sample exploration for test generation. One of the
following cases may arise while processing a HSMSC node ni visited during search.
Case 1: (Alg. 2, lines 3–5) All the test-purpose events are matched, i.e. an ac-
cept state is reached in LTP. In this case, the SMSC obtained by the asynchronous
concatenation [8] of SMSCs corresponding to HSMSC nodes along the current path
being explored, is reported as a test case. Moreover, the current path is not further
explored. For example, in Figure 8-6, a test case is found at a depth of 3 at node
labeled with n2, and corresponds to a SMSC S = S0.S1.S2.
Case 2: (Alg. 2, lines 6–8) Execution of an event in Si matches a forbidden event in
LTP leading to an invalid state in LTP. At this point a warning message is generated
(Alg. 2, line 7), so that user may inspect the system model for the possibility of
any error. The search then backtracks and continues along an alternate path. For
example, at node labeled with n3 in Figure 8-6, a forbidden event is matched causing
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the search process to backtrack.
Case 3: (Alg. 2, lines 9–11) Otherwise, the current path is continued to be explored
in a similar manner up until the depth bound of D is reached, at which point it
backtracks (see node labeled with nk in Figure 8-6).
Thus, the abstract test case SMSCs derived contain all the test-purpose events
(except for the forbidden events) according to the partial order specified by test-
purpose SMSC STP, possibly interspersed with other events appearing in the SMSC
model.
The running time for Algorithm 2 is O(|EH|
D.NH .|ET |.D), where EH is the max-
imum number of outgoing edges from a node in the HSMSC H , ET is the maximum
number of outgoing edges from a node in the test-purpose LTS LTP, and NH denotes
the maximum number of events in a SMSC corresponding to a node in HSMSC H .
The term |EH |
D determines the maximum number of paths that can be explored
in HSMSC H for a depth bound of D. While for each path explored, NH .|ET |.D
determines the maximum possible comparisons between the system-model and test-
purpose events.
To formally describe the test generation process discussed above, we define a satis-
faction relation between a test-purpose TP and a system model Spec in the following.
Recall that, ΣSpec represents the set of process expressions describing Spec, CSpec de-
notes the set of system-states of Spec and →Spec captures the abstract execution
semantics of Spec (Section 8.1).
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Definition 21. Satisfaction relation. Let Spec be a given system model and LTP =
(T,→TP, t1, I, A) be the test-purpose LTS corresponding to a test-purpose TP. Then,
relation ≃⊆ T × (ΣSpec × CSpec) is a satisfaction relation s.t. ∀t ∈ T\I, s1 ∈ ΣSpec,
c1 ∈ CSpec: t ≃ (s1, c1) iff
1- t ∈ A∨
(∃ a ∈ ActTP, t
′ ∈ T\I,
w = b1 . . . bn ∈ Act
+
Spec, si ∈ ΣSpec, ci ∈ CSpec, 1 < i ≤ n+ 1•
2- (c1 : s1
b1→Spec c2 : s2 . . .
bn→Spec cn+1 : sn+1
3- ∧ ∀a′ ∈ ActTP, t
′′ ∈ T, 1 ≤ i < n· (t
a′
→TP t





5- ∧ a ≈ bn
6- ∧ t′ ≃ (sn+1, cn+1)
)
).
Intuitively, the satisfaction relation holds between a test-purpose LTS LTP’s state
t ∈ T and a process expression s1 ∈ ΣSpec describing the system model Spec at a
given system-state c1 ∈ CSpec (i.e. t ≃ (s1, c1)) in the following cases–
a) t ∈ A (Defn. 21, line 1), i.e. t is an accepting state in the test-purpose LTS LTP.
This indicates that all (non forbidden) test-purpose events have been matched,
and hence the test-purpose is satisfied.
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b) There exists an event execution sequence b1 . . . bn from s1 at system-state c1, re-
sulting in process expression sn+1 and system-state cn+1 with s2, . . . , sn (c2, . . . , cn)
as the intermediate process expressions (system-states)– see (Defn. 21, line 2).
In this case, none of the following events –b1, . . . , bn−1– are equivalent (as per
relation ≈) to any test-purpose event labeling an outgoing transition from state
t in the test-purpose LTS LTP (Defn. 21, line 3). Only event bn is equivalent
to a test-purpose event a, labeling an outgoing transition from t, with t′ as
the destination state in LTP (Defn. 21, lines 4 & 5). Further, the satisfaction
relation t′ ≃ (sn+1, cn+1) holds recursively (Defn. 21, line 6).
8.3.2 Template generation
Once abstract test cases are obtained in the form of SMSCs as described above, we
derive a set of templates (see Def. 1, p. 218) corresponding to each abstract test case.
The template generation takes place in two phases– (i) execution of the given ab-
stract test case SMSC S using our abstract SMSC execution semantics (see Sec. 8.1),
followed by (ii) derivation of templates from various system states reachable after ex-
ecution of S (from a given initial state) in step (i). We now discuss these two phases
in more detail.
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Abstract test case execution
In the first phase of template generation, the given abstract test case SMSC S is exe-
cuted using our abstract execution semantics for SMSCs (see Section 8.1). However,
for template generation, an extended version of the abstract system-states is used
during the execution. For convenience, we refer to an extended abstract system-state
simply as extended-state. Compared to the abstract system-state, in addition to
maintaining the local state information, an extended-state also maintains the list of
events executed by various objects. During template generation, this additional in-
formation enables distinguishing among the objects based on the events executed by
them.
We now describe the concept of extended-states with the help of an example.
Consider the Client class consisting of variables cl status and v from the CTAS case
study. An abstract system-state for the Client class consists of tuples of the form
〈val, n〉, where val ∈ V al(VClient) and n ∈ N ∪ {ω} (ref. Section 8.1). Let EClient
denote the set of all Client events occurring in the CTAS system model. Then, an
extended-state for the Client class will consist of triples of the form 〈val, h, n〉, where
val ∈ V al(VClient), h ∈ E
∗
Client and n ∈ N ∪ {ω}. For a given triple 〈val, h, n〉,
h is the list of events executed by the objects represented by this triple. Consider
the execution of an event e corresponding to the receive of message ClientPostRvrt
in SMSC NotRcvWthr (see Fig. 8-1(c)), at an extended-state for Client class given
by– {〈(cl status = 5, v = 0), h1, 3〉, 〈(cl status = 5, v = 1), h2, 1〉}, where h1, h2
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are some execution histories. The resulting extended-state after execution of e is
{〈(cl status = 7, v = 0), h′1, 3〉, 〈(cl status = 7, v = 1), h
′





obtained by concatenating event e to event list h1 and h2 respectively.
The algorithm for executing a SMSC using extended-states is outlined in Algo-
rithm 3. It takes as input an abstract test case SMSC S and set of initial extended-




p , [], np〉}}, where v
init
p is an initial valuation of vari-
ables of process class p, [] represents an empty event list, and np ∈ N ∪ {ω} is the
number of objects in class p, where ω represents an unbounded number of p objects in
their initial state. At any point during the execution of the abstract test case SMSC
S, the procedure maintains the set of all reachable extended-states from the initial
set of extended-states. At each step during execution while considering an event e
from S, the set of all reachable extended-states is derived from the current set of
extended-states (Alg. 3, lines 3–31). This is done by considering each extended-state
E in the current extended-state set ES one by one, and various triples within it that
can execute e. If e is an existential event (Alg. 3, lines 5–18), for each triple in E
which satisfies the guard of e, an object from it is chosen to execute e. This results
in a new extended-state, with local state (val) and event history (h) of the executing
object updated with the effect of execution of e (Alg. 3, lines 7–18). In this case,
multiple extended-states may be generated from a single extended-state. This is be-
cause multiple object-states in an extended-state may satisfy the guard of e. If e
is a universal event (Alg. 3, lines 19–30), then a single extended-state is generated
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Algorithm 3: SMSC execution using extended-states
Input: S – abstract test case SMSC
Input: ES – initial set of extended-states
Output: Updated set of extended-states
T ES ← ∅ ; /* Temporary set of extended states */1
while not all S events have executed do2
e← next S event to be executed ; /* e: an enabled-event chosen3
according to partial ordering of S */
forall E ∈ ES do /* E: extended-state */4
if e is an existential event then5
forall 〈val, h, n〉 ∈ E do6
if val satisfies the guard of event e then7
val′ ← effect of execution of e on val;8
if 〈val′, h.[e], k〉 ∈ E then /* k ∈ N */9
E ′ ← E\{〈val′, h.[e], k〉} ∪ {〈val′, h.[e], k + 1〉};10
else11
E ′ ← E ∪ {〈val′, h.[e], 1〉} ;12
n′ ← n− 1 ; /* ω − 1 = ω */13
if n′ == 0 then14
E ′′ ← E ′\{〈val, h, n〉}15
else /* n′ > 0 otherwise */16
E ′′ ← E ′\{〈val, h, n〉} ∪ {〈val, h, n′〉};17
T ES ← T ES ∪ {E ′′};18
else if e is a universal event then19
bool check ← false;20
E ′ ← ∅ ; /* Temporary extended-state */21
forall 〈val, h, n〉 ∈ E do22
if v satisfies the guard of event e then23
v′ ← effect of execution of e on val;24
E ′ ← E ′ ∪ {〈val′, h.[e], n〉};25
E ← E\{〈val, h, n〉};26
check ← true;27
if check == true then28
E ′ ← E ′ ∪E;29
T ES ← T ES ∪ {E ′};30
ES ← T ES; T ES ← ∅;31
return ES;32
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from a source extended-state containing triple(s) satisfying e’s guard; the local states
and event histories of all objects that can execute e are updated with the effect of
execution of e in the resulting extended-state.
We now illustrate the above process using a small example. Consider a sample
abstract test case SMSC shown in Figure 8-7. It contains a lifeline representing pro-
cess class A with an unspecified number of objects, and a lifeline representing process
class B with a single object. Assume, that A contains a local variable x initialized
to 0, while B has no local variables. We now consider execution of the SMSC in Fig-
ure 8-7, from the initial set of extended-states given by {{〈x = 0, [], ω〉A, 〈ǫ, [], 1〉B}}.
For convenience, we have added process-class name as subscript to each object-state
triple within an extended-state. The first element of B’s object state is empty (or ǫ)
since there are no local variables in B. For executing event e1 (see Fig. 8-7), since
its guard is true, any A object can be chosen to execute it. An object from A-state
〈x = 0, [], ω〉, present in the only available initial extended-state, is chosen to execute
e1. The resulting extended-state with the state and event-set of the executing object
updated is {〈x = 1, [e1], 1〉A, 〈x = 0, [], ω〉A, 〈ǫ, [], 1〉B}. Next, e2 is executed by the
object in B-state 〈ǫ, [], 1〉. The resulting set of extended-states is shown as the first
entry in Table 8.1. In a similar manner various events in Figure 8-7 are executed
one by one. Some other extended-state sets reached during execution are shown in
Table 8.1. Note that, the final set of extended-states (third entry, Table 8.1) contains
two extended-states. These arise due to two different choices of object-states of A for

















Figure 8-7: Example test case SMSC.
Table 8.1: Extended-states reachable during template generation.
Sets of reachable Extended-states
1. After e1, e2 {{〈x = 1, [e1], 1〉A, 〈x = 0, [], ω〉A, 〈ǫ, [e2], 1〉B}}
2. After e1–e4 {{〈x = 1, [e1], 1〉A, 〈x = 2, [e3], ω〉A, 〈ǫ, [e2, e4], 1〉B}}
3. Finally {{〈x = 3, [e1, e5], 1〉A, 〈x = 2, [e3], ω〉A, 〈ǫ, [e2, e4, e6], 1〉B},
{〈x = 1, [e1], 1〉A, 〈x = 3, [e3, e5], 1〉A, 〈x = 2, [e3], ω〉A,
〈ǫ, [e2, e4, e6], 1〉B}}
executing event e5, at the extended-state reached after executing events e1 to e4.
Constructing templates
In the second phase, corresponding to each final extended-state E obtained after
executing abstract test case SMSC as described above, we construct a template (see
Def. 1, page 218) TE as follows. For each triple 〈 val, h, k〉 in E we do the following. If
k is finite, we add k lifelines (along with the events appearing in the execution history
h) in the template TE . If however, k = ω (i.e., 〈 val, h, k〉 represents unbounded
number of objects), we create a single lifeline representing one or more objects for
this triple provided the execution history is non-empty (i.e., h 6= []). This corresponds
to our interpretation of ω as n ≥ 1 objects, where the number n is unbounded. Note
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that, the event execution list of a triple with an unbounded number of objects will
contain only universal events. This is because, in an abstract test case an existential
event can occur only a finite number of times, with each occurrence executed by a
single object. We call a lifeline representing one or more objects as amarked lifeline
(see Def. 1, p. 218) and annotate it with a + sign in the template. During concrete
test generation, these marked lifelines are blown up into several lifelines depending
on the supply of objects in the concrete system. There is at most one marked lifeline
for each process class.
Once the lifelines are created in the template along with the events they participate
in, completing the template SMSC is trivial. We simply connect the send events with
their corresponding receive events as per the partial order prescribed by the abstract
test case SMSC.
Theorem 2. A template derived corresponding to an abstract test case S using the
approach described in Section 8.3.2 satisfies the properties specified in Definition 1
(page 218. That is, a template T captures a projection of events from a symbolic
lifeline lp representing process class p in S, to one or more lifelines from process class
p in T (represented as Cp) such that,
1. The projected events (from lp to lifelines in Cp) follow the top-down event or-
dering along lp.
2. An existential event from lp appears along exactly one lifeline in Cp, while a
universal event from lp appears along all lifelines in Cp such that– the event se-
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quence (from top to bottom) along a lifeline l in Cp captures a feasible execution
path in the control-flow of process class p (i.e. events along l can be executed by
a single p-object).
Proof. 1. Template T is constructed from a final extended-state E reached after
execution of abstract test case S as described in Sections 8.3.2 and 8.3.2. Each
lifeline l in T corresponds to a triple tr = 〈val, h, n〉 in E such that h 6= [],
with the sequence of events in execution list h appearing along the lifeline l.
Assuming that triple tr represents objects of process class p– (i) events in h will
be the events appearing along symbolic lifeline lp from class p in S, and (ii) the
event sequence (in h) would follow the top-down ordering along lp as per our
SMSC operational semantics [101].
2. From lines 4–18 of Algorithm 3 we observe that exactly one object is chosen to
execute am existential event from a triple satisfying the event guard (lines 6–7,
Alg. 3) in a given extended state E (line 4, Alg. 3). Therefore, each occurrence
of an existential event can appear in execution history of exactly one object.
Note that, a triple tr = 〈 val, h, k〉 containing existential events in its event
execution list h represents k ∈ N objects executing k distinct occurrences of
an existential event (in h) appearing along a symbolic lifeline in S. Further, tr
will be blown up into k concrete lifelines in T . Hence, each occurrence of an
existential event in S will appear along exactly one lifeline in T . The different
object choices (modulo object identity) for executing an existential event are
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mutually exclusive and lead to different possible final extended states (and thus
resulting in different templates).
On the other hand, while executing a universal event e, all object choices that
can execute e from a given extended-state E are considered together to execute
e, resulting in a new unique extendbed state E ′ (lines 19–30, Alg. 3).The ex-
ecution histories of all triples whose state satisfies e’s guard (line 22, Alg. 3)
will be appended with e after its execution. Thus, eventually when template
lifelines are created from the final extended states, the event e will appear along
all lifelines that executed e.
Furhter, at any point during the execution of abstract test case SMSC S for
template generation (Section 8.3.2), the execution history of a triple withing
an extended-state contains only the sequence of events that can be executed by
the objects of that triple from their initial states (thus representing a feasible
execution in their control flow). This can be easily shown using induction on
the event execution sequence.
Lemma 3. For an abstract test case S, our template generation procedure constructs
the set of templates T as defined in Definition 1 (page 218).
Proof. As shown in Theorem 2, a tempate generated by our procedure satisfies the
propperties specified in Definition 1 (page 218). We now only need to show that our
template generation procedure constructs the complete set T . From the definition










Figure 8-8: Templates for abstract test case shown in Fig. 8-7.
of templates and Theorem 1 we can easily see that different templates arise due to
different possible projections of existential events from a symbolic lifeline in S to
corresponding lifelines (of the same process class) in a template in T . Our template
generation procedure constructs a template from a final extended-state (see Sec. 8.3.2)
reahced after executing S (see Sec. 8.3.2). Now, while executing S, for each existential
event e we consider all reachable extended states at that point and each object within
an extended state (modulo the object identity) that can execute e (lines 4–18, Alg. 3).
These choices capture all possible projections of e in the final resulting templates.
For illustration, recall that the final extended-states of the abstract test case SMSC
in Figure 8-7 were captured in the third entry of Table 8.1. Now, one template test
case each is generated for the two final extended-states in Table 8.1. The two template
test cases appear in Figure 8-8.
8.3.3 Concrete test case generation
Once templates are obtained from an abstract test case, concrete test cases in the
form of MSCs are then derived from the templates. Given (i) a template derived from
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an abstract test case T , corresponding to a system model Spec and test-purpose TP,
and (ii) an object configuration
⋃
p∈P Op (see Def. 2, p. 222) corresponding to Spec,
we generate concrete test case MSC(s) from the given template as follows. Given
the set of objects Op for each process class p, we simply assign concrete objects to
the lifelines of the template which correspond to class p. For each lifeline l involving
p we assign one concrete p-object, provided l is not a marked lifeline. Recall that
there can be at most one marked lifeline for a process class p. If class p has a marked
lifeline we assign all remaining p-objects to it once the unmarked lifelines involving
p are assigned objects. Note that, the number of objects in Op should be equal to
or greater than the total number lifelines representing process class p in the given
template in order to obtain concrete test case(s) from it. Next, we define the set
of minimal concrete tests, which are derived from the set of templates (see Def. 1,
p. 218).
Definition 3 (Minimal concrete tests). Given an abstract test case SMSC S derived
from system model Spec, and an object configuration OC (see Def. 2, p. 222) for
Spec, the set of minimal concrete tests consists of concrete test cases obtained by
instantiating each template T derived from S exactly once (if for each process class
p, the configuration OC has at least as many p-objects as the number of p-lifelines in
T ), or zero times (otherwise).
The set of all concrete test cases can be generated from the minimal concrete tests
by considering all possible object choices for various lifelines.
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Figure 8-9: Minimal concrete test cases.
For the abstract test case shown in Figure 8-7, two template tests were generated
(Figure 8-8). Then, for a concrete configuration with four A objects, two concrete
test cases are generated (shown in Fig. 8-9) for these two templates. As can easily be
inferred from the guards of A-events e1, e3 and e5 (see Figure 8-7), any object can be
chosen to execute events e1 and e5, while e3 is to be executed by all objects that have
not executed e1. Thus, with four A objects, a total of 4 × 1 × 4 = 16 concrete test
cases can be generated, out of which we only test the two test cases of Figure 8-9.
We deem two concrete test cases as behaviorally distinct, if one cannot be derived
from another simply by switching object identities. Further, we call a set C of concrete
test cases generated from an abstract test case S to be optimal, if all test cases in C
are (pair-wise) behaviorally distinct and no new behaviorally distinct test case (with
respect to C) can be generated from S.
Theorem 4. Given an abstract test case S, a set of minimal concrete tests derived
from S is optimal.
Proof. Let T be the set of templates derived from S. From the definition of templates
(see Def. 1, p. 218) we know that each template captures a projection of events from
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a symbolic lifeline in S to one or more lifelines in a template in T . For a template
t ∈ T and a process class p, let Ctp denote the set of lifelines from class p in t. Then,
following holds–
∀t1, t2 ∈ T , ∃p ∈ P such that :
(i) ∃l ∈ Ct1p · ∀l
′ ∈ Ct2p , l 6= l
′, and
(ii) ∃l ∈ Ct2p · ∀l
′ ∈ Ct1p , l 6= l
′.
Thus, clearly a concrete test derived from t1 cannot be derived from t2, since here
will be at least one lifeline in a concrete test case MSC derived from t1 (t2) which will
be behaviorally distinct from all lifelines in t2 (t1). Hence, the minimal concrete tests
(see Def. 3, p. 239) derived from S are all behaviorally distinct. Further, we know
that for a given object configuration (see Def. 2, p. 222) the concrete tests derived
from a template will only differ in object identities of various lifelines, and hence are
not behaviorally distinct. Thus, if the set of minimal concrete tests is not optimal,



























Figure 8-10: Summary of our test generation flow.
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8.3.4 Summary
To summarize, we recapture our overall test generation flow in Figure 8-10. While the
left column outlines the steps involved in test case generation, the right column indi-
cates if a step needs to be repeated to generate tests for different object configurations
(see Def. 2, p. 222). As can be easily seen, once templates have been generated for
a given abstract test case, concrete test cases for different object configurations can
be obtained directly from these templates without re-modeling or re-executing the
system. This makes our approach highly portable, as evidenced by our experiments
(see Section 8.5.2).
8.4 Test-execution Setup
Having derived the concrete test case MSCs as described in the last section, we briefly
discuss the experimental setup for testing a system implementation using these test
cases. As mentioned earlier, the implementation under test (or, IUT) can either be
constructed manually, or generated (semi-) automatically from another system model.
Initially, the lifelines in a test-case MSC are divided into two categories– (a) those
representing the components constituting the implementation under test (IUT), and
(b) tester lifelines, representing the test environment for the IUT components. The
tester-components are then generated from these tester lifelines to interact with, and
test the IUT components. Further, a master-tester component is also generated for





































Figure 8-11: Design flow with detailed Test execution architecture.
the purpose of giving the test verdicts.
The overall test-architecture consisting of IUT components, tester-components
and the master-tester, is shown in Figure 8-11. The IUT components labeled as
Ck+1 . . . Cn, correspond to the IUT lifelines in a test-case MSC (numbered k+1 . . . n
in the test-case MSC in Figure 8-11). The double solid (dashed) arrows represent the
flow of input (output) messages with respect to IUT, among various components in
the test setup. The IUT input events are also referred to as controllable events, as
sending inputs is under the control of the tester-components. Similarly, the output
events from IUT are called observable events, since they can only be observed by the
tester components. This setup corresponds to a distributed testing architecture [116],
where multiple testers are used to stimulate and observe the IUT components. We



































(a) Test-case MSC M (b) Partial Order of M (c) Test graph of M-
Observable and 
Controllable events
(d) Test graph of M-
Synchronization events
(e) Local test graphs of 
tester lifelines A and B
!m4 !m4
Figure 8-12: Generation of tester-components from a test-case MSC.
now discuss the derivation of tester components corresponding to tester lifelines.
Tester Component To obtain the tester components from a test case MSC, we
follow a distributed tester synthesis approach similar to [63]. The test case MSC is
viewed as a partial order 〈E,≤〉 over various events E appearing in it. The partial
order ≤≡ (≤l ∪ ≤m)
∗ is the transitive closure of ≤l and ≤m, where ≤l is the linear
ordering of events from top to bottom along all lifelines, and ≤m represents the
ordering between a message send es and its corresponding receive er, s.t. es ≤m er. A
sample test-case MSC and its corresponding partial order are shown in Figures 8-12(a)
and 8-12(b). Note that a send (receive) event corresponding to a message m is shown
as !m (?m) in Figure 8-12.
For generating the tester components, a reduced partial order 〈ET ,≤T 〉, called test
graph, is obtained from the test-case MSC’s partial order. It contains only controllable
and observable events ET (⊆ E) with respect to the IUT components in test case
MSC, and a partial ordering ≤T over them such that, ∀e, e
′ ∈ ET , e ≤T e
′iff e ≤ e′.
For the test-case example shown in Figure 8-12(a), where lifelines A and B represent
the tester lifelines, its test graph is shown in Figure 8-12(c).





















Figure 8-13: Generated tester-components for test-case MSC shown in Fig. 8-12(a).
In the next step, synchronization messages are introduced in the test graph to
preserve the causality constraints between the events appearing along the distinct
tester lifelines. For a direct ordering between two events appearing along different
lifelines, a synchronization send is introduced after the first event along its lifeline,
while the corresponding receive is added before the second event along its lifeline.
Further, after the last event along each tester lifeline in the test graph, sending of a
pass message is also added. These messages are received by the master-tester (not
shown here) based on which it gives test verdicts. The test graph for the above
example, with synchronization messages (s1 and s2), and pass verdicts appears in
Figure 8-12(d).
From the resulting test graph detailed in the preceding, a local test graph for each
tester lifeline is derived by taking a projection over the events appearing along that
lifeline (shown in Figure 8-12(e)). A tester component is then derived as a sequential
automaton from each local test graph by considering all possible event linearizations.
246 CHAPTER 8. TEST GENERATION FROM SMSC
Further, in these automatons, from each node with an outgoing transition labeled
with a receive event ?er, two outgoing edges labeled with θ and ?¬er respectively, are
added. Here θ represents a timeout event, which occurs if no input is received within
a given timeout value. On the other hand, ?¬er represents the receipt of a test case
event other than er. Both these events (θ and ?¬er) result in sending of fail verdict
to the master-tester. The automata for tester lifelines A, B are shown in Fig. 8-13.
Test verdicts The master tester gives the final test verdict based on the test ver-
dicts received from various tester-components during test execution. Possible verdicts
given by the master-tester are– (i) pass, if master-tester receives a pass verdict from
all tester components, (ii) fail, if master-tester receives a fail verdict from any tester
component, or (iii) inconclusive, if master-tester receives an inconclusive verdict
from some tester components and no tester component sends a fail verdict. These
verdicts are assigned in accordance with the formal conformance relation ioco [111].
An implementation ioco-conforms to a specification (or, system model), if after the
execution of an implementation trace allowed by the specification, the possible imple-
mentation outputs are those allowed by the specification. The absence of any output
(e.g., due to a deadlock) is also treated as an observable output.
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8.5 Experiments
In this section, we report on three classes of experiments. The first deals with the
performance of our test generation algorithms, the second explores the portability
of our approach across different system configurations, and the third reports on the
efficacy of the concrete test cases we generate in debugging system implementations.
8.5.1 Test generation
Since we use SMSCs for system modeling as well as for test-purpose specification,
our test generation engine is built on top of SMSC operational semantics [101]. The
SMSC operational semantics was encoded earlier as Prolog rules in the XSB logic
programming system [4]. We build our test generation framework (also in Prolog)
on top of these Prolog rules encoding SMSC operational semantics. All experiments
were conducted on a Pentium-IV 3GHz machine with 1GB of main memory.
We consider the overall test generation flow as summarized in Figure 8-10. For the
CTAS example, we derived five test-purposes with the aim of covering its major use-
cases. Test-purposes (TP) 1 and 2 were designed to generate test cases for successful
and unsuccessful connection requests respectively, from a Client object. The remain-
ing three test-purposes (TP-3, 4, and 5) were used to elicit test cases corresponding
to (un)successful weather updates of connected clients via CM. TP-3 represents a
scenario where some Clients are unable to receive the weather update. Subsequently,
all Clients revert back to using the old weather information. In TP-4, all Clients
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are successfully updated with the new weather information. Finally, TP-5 (shown in
Fig. 8-3(a)) captures the scenario where at least one Client fails to either use the new
weather update, or revert back, leading to all Clients getting disconnected.
Abstract test generation For all five test-purposes, abstract test cases were gen-
erated using the procedure outlined in Section 8.3.1. Abstract test-generation results
are shown in Table 8.2 (columns 2–4). For each test-purpose, paths in the CTAS
HSMSC were explored up to a depth of 20. Execution times are reported for gener-
ating either a single (Tab. 8.2, col. 2), or all (Tab. 8.2, col. 3–4) abstract test cases
corresponding to a test-purpose.
Table 8.2: Symbolic Test Generation for CTAS example with exploration depth set
to 20. For generating the concrete tests, we consider 3 Clients.
1 Abst. All Abst. All
TP # test case test cases # Templates Concrete
Time(s) Time(s) Total # Test Cases
1 11.92 46 1 1 3
2 0.02 33 2 2 6
3 3.8 55 4 14 84
4 3.8 58 8 14 84
5 3.9 56 5 20 120
Template and concrete test generation As discussed in Section 8.3.2, from an
abstract test case we first generate a set of templates. A set of minimal/all concrete
test cases is then derived from these templates for a given object configuration (Sec-
tion 8.3.3). In Table 8.2 (col. 5), we report the total number of templates generated













Figure 8-14: Ratio of All/Minimal no. of concrete test cases for Test-purpose 4.
from these templates for an object configuration consisting of– three Client objects,
one CM object and one WCP object. The number of minimal concrete test cases
obtained for this configuration is same as the number of templates (Tab. 8.2, col. 5),
since all the templates can be instantiated to a concrete test for the given configura-
tion with three clients. We also show the total number of all possible concrete test
cases for each test-purpose (Tab. 8.2, col. 6).
By comparing columns 5 and 6 in Table 8.2 we see that for a given test-purpose
the number of all concrete test cases generated can be significantly greater than the
minimal number of test cases. Moreover, this gap increases as the number of objects
in the system configuration is increased. This is because, the number of minimal test
cases is bounded by the number of templates generated for a given test-purpose (see
Sec. 8.3.3). On the other hand, the number of all possible tests keeps on increasing
with the increasing number of objects. For illustration, ratio of the all to the minimal
number of concrete test cases for test-purpose 4 (TP-4), with increasing number of
clients, is plotted in Figure 8-14.
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(b) Concrete Test case - 4
∃1 Client.cl_status=3
Figure 8-15: Test-purpose 4 and a corresponding Concrete test case.
Example. Consider test-purpose 4 (TP-4), shown in Figure 8-15(a). The first two
Done messages in TP-4 reflect the successful connection of two clients to controller
CM (more clients can also be connected, but we need at least two clients for this
test-purpose). The subsequent Update message corresponds to the weather update
request initiated by WCP. Then we have a forbidden message No with don’t care
guards (∗) for both the Client and CM lifelines. Thus, it would match, and hence
avoid generating test cases with any No message sent by a client to CM during the
weather update.
A concrete test case MSC corresponding to TP-4 is partially shown in Figure 8-15(b).
The message names appearing in bold italics represent the matching events in the test-
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Table 8.3: No. of nodes and edges in the (S)MSC-based models constructed for
CTAS.




# Edges 24 157 285
purpose (Fig. 8-15(a)). Initially, two clients c1 and c2 get connected to CM (cm1) by
sending the Connect message, eventually receiving the Done message. Various inter-
mediate messages exchanged during these connection setups are not shown; these are
represented via dotted line segments along lifelines in Figure 8-15(b). Subsequently,
the two connected clients are successfully updated with the latest weather information
via CM.
8.5.2 Portability
We now evaluate one of the key benefits of our approach — portability. By portability,
we mean the relative ease of generating concrete tests for different object configura-
tions, once our templates are generated.
For the purpose of these experiments we constructed two concrete models of the
CTAS case-study using HMSCs. These two models differed in the number of Client
objects– consisting of three and four Clients respectively . In the Table 8.3, we report
the number of nodes and edges in our SMSC based CTAS system model and the two
HMSC models constructed above.
At this point we note that, our SMSC based test generation approach already saves
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us considerable time and effort by avoiding re-modeling the system requirements for
different object configurations. Moreover, we measure the time saved in terms of test
generation for a given object configuration, due to our template-based approach (see
Fig. 8-10). In Table 8.4, we compare “the time taken to generate the minimal set of
concrete tests (see Def. 3, page 239) from our SMSC based model” with “the time
taken to generate the corresponding set of test cases from the HMSC models”. Note
that, for our SMSC based approach, we report the execution times for generating test
cases directly from the templates for different object configurations (since templates
need to be generated only once).




3 Clients 4 Clients
TP1 0.033 s 38 s 148 s
TP2 0.12 s 35 s 144 s
Only the results corresponding to test-purposes 1 and 2 are shown in Table 8.4,
since exploration did not even terminate (after running for 30 min.) for the other
three test-purposes in the case of HMSC models. This is because of the blow-up in
the number of paths in the concrete HMSC models.
8.5.3 Test execution
We also performed experiments to evaluate the efficacy of our generated tests for
debugging system implementations. In this set of experiments, we worked with two
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models of CTAS — a Statechart model was used to automatically generate a C++
implementation using the Rhapsody tool [100] and a SMSC model was used to gener-
ate test cases which were tried on the C++ implementation. Note that the Statechart
model was derived separately, by a person other than the authors.. We begin by first
explaining our test execution setup.
Table 8.5: Key features of the CM’s Statechart.
No. of No. of No. of No. Unique No. Unique
States Trans. Guards events sent events recvd
25 34 3 13 6
In our experiments, we focused on testing the central controller (CM) compo-
nent of CTAS C++ implementation. The implementation code was generated auto-
matically from the Statechart model of the CTAS requirements using the Rhapsody
tool [100]. In Table 8.5, we present the key features of the CM’s Statechart model.
The C++ code for CM was tested against our minimal set of concrete test cases,
derived using the five test purposes discussed earlier. This testing process led to the
discovery of some significant bugs in the Statechart model of CM, such as missing
transitions, states etc.
We now discuss one of the more subtle bugs discovered while testing against
one of the test cases (see Figure 8-15(b), this was a test case corresponding to the
fourth test-purpose in Fig. 8-15(a)). The execution of this test case resulted in an
fail verdict. The output log produced by the test driver indicated that the tester
components corresponding to– a) Client objects c1 and c2 timed-out while waiting for















































(a) Partially executed trace of
Test case - 4
(b) Original CTAS req. (c) Part of CM statechartfor req. 2.8.12
(d) Rhapsody equivalent of 
statechart shown in (c)
(e) Corrected statechart
segment for part shown in (c)
Figure 8-16: Test execution and tracing of test results for Test case 4.
message ClientPostUpd from CM (cm1), and b) WCP object wcp1 timed-out waiting
for the WCPEnable message from cm1. The partially executed trace depicting the
tester components is shown in Figure 8-16(a). The boxes shown group together the
events that correspond to a particular node in the CTAS HSMSC, with the node
name appearing at the top right corner of the box. The last box drawn using dashed
line in Figure 8-16(a) represents an incomplete set of events executed from SMSC
RcvWthr.
For convenience, we show the mapping of various SMSCs to the original CTAS
requirements from which they were derived. From there, the source of error was
discovered in the Statechart description of the CM. The part of the Statechart where
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Statechart Bugs
a) Receive event 
modification
b) Send event 
modification
a) Guard modification at 
a conditional branch











1. Event 2. Guard 3. Structure
Figure 8-17: Taxonomy of bugs introduced in Statechart models for the CTAS case
study.
fault was located is shown in Figure 8-16(c). In state s1 the CM waits to receive
the message Yes, and updates a counter count to check if all the clients have replied.
However, we found that Rhapsody interprets this as another (supposedly equivalent)
structure (shown in Figure 8-16(d)). Now, in this case the counter is incremented
after checking the guard count < nClients, instead of doing so before this check. To
ensure that the guards of outgoing transitions from the condition node (marked with
c) are evaluated after count is incremented, a new state s3 was introduced between
state s1 and the condition node, which corrected this fault. The updated structure is
shown in Figure 8-16(e).
Fault-injection and debugging To further test the bug-detection capability of
the test cases derived using our approach, we derived various buggy versions of CM’s
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implementation by manually injecting bugs in CM’s Statechart and generating code
from that via Rhapsody tool. Three different category of bugs (see Table 8.6) were
systematically introduced in the CM’s Statechart for this purpose. The taxonomy of
these bugs is shown in Figure 8-17. Majority of the bugs were introduced by modifying
a transition label in the Statechart, which is of the form trigger[guard]/action.
Here trigger represents the event whose reception triggers this transition, provided
the guard evaluates to true. The action is a set of events (C++ code) executed if
this transition is taken. All these three parts of a transition label are optional.
The first category of bugs involved modification of transition triggers, or of actions
which involved sending event triggers. A total of 33 buggy versions were constructed
in this category. The second category of bugs (6 in all) were constructed by mod-
ifying the guard of each outgoing transition individually from a condition node in
the Statechart. To obtain the third category of bugs, the structure of the Statechart
was modified. Specifically, the targets of various transitions were changed to point to
another node in the Statechart, such that the original target node was still reachable
from the initial Statechart node via an alternate path. A total of 19 buggy versions
were thus constructed.
In order to test the above-mentioned buggy implementations, we used the five
(5) test-purposes discussed earlier. These test-purposes correspond to the main use-
cases of the CTAS example. For these five test-purposes, assuming a concrete system
with two (2) client objects, we derived seven (7) concrete test cases using our test
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generation method. Note that the generation of these seven concrete test cases in-
volved (a) constructing an abstract test case SMSC for each test-purpose (b) deriving
template test case MSCs from the abstract test case SMSCs, and (c) finally deriving
concrete test case MSCs from the template test MSCs by considering the objects in
the concrete implementation being tested.
All the buggy CM implementations mentioned in the preceding were tested against
our minimal set of concrete tests, derived using the five test-purposes discussed earlier.
We deem to have detected a buggy implementation, if it fails at least one test from the
set of minimal concrete test cases we generate. We summarize the results in Table
8.6.
Table 8.6: Use of our generated concrete tests for detecting bugs in C++ implemen-
tation
Bug Total # of # of buggy versions
category buggy versions detected
1. Event 33 33
2. Guard 6 4
3. Structure 19 16
All bugs in the first category were detected. This is because, our test-cases covered
all the main use-cases in CTAS model, thereby covering all messages exchanged in the
system at least once. Since, bugs in the first category involved modifications relating
to send or receive of various messages in the system, they were all detected. For the
second category, two buggy versions remained undetected. Recall that, this category
of bugs involved modifying transition guards. For the two buggy versions which
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remained undetected, the guard modification caused them to ignore some inputs2
sent by the tester components. However, their response to various tester components
was still in accordance with the test cases. Thus, they appeared to behave correctly
based on their outputs and passed all test cases. In the third category, three cases
were left undetected. For these three buggy versions, none of our test cases exercised
the CM’s code beyond the point, where bugs could be detected. CTAS being a
reactive system involves non-terminating executions, detection of these bugs would
require executing more than one test-cases in succession.
As we can observe, using our test generation methodology, we detected over 90%
of the buggy implementations. Note that these implementations were derived from
a Statechart model (independently constructed by a person other than the authors),
different from the SMSC based model used for deriving the test cases.
Instead of trying out minimal number of concrete tests for the five test-purposes,
if we had tried out all possible concrete tests — no more buggy implementations
would have been detected. This is because the total set of concrete tests is simply
obtained by switching the object identities of the minimal set of concrete tests (ref.
Section 8.3.3), and do not test any more behavior than the minimal set of concrete
tests. Thus, our strategy of computing/testing the minimal number of concrete tests
for a given test-purpose can lead to significant productivity enhancement in testing.
2This is allowed by the Statechart semantics in the Rhapsody tool.
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8.6 Discussion
In this chapter, we have presented a model-based test generation methodology for
distributed reactive systems with many behaviorally similar objects, based on our
notation of SMSCs. The key aspect of our approach is the automated generation of
abstract test cases from a system model, followed by generating test case templates
from them. A minimal set of behaviorally distinct concrete test cases can then be
derived directly from these templates for various system configurations.
Our approach benefits the designer by grouping together behaviorally similar tests,
thereby helping him/her comprehend the implementation under test. More impor-
tantly, if the system configuration changes (due to change in number of objects in one
or more classes), the concrete tests can be generated from our templates with very
minimal effort. Various experimental results illustrate the efficacy of our approach.







Conclusions and Future Work
The Model-driven design and development of systems is becoming increasingly pop-
ular, and gaining widespread usage due to its various advantages. Various modeling
notations, such as UML, which were earlier used mainly for requirements gathering
and documentation purposes, have now become the main focus of various model-
driven development methodologies. However, it is also becoming clear, that in order
to fully utilize various benefits of model-driven development, directly using existing
notations may not suffice. This is because, the modeling notations are often too
generic, or may simply lack features to support development for a certain category of
systems. The use of Domain Specific Languages (or DSLs) is seen as an important
step in this direction, with major organizations providing initial tools to support de-
sign and development of DSLs, for example, Microsoft’s Domain Specific Language
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Tools1 and Eclipse Modeling Framework2.
In this thesis, we have developed two scenario-based behavioral modeling nota-
tions, targeted towards distributed reactive systems consisting of classes of interacting
processes. Both our notations– Interacting Process Classes (IPC) and Symbolic Mes-
sage Sequence Charts (SMSC), are equipped with an abstract execution semantics
(unlike most of the existing notations), which allow for efficient and scalable vali-
dation of initial system requirements. While IPC supports state-based modeling of
systems with inter-process interactions being specified at a higher level of granularity
than a single message send/receive, SMSC supports purely scenario-based modeling.
We note that, often deciding which notation to use for modeling, depends on the
requirements specification itself [42].
Another interesting and challenging aspect that we have attempted to address
in this thesis is the maintenance of associations in the abstract execution setting.
Though, it is relatively straightforward to handle associations when dealing with
concrete objects, in our abstract execution where objects’ identities or states are not
maintained individually, we over-approximate association information by maintaining
association links among groups of objects. Consequently, spurious behaviors may
arise during abstract execution, which can be detected by checking if there exists
any concrete realization of the given execution trace. Interestingly, we have not seen
association based constraints being explicitly specified or used in various popular
1http://www.domainspecificdevelopment.com/
2http://www.eclipse.org/modeling/emf/
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notations such as Statecharts or Live Sequence Charts (LSCs).
Finally, we observe that majority of model-based test generation works use state-
based notations as the underlying system model, while scenario-based notations may
be used to specify a test-purpose. In our case, we support automated test case gener-
ation from both IPC and SMSC, where SMSC is entirely a scenario-based notation,
while in case of IPC, inter-process interactions are modeled as transactions specified
using MSCs. Since, distributed reactive system requirements are more naturally cap-
tured using a scenario-based notation, the test cases generated from our models can
serve as a means to test a system implementation against the original requirements.
Further, abstraction at both syntactic and semantic level in case of SMSCs, allows us
to generate a minimal set of concrete test cases capturing all distinct relevant behav-
iors corresponding to a given test-purpose (modulo the maximum test-case length).
9.1 Future Work
9.1.1 Extensions
Timing Constraints. In order to be able to capture and reason about the real-time
behavior, we need to include support for modeling and execution of timing constraints
in our modeling notations. For instance, integrating timing features in our modeling
frameworks to enable us to specify timing constraints such as: message delays and
upper/lower bounds on a process to engage in certain actions. Note that, handling
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of real time constraints becomes more challenging in the presence of our abstract
execution semantics.
Behavioral Subtyping. Also, currently we do not support class inheritance, either
structural or behavioral. The structural inheritance primarily aims at reusing exist-
ing class definitions and possibly adding new behaviors, or redefining existing ones.
However, this does not guarantee any form of behavioral conformance between the
subtype and the supertype. On the other hand, the notion of behavioral subtyping
plays a crucial role in object oriented systems by allowing an object of a subtype to
replace the object of its parent type, without changing the overall system behavior.
One of the early works in this area is by Liskov and Wing [76] which focuses on passive
objects objects whose state change is only via method invocation by other objects.
Subsequently, behavioral subtyping of active objects has been studied in many works
(e.g. [13, 50, 118]). These works mostly exploit well-known notions of behavioral
inclusion (such as trace containment or simulation relations) to define notions of be-
havioral subtyping. In future, we aim to incorporate similar notion(s) of behavioral
inclusion to allow reuse of existing process classes, and define an efficient mechanism
for checking substitutability of a subtype for its supertype. Behavioral subtyping has
mainly been studied in the intra-object setting, where the behavior of each class is
explicitly specified, for example, using a finite state machine. It would be interesting
to study the behavioral notion of a subtype in the scenario-based setting (such as
SMSCs), where intra-object behavior is not explicitly described.
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Model checking. Another interesting extension to our present work can be the de-
velopment of a verification frameworks centered on our abstract execution semantics,
that will exploit the abstraction-refinement based approach to software model check-
ing. The abstraction refinement framework can be used to find which associations
need to be tracked in the abstract execution semantics, in order to avoid spurious
run(s). For instance, in case of IPC we may have transaction guards of the form
(r1, r2) ∈ asc1 ∧ (r2, r3) ∈ asc2 where r1, r2, r3 are transaction roles. Consequently,
it will not be sufficient to track only associations asc1 and asc2 appearing in the
system specification. Instead, we also need to track “derived” associations during
abstract execution; in the above example the relation formed by the join of the asc1,
asc2 relations is one such association. This is similar in flavor to predicate abstrac-
tion based abstraction refinement [11, 54] — where tracking the predicates/conditions
appearing in the program is not sufficient, and abstraction refinement gradually finds
out the additional predicates to track.
9.1.2 Tool Support
In order to allow further evaluation, as well as extension of the expressive power and
analysis capabilities of IPC and SMSC notations, appropriate tool support is required.
Rather than developing from scratch, existing platforms such as PAT (Process Anal-
ysis Toolkit)3 can be used for this purpose. PAT was primarily developed for the
3http://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/~pat/
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verification of systems specified using Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP)
under fairness assumptions. However, it has evolved into a more generic platform
having a modularized design supporting the analysis of different systems/languages.
Its modular architecture allows the support for new languages to be added easily by
providing the appropriate rules for syntax and semantics. Thus, it can potentially be
used as a platform for developing verification tools for IPC and SMSC.
9.1.3 Applications
In recent years, the concept of providing computing as a service has become in-
creasingly popular, with several organizations such as IBM4 and Microsoft5, working
towards providing various services and development tools in this direction. Various
Cloud computing and Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) frameworks present a
major step in this direction, where the main idea is to provide software as services
(computing) over the Internet/network (cloud) in a homogeneous and trustworthy
manner. Thus, in the framework of service based computing, a software function-
ality (possibly implementing a service itself) is realized by utilizing other services
over the network. This creates a kind of global distributed computing environment
with various services collaborating to accomplish a common goal. Clearly, several
challenges arise in this framework, for instance those pertaining to security, relia-
bility, performance etc. which need to be investigated. We observe that various
4 http://www-01.ibm.com/software/solutions/soa/
5http://www.microsoft.com/azure/default.mspx
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model-based design and analysis techniques from the domain of distributed reactive
systems can be applied directly or adapted to the domain of cloud computing. For
instance, scenario-based notations such as MSCs can be used to specify global in-
teractions between collaborating services, while state-based notations such as Finite
State Machines are useful for high level specification of individual service behaviors
[96].
Based on our modeling notations and the associated abstract execution semantics,
we are interested in pursuing the following research directions:
Symbolic pattern discovery in Service Oriented Architectures (SOA).
Discovering or identifying service engineering patterns in existing service ori-
ented systems can be beneficial in a number of ways, such as, for behavioral
validation of services, for service-reuse by identifying services that follow spe-
cific execution pattern, etc. Since, interaction patterns can be described quite
naturally using scenario-based notations, we would like to investigate the use
of our notations for generic pattern description and discovery.
Parameterized Model-based Performance and Security Analysis of
Web Services. Similar to the class of distributed reactive systems targeted this
thesis, many web-services may involve an arbitrary number of services at run-
time. For example, an e-business system where a supplier-service may consult
various warehouse-services in relation to an order placed by a customer-service.
Works on performance and security analysis of web-services (e.g. [40, 16]) gener-
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ally fix the number of various services in the system for the purpose of analysis.
We would like to investigate approaches for performance and/or security anal-
ysis in the parameterized setting for the number of services in a given system.
Model-based testing of services. Study model-based testing of services,
where the number of participating services of a certain type is not known be-
forehand (e.g. warehouse-service in the e-business scenario mentioned above).
Finally, we note that, even though here we have only focused on Services, our
modeling notations can be utilized in any other suitable domain.
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A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. The proof is by induction on N , the length of the execution sequence σ. It
will be convenient to strengthen the induction hypothesis by assuming the following
two properties to hold inductively as well:
• Property (1) Let n be the number of objects whose local states are given by
the behavioral partition beh ∈ BEHp after the concrete execution of σ.
1 Then,
after the abstract execution of σ, the object count for behavioral partition beh
is also n.
• Property (2) After the concrete execution of σ, let there be n tuples of the form
〈o1, . . . , ok〉 following association asc, where o1, . . . , ok are concrete objects, and
1Recall that whether an object resides in beh is determined by its control state, history and
valuation at the end of executing σ
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the states of o1, . . . , ok are defined by the behavioral partitions beh1, . . . , behk.
Then, after the abstract execution of σ, the association information maintained
is such that the asc count for the k-tuple 〈beh1, . . . , behk〉 is ≥ n.
The result is obvious if N = 0. Hence assume that N > 0 so that σ = σprev ◦ γ
and the induction hypothesis holds for σprev. Let o1, . . . , om be the concrete objects
used to play the roles r1, . . . , rm in the concrete execution of transaction γ. If the
states of o1, . . . , om are given by behavioral partitions beh1, . . . , behm (beh
′
1, . . . , beh
′
m)
in the concrete execution before (after) execution of γ, the following holds:
• beh1, . . . , behm can serve as witness partitions of lifelines r1, . . . , rm of transac-
tion γ under the abstract semantics after the execution of σprev. This follows
from properties (1) and (2) above in the induction hypothesis.
• beh′1, . . . , beh
′
m are the destination partitions of beh1, . . . , behm in the abstract
execution of γ. This follows from the definition of destination partition (Defi-
nition 7, page 48).
Now, in the concrete execution of γ, corresponding to each participating object oi,
whose state changes from behi to beh
′
i, the count of objects whose state is given by
the behavioral partition behi (beh
′
i) is decremented (incremented) by 1. Note that
it is possible that there are more than one objects participating in γ whose state
is given by the same behavioral partition beh (beh′) before (after) execution of γ.
Suppose, there are n1 (n2) concrete objects (participating in γ) whose state is given
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by the behavioral partition beh (beh′) before (after) execution of γ. Then, after the
execution of γ, the count of beh (beh′) will be decremented (incremented) by n1(n2).
Similarly, in the abstract execution of γ, corresponding to each role ri in trans-
action γ, the object count of the witness (destination) partition, behi (beh
′
i) will be
decremented (incremented) by 1. Again, it is possible for a behavioral partition beh
(beh′) to be the witness (destination) partition for more than one roles in γ. Suppose,
there are n1(n2) roles having same witness (destination) partition, beh (beh
′). Then,
after the execution of γ, the count of beh (beh′) will be decremented (incremented) by
n1(n2). Thus, we can conclude that Property (1) of the induction hypothesis therefore
holds after the execution of σ = σprev ◦ γ.
To show that property (2) also holds, we consider the four cases according to the
ways in which a k-ary association asc may be altered via the concrete execution of γ.
Let r1, . . . , rm be the roles of transaction γ.
• Case A: We have a guard (ri1 , . . . , rik) ∈ asc as part of γ. Suppose that there are
n1 and n2 number of k-tuples of concrete objects in association asc, whose local
states are given by the behavioral partitions beh1, . . . , behk and beh
′
1, . . . , beh
′
k
respectively, before concrete execution of γ. Now, suppose a k-tuple of con-
crete objects 〈o1, . . . , ok〉 in association asc is chosen for concrete execution of
γ, s.t. the local states of objects o1, . . . , ok are given by the behavioral parti-
tions beh1, . . . , behk (beh
′
1, . . . , beh
′
k) before (after) execution of γ. Thus, after
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the concrete execution of γ, the count of k-tuples in asc whose objects’ states
are given by beh1, . . . , behk (beh
′
1, . . . , beh
′
k) is decremented (incremented) by 1,
resulting in association counts of ‘n1 − 1’ (n2 + 1).
By the induction hypothesis, the asc count for the k-tuple 〈beh1, . . . , behk〉
(〈beh′1, . . . , beh
′
k〉) in the abstract execution is na(nb) after σ
prev, such that na ≥
n1 (nb ≥ n2). Further, we can choose the behavioral partitions beh1, . . . , behk as
the witness partitions for roles ri1 , . . . , rik to execute γ. Then, from Property (1),
the corresponding destination partitions after executing γ are beh′1, . . . , beh
′
k.
Thus, after the abstract execution of γ, the asc count for the k-tuple
〈beh1, . . . , behk〉 (〈beh
′
1, . . . , beh
′
k〉) is updated to ‘na − 1’ (nb + 1) (see the case
for “Check” in the handling of associations, Section 3.5.3).
• Case B: We have insert (ri1 , . . . , rik) into asc as the post-condition of γ. Sup-
pose o1, . . . , ok are the objects chosen to play the roles ri1, . . . , rik in the con-
crete execution of γ and their local states are given by the behavioral partitions
beh1, . . . , behk (beh
′
1, . . . , beh
′
k) before (after) execution of γ. Then a new k-tuple
〈o1, . . . , ok〉 will be inserted in asc in concrete execution, thereby incrementing
the count of k-tuples in asc, whose objects’ states are given by beh′1, . . . , beh
′
k, by
1. Due to induction hypothesis, in abstract execution we can choose the behav-
ioral partitions beh1, . . . , behk as the witness partitions for the roles ri1, . . . , rik
for executing γ. This means that beh′1, . . . , beh
′
k will be the destination partitions
of roles ri1 , . . . , rik in the abstract execution; the asc count of the corresponding
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k-tuple is incremented by 1 in the abstract execution as well.
• Case C: We have delete (ri1 , . . . , rik) from asc as the post-condition of γ. Sup-
pose o1, . . . , ok are the objects chosen to play the roles ri1 , . . . , rik in the con-
crete execution of γ and their local states are given by the behavioral par-
titions beh1, . . . , behk before execution of γ. Then the k-tuple 〈o1, . . . , ok〉 is
in asc before executing γ and is removed from asc after executing γ, thus
decrementing the count of k-tuples in asc, whose objects’ states are given by
beh1, . . . , behk, by 1. Again, in abstract execution we choose the behavioral
partitions beh1, . . . , behk as the witness partitions for the roles ri1 , . . . , rik for
executing γ, and decrement the count of k-tuple 〈beh1, . . . , behk〉 by 1 after
executing γ.
• Case D: Suppose Oγ is the set of objects chosen to play the roles in the concrete
execution of γ. Let τc be a k-tuple consisting of objects Oasc in association asc
such that, {o1, . . . , oj} = Oγ ∩Oasc, and the local states of objects o1, . . . , oj are
given by the behavioral partitions beh1, . . . , behj (beh
′
1, . . . , beh
′
j) before (after)
concrete execution of γ. Further let the local states of objects in k-tuple τc
(i.e. Oasc) be given by the k-tuple τ (τ
′) of behavioral partitions before (after)
concrete execution of γ. Then the k-tuple τ (τ ′) will contain the behavioral par-
titions beh1, . . . , behj (beh
′
1, . . . , beh
′
j) representing the states of objects o1, . . . , oj
before (after) concrete execution of γ. Note that τ and τ ′ may only differ in
behavioral partitions corresponding to the objects o1, . . . , oj. Thus, after the
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concrete execution of γ, the count of k-tuples of objects in asc whose objects’
states are given by the k-tuple τ (τ ′) of behavioral partitions, is decremented
(incremented) by one.
By the induction hypothesis, we can choose the witness partitions BEHγ repre-
senting the local states of objects Oγ chosen above, to play the respective roles
in abstract execution of γ. Further, let BEHτ be the set of behavioral partitions
in the k-tuple τ . Then BEHγ will contain behavioral partitions {beh1, . . . , behj}
(= BEHγ∩BEHτ ) corresponding to objects o1, . . . , oj above. Then, from Prop-
erty (1), the corresponding destination partitions after executing γ are given by
beh′1, . . . , beh
′
j . Thus, after the abstract execution of γ, k-tuple τ will result in
τ ′, and the asc count for τ ′ is incremented by 1 (see the case for “Default” in
the handling of associations, Section 3.5.3).
Note that we do not decrement the asc count of k-tuple τ in the abstract exe-
cution of γ. This is to consider the case where the objects chosen from witness
partitions beh1, . . . , behj may not be in association asc. In this case there will be
no update in asc content in concrete execution. However, since precise associa-
tion information is lost in abstract execution, we consider both the possibilities
–the participating objects may or may-not be in asc– in updating the association
content for asc.
This concludes the induction step for Property (2).
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A.2 Checking spuriousness of execution runs in
Murphi
Here we elaborate how we can check whether an execution run produced by our ab-
stract simulator is spurious (i.e. cannot be realized in concrete executions). We have
implemented the spuriousness check using the Murphi model checker [83]. The reason
for using Murphi is its inherent support for symmetry reduction via the scalarset data
type. We now discuss how Murphi’s support of symmetry reduction is exploited to
perform our spuriousness check efficiently.
We define the following data types for each process class.
• A scalarset type to act as an object identifier having the cut-off number2 as its
upper limit. For example, for Car class containing N objects, following type
will be declared:
Car: Scalarset(N); –index for process class Car
• Enumeration variable types which define sets of states of its LTS and various
DFAs. Assuming that the LTS of process class Car contains M states and one
of its DFAs, say dfai has Di states, the following translation will result:
stCar: Enum {st car1,...,st carM}; –states for LTS of Car
dfai Car: Enum {d car i1,...,d car iDi}; –states for dfai of Car
2The number xp,σ for process class p and execution run σ, defined in Section 3.6.3
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Based on the types defined above, following variables are declared for each process
class:
• An array of enumeration type representing the LTS states, indexed by the
scalarset type corresponding to this process class. For example, LTS states
for objects of process class Car will be represented using the following array
variable:
Car lts: Array [Car] of stCar;
• Similarly, array variables are defined to represent the DFA states.
• Arrays corresponding to the variables in the IPC model. Murphi supports only
integer/boolean variables and the range for integer type needs to be specified
in declaration. For example, variable mode3 for the Car is declared as follows:
Car mode: Array [Car] of 0..1;
Associations are represented using two dimensional arrays having the value range
0..1. For an association “Asc” between two process classes A and B, assuming that
A and B have been declared as appropriate scalarset types, this array is declared as
follows:
Asc: Array [A] of Array [B] of 0..1;
3A car’s mode indicates whether the car will stop or pass through its current terminal.
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An array entry of 1 will indicate the existence of an association between the objects
of A and B, whose identities are represented by the index values of that particular
array element.
For each transaction-occurrence in the trace σ being checked, a corresponding
rule is defined in Murphi (representing a guarded command) using the witness and
destination partitions’ information: control states, dfa states and variable valuations
for the participating agents, obtained from the abstract execution. The initial con-
figuration for the Murphi execution is given as the “Startstate” declaration, where
the initial control states, dfa states and variable valuations for various objects are
defined. If an execution run σ produced by our abstract simulation is suspected to
be spurious by the user, (s)he can submit it to Murphi for spuriousness check. Given
our encoding of the reduced concrete IPC model to Murphi, if σ is indeed spurious
it will correspond to a deadlocked run in Murphi, with Murphi getting stuck at a
spurious transaction. By slight modification in the Murphi code we are able to pre-
cisely identify the transaction that σ got stuck at and furthermore report the system
state at that point. This can then be analyzed by the user to determine the cause of
spuriousness.
For illustration, we analyzed the trace σ = t1.t2.t3, corresponding to the example
discussed in Section 3.6.3, for spuriousness using Murphi-based approach outlined in
the preceding; as expected, σ was indeed found to be spurious.
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Appendix B
IPC Test generation Algorithm
genTrace
The function genTrace described in Algorithm 4 takes as input two parameters: a
set S of states to be explored, and the current goal transaction τ . It then tries to
generate a trace to the current goal transaction τ from a state in S. It maintains the
set Open containing the states yet to be explored and the set GoalSet to store the
state(s) reached after executing the goal transaction τ . The set GoalSet is initially ∅.
At the end of each iteration of the while loop (lines 2–35, Algorithm 4) if GoalSet is
not empty, then we have found a trace up to the current goal transaction. We return
the set GoalSet and also the set Open containing the unexplored states (lines 32–33,
Algorithm 4).
In each iteration of the while loop, a state s with minimum value of f(s) (=
g(s)+h(s)) is chosen and removed from Open (line 3, Algorithm 4). All successors of
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Algorithm 4: genTrace(S, τ): adapted from A∗
1: Open← S; GoalSet ← ∅
2: while Open 6= ∅ do
3: s← getMinf (Open); Open ← Open− {s}
4: for all m ∈ successors(s) do
5: setSuccessor(m,s) /* Add m as a successor of s*/
6: if notVisited(m) then
7: /* Case 1: m not visited yet */
8: if (m is a destination state of a τ transaction) then
9: GoalSet ← GoalSet ∪ {m}
10: h(m)← distance from m to next goal transaction (after τ), use
Equation (7.1)
11: else
12: Open ← Open ∪ {m}
13: h(m)← distance from m to τ , use Equation (7.1)
14: end if
15: g(m)← g(s) + 1 /* length of generating path */
16: setParent(m,s)
17: else if m ∈ Open then
18: /* Case 2: m reached earlier, successors not explored */
19: if (g(s) + 1) < g(m) then
20: /* we have found a shorter path to m via s */
21: g(m)← g(s) + 1; setParent(m,s)
22: end if
23: else
24: /* Case 3: m reached earlier and successors explored */
25: if (g(s) + 1) < g(m) then
26: /* we have found a shorter path to m via s */
27: g(m)← g(s) + 1; setParent(m,s);











s are generated and the search tree capturing states visited so far is updated. Note
that in the search tree capturing the states visited so far, we maintain one of the
predecessors of each visited state s as the “parent” of s. This is done to remember
the shortest path from the start state to state s, such that it includes all previous goal
transactions (i.e. transactions appearing in the test specification that have already
been executed) in the order of their occurrence.
Thus, the parent pointer of each state s is set to a state x such that (a) s is a
successor of x and (b) the current shortest path from start state to s consists of the
current shortest path from start state to x (covering the previous goal transactions
in the order executed) and the edge x → s. For each successor m of state s, the
following updates need to be performed.
Case 1: (line 7, Algorithm 4) If m has not been reached earlier, it is added either to
GoalSet or Open (lines 9 and 12, Algorithm 4), depending on whether m is reached by
executing the current goal transaction τ or not. The value of h function (appearing
in A∗’s evaluation function) is also computed accordingly. Finally, we compute the
value of g function of A∗’s evaluation function, and set the node s as m’s parent in
the search tree capturing visited states.
Case 2: (line 18, Algorithm 4) Otherwise, we check if m ∈ Open and if so, we know
that m has been reached earlier via an alternate path. In this case if the new path
to m is shorter, we accordingly update the function g for m. Note that the function
h remains unchanged since it estimates the length of the path from m to τ , which is
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Figure B-1: Updating parent pointers in search tree — line 28 of genTrace (Alg. 4).
not affected by the path through which m is reached from the start state.
Case 3: (line 24, Algorithm 4) In case m is not present in Open also, then it was
reached and its successors were explored earlier. Again, we check if the new path to m
is shorter. If it is so, then its g value is updated and parent pointer set to s. Further,
in this case we check the children of m in the search tree capturing the visited states.
For all the successors already pointing to m as their parent, their g value is updated.
For all other successors, if the new path to them via m is shorter, then m is set as
their parent, also updating their g value. This process is repeated for successors of




C.1 Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. We consider the abstract SMSC execution semantics in the presence of as-
sociations as discussed in Section 4.7. The proof is by induction on N , the length
of the event1 execution sequence σ. For convenience, we strengthen the induction
hypothesis by assuming the following two properties to hold inductively as well:
• Property (1) Let n be the number of objects whose local states are given
by the behavioral partition beh ∈ BEHp(Vp, Rp) after the concrete execution
of σ. Then, after the abstract execution of σ, the object count for behavioral
partition beh is greater than or equal to n.
1Synchronous execution of a message annotated with an association constraint is considered as
a single event.
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• Property (2) After the concrete execution of σ, let there be n tuples of the
form 〈o1, o2〉 following association asc, where o1, o2 are concrete objects, and
the states of o1, o2 are defined by the behavioral partitions beh1 and beh2. Then,
after the abstract execution of σ, the association information maintained is such
that the asc count for the tuple 〈beh1, beh2〉 is ≥ n.
The result is obvious if N = 0. Next, assume that N > 0 so that σ = σprev · e
and the induction hypothesis holds for σprev. Let O = {o1, ..., om} be the set of
concrete objects chosen to execute event e in the concrete execution. If the states of
o1, . . . , om are given by behavioral partitions beh1, . . . , behm (beh
′
1, . . . , beh
′
m) in the
concrete execution before (after) execution of e, the following holds:
• beh1, . . . , behm can serve as witness partitions for event e under the abstract
semantics after the execution of σprev. This follows from Properties (1) and (2)
above in the induction hypothesis.
• beh′1, . . . , beh
′
m are the destination partitions of beh1, . . . , behm in the abstract
execution of e. This follows from the definition of destination partition (Def. 17,
p. 123).
In the concrete execution of e, corresponding to each participating object oi whose
state changes from behi to beh
′
i, the count of objects whose state is given by the
behavioral partition behi (beh
′
i) will be decremented (incremented) by 1. Note that it
is possible that there are more than one objects executing e whose state is given by
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the same behavioral partition beh (beh′) before (after) execution of e. Suppose, there
are n1 concrete objects (executing e) whose state is given by the behavioral partition
beh (beh′) before (after) execution of e. Then, after the concrete execution of e, the
count of objects whose state is given by beh (beh′) will be decremented (incremented)
by n1.
Now, if there are no association constraints annotating event e, then in the ab-
stract execution of e the object count of the witness (destination) partition behi (beh
′
i),
i ∈ 1 to m, will be decremented (incremented) by 1. Again, if there are more than
one objects, say n1, executing e whose state is given by the same behavioral partition
beh (beh′) before (after) execution of e; then, after the execution of e, the count of
beh (beh′) will be decremented (incremented) by n1. Note that, in the abstract exe-
cution we use following arithmetic operators, ⊕ and ⊖, for increment and decrement,
respectively (see Section 4.4.4). We now consider the update of partition counts in
the presence of association insert constraint with event e. Thus, execution of e will
actually constitute synchronous execution of a send-receive event pair. Further, we
assume that one of the send/receive event has existential mode and the other has
universal mode. Other association constraints and event execution modes can be
handled in a similar manner. As discussed in Section 4.7.1, the object count of the
witness (destination) partition for the existential event will be decremented (incre-
mented) by 1. Let beh (beh′) be one of the witness (destination) partitions for the
universal event. Let the object count of witness (destination) partition beh (beh′) be
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decremented (incremented) by n1 in the concrete execution. However, in the abstract
execution we decrement (increment) the minimum (maximum) number of objects
from each witness (destination) partition as permitted by the given association con-
straint (ref. Section 4.7.1). This would result in decrementing (incrementing) the
object count of partition beh (beh′) by a number less-than (greater-than) or equal to
n1. Thus, we can conclude that Property (1) of the induction hypothesis holds after
the execution of σ = σprev · e.
Next, we show that Property (2) also holds. In event e, let m be the message
annotated with an association insert constraint whose corresponding send and receive
events are executed synchronously. In the following, again we consider the case where
one of the send/receive event (say, ex) has existential mode and the other (say, ea)
has universal mode. Property (2) can be easily shown to hold for other association
constraints and event execution modes in a similar manner.
Let insert(asc) be the post-condition of message m, such that object ox is chosen
to execute the event ex and objects o1, . . . , ok are chosen to execute the event ea in the
concrete execution of m. Let the local state of object ox be given by the behavioral
partition behx (beh
′
x) before (after) execution of ex. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the local state of all the objects o1, . . . , ok is given by the behavioral
partition beha (beh
′
a) before (after) execution of ea. Then, after the concrete execution
of m, k object tuples 〈ox, o1〉, . . . , 〈ox, ok〉 will be inserted in the asc relation. Note
that, due to association constraints k will be less than or equal to the maximum
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number of objects that ox can get associated with via asc. Assuming that objects
ox, o1, . . . , ok are not related to any other objects via the asc relation before execution
of e, the count of tuples in asc whose objects’ states are given by beh′x and beh
′
a will be
incremented by k. Due to induction hypothesis, in abstract execution we can choose
1 object from the behavioral partition behx and at least k objects from the behavioral




a will be the
destination partitions for the objects executing ex and ea in the abstract execution.
Further, the asc count of the tuple 〈beh′x, beh
′
a〉 will be incremented at least by k
following the association count update as discussed for the case acount′asc(dpx,dp)
in Section 4.7.1.
This concludes the induction step for Property (2).
